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Preface
It is only by mobilizing knowledge that is widely dispersed
across a genuinely diverse community that a free society can
hope to outperform its rivals while remaining true to its
values.
(Ober 2008, 5)
The technologies of the twenty-first century are bringing to reality the dream of a fully
connected planet. Computers, algorithms and the Internet of Things (IoT) augment
exponentially our capacity to link people, data and systems as never before in history.
Mobile devices, server farms and grids increase their computing power by orders of
magnitude to process staggering masses of data. Refined heuristics profile our
actions, predict our needs and read the source code of our thoughts. Our fridges,
stoves and toasters will be soon talking to each other with no humans in the loop.Will
they also conspire against us, as in a post-Orwellian IoT farm?
The age of connectedness brings an unprecedented promise of exceptionally
distributed data, information and knowledge. Yet, the dystopian nightmare of a
metadata hydra emerging from our data lakes is also looming. Our human–com-
puter interactions, like Schrödinger cats in sealed boxes, are a blur of possibilities
(so we better try hard to not end up like the cats!).
This book, the reader may rest assured, unveils no new paradigm on quantum
democracy. Nevertheless, there is a bit of a thought experiment in these pages, and
it stems from combining our different backgrounds as researchers working in the
areas of computer science, political science, law and philosophy. So, this is the
experiment we suggest: If all data, information and knowledge that is currently
contained in digital silos were searchable, linkable and shareable, what benefits
would this bring for democracy? What if we applied the principles of Linked Open
Data to the emergent institutions of the digital democracy ecosystem so that, as
Ober suggests, distributed knowledge could be effectively mobilised and we
remained free societies true to our values? Which meta-rules would this new sce-
nario require? Would we need a new meta-rule of law?
v
These are the theoretical questions guiding the chapters of this book. But our
proposal is also deeply anchored in our own experiences with some emergent
practices where collective intelligence emerges from connecting people, technology
and data. These experiences are also practically simultaneous in time. In late 2010,
Marta Poblet joined a newly formed group of volunteers providing online support
to emergency and disaster management organisations in disaster response. The
Standby Task Force (SBTF) was then a loosely connected group of individuals
across the world who would scramble at the request of help from formal organi-
sations. A few volunteers would act as coordinators of teams that volunteers could
join to perform different tasks: social media monitoring, geolocation of events,
verification of reports and analysis. These tasks could be structured, shared and
visualised using Ushahidi, an open-source, crowdsourcing platform built in Kenya
by activists and software developers following the presidential election of 2007.
SBTF volunteers developed protocols and workflows as they deployed in the
aftermath of floods (Pakistan 2011, Colombia 2012), typhoons (Yolanda 2012,
Pablo 2013), earthquakes (Nepal 2015), humanitarian crisis (Libya 2011, Balkans
2015) and elections (Kenya 2012). They also coordinated their tasks through online
platforms such as Skype, Ning or, more recently, Slack. This data-intense, largely
distributed effort led to the emergence of collective intelligence about crises,
affected populations, and on how to leverage online, remote help for the offline,
local response. Digital maps are the outputs of both distributed tasks and collective
intelligence (as related datasets and situation reports are), but traces of that
emerging collective intelligence were also visible in chats, Google Docs, protocols
and workflows. Question about how to properly manage, archive and reuse col-
lective intelligence and its digital outputs was already raised in 2010 for emergency
and disaster management. We now raise them for democracy.
Pompeu Casanovas is a Law & Technology and Law & Society scholar. Since
2003, he has been involved in the initial development of the Semantic Web in many
national and EU projects on information systems, judicial institutions and new
regulatory frameworks. From that standpoint, he has witnessed the emergence of
relational forms of law and the growing importance of dialogue, interactions and the
social fabric in institutional settings and institutional design. From 2008 to 2011, he
served as scientific director of the Catalan White Book on Mediation, a collective
endeavour of sixteen research teams and more than one hundred researchers.
Catalonia’s population had grown from 6 to 7.5 million inhabitants in ten years due
to intense migration flows. All public services—from schools to care units and
hospitals—had to grapple with the challenges of this rapid influx. Much to
everyone’s surprise, the findings showed that those challenges had been handled in
the first place by ordinary people in neighbourhoods and towns, as well as by the
professionals in the public sector (teachers, doctors, nurses, administrator, etc.),
rather than led by the government or its public policies. As of 2008, 2% of the
Catalan population had participated in mediation processes, and 10% in social
support activities. He learnt that law, policies and regulations matter, but demo-
cratic culture ranks first.
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Víctor Rodríguez-Doncel is a computer scientist who has witnessed the emer-
gence of machine-readable licences in the Web of Data. When the first Creative
Commons licences were released in December 2002, few would have believed they
would reach the popularity they have now. Up to 2018, over 1.4 billion works have
been published along with a Creative Commons licence, unleashing a formidable
amount of creativity and knowledge available to anyone. In a more silent revolu-
tion, licences and other sorts of agreements are now being translated into their
equivalent digital counterparts, designed for computers to reason with. Víctor has
edited international standards to represent machine-readable contracts (ISO/IEC
21000-20), computer policies (W3C ODRL) and the content value chain (ISO/IEC
21000-19), always using Semantic Web technologies. He believes that if the culture
of sharing is supported by intelligent technologies, a new breed of resources will be
available to anyone and the almighty Artificial Intelligence algorithms crunching
data will not remain a weapon available only to the few. For its intrinsic nature, the
Semantic Web is the key tool towards building a global network of distributed data,
knowledge and decision power.
Marta, Víctor and Pompeu have been collaborating for a long time in a number
of research projects and publications. This book draws from this previous work to
bring recent advances in the Web of Data to democratic theory and law. We believe
that the opportunities and challenges of building infrastructures for Linked Data—a
term coined by Tim Berners-Lee in 2006—can be of interest to political scientists
and legal scholars. Data, information and knowledge that can be freely accessed,
shared and reused amplify our resources and capacities as citizens in modern
democracies. This may even help us to reconsider concepts such as ‘expertise’,
‘participation’ or ‘governance’ under a new light. This book is just one step in that
direction.
Melbourne, Australia Marta Poblet
Melbourne, Australia Pompeu Casanovas
Madrid, Spain Víctor Rodríguez-Doncel
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Linked Data
Abstract This chapter presents Linked Data, a new form of distributed data on the
web which is especially suitable to be manipulated by machines and to share
knowledge. By adopting the linked data publication paradigm, anybody can publish
data on the web, relate it to data resources published by others and run artificial
intelligence algorithms in a smooth manner. Open linked data resources may
democratize the future access to knowledge by the mass of internet users, either
directly or mediated through algorithms. Governments have enthusiastically
adopted these ideas, which is in harmony with the broader open data movement.
Keywords Linked data  Semantic web  Democracy  Ontologies  Knowledge
representation  eDemocracy
1.1 Introduction
More than half of the world’s population has access to the Internet. Vast amounts of
knowledge accumulated in roughly 2 billion websites are available to anyone who
is able to read and can afford an internet connection.
Entertainment habits, interpersonal human relations and almost any conceivable
aspect of human life have been profoundly transformed with the arrival of the
internet. Yet modern democracies have remained relatively unaffected. It is true that
propaganda techniques have undergone changes, political parties organize their
campaign strategies differently and the idea of eDemocracy is perhaps about to
hatch; but the public institutions, the habits of citizens and the overall political game
are all apparently the same.
We have to indulge—Internet is a new thing. But a careful observation of the
evolution of technologies and the new organizational forms they enable reveal
discrete signs of change, now with little effect but potentially of much impact.
This chapter introduces some new technologies and ideas which may seem
irrelevant today, but which will probably exert a powerful influence on the forth-
coming transformations of the concept of democracy.
© The Author(s) 2019
M. Poblet et al., Linked Democracy, SpringerBriefs in Law,
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1.2 The World Wide Web as a Source of Data
and Knowledge
1.2.1 Data, Information and Knowledge
Marshall McLuhan described technology as extensions of man (McLuhan 1964),
whereby our bodies and our senses are extended beyond their natural limits.
Certainly, a shovel is an improvement of our hands when we dig a trench and
telescopes are augmented eyes when we look at the stars. In top level chess tour-
naments, chess players prepare their games and study their opponents with a joint
team of humans and machine—machines also extend human’s capabilities for
thinking.
In order to make a value judgement, we need data—this is a truism. But today
we also need machines which need data. Whenever we take an important decision,
we usually google for some related information. Our decisions are mediated by
information provided by a company, or a handful of companies, whose interests
may not match our interests. Maybe in the future we will have a wider range of
algorithms to apply to a common pool of open knowledge—both data and algo-
rithms are essential extensions of our mind enhancing and rational processes.
This book is about linked democracy, a concept of democracy where knowledge
plays a central role; and this relation between data, algorithms and knowledge has
to be studied in more detail. One of the possible conceptual frameworks is the
popular pyramid of data, information and knowledge, represented in Fig. 1.1 in a
manner that suggests that data is abundant, information not so much and knowledge
is scarce.
We can simply define data as ‘the symbols on which operations can be per-
formed by a calculator, either human or machine’. Data conveys information about
any conceivable entity—the stars, a unicorn, you. The following four types of data
can be distinguished, as made by Floridi (1999): (a) primary data is the main sort of
data an information system is designed to convey; (b) metadata, when data is about
data. For example, the creation date or the creation place of another piece of data;
(c) operational data, related to the usage, performance or command of the
Knowledge
Information
Data
Fig. 1.1 Data, information
and knowledge
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information system and (d) derivative data, when data has been extracted from the
other types of data. The consideration of what is data and what is metadata is
inseparable from the use that is going to be made of it; and what is metadata for one
receiver may well be data, and a valuable one, for another receiver. The same
blurred frontiers exist among the other types of data.
Data are grouped in messages that transmit some information in a communi-
cation channel from a sender to a receiver. One single piece of data has value
inasmuch as it can represent a message with meaning in a context, that is to say,
convey information. In other words, data can be seen as information without
meaning. Extracting information from data is not always an obvious task.
Through the study and interpretation of data it is sometimes possible to extract
valuable information. When this information is considered during the course of a
decision process, then that information is called knowledge, at least under the most
utilitarian gnoseological dogma. If choice is an important element of democracy
and decisions ultimately depend on data (processed either rationally or irrationally),
we can conclude that data is at the base of democracy.
1.2.2 The Web as a Source of Data
In the World Wide Web, the pages that are visited when one does ‘internet surfing’
are a set of documents globally accessible and hosted in distantly located com-
puters. These documents are text files in HTML format (richly formatted text),
images, videos and small computer programs (scripts) among other file types.
Documents are accessible because the variety of heterogeneous data transmission
technologies, including optical fibre, radio links or network cables, observe the
same standard protocols, thus enabling their interoperation.
The internet protocols determine that whenever somebody browsing a web (the
client computer) types a web address in the web browser, like http://site.
com/page, an internet address (IP address, from ‘Internet Protocol’ address) is
returned from the name (site.com) and that computer (server) is contacted to
retrieve the requested document. The protocol ruling the exchange of commands
and documents between a client and a server in the web is the ‘HTTP’ (Hyper Text
Transfer Protocol). The term hypertext makes reference to the fact that documents
typically include links to other pages, either hosted locally in the same computer or
remotely in another server.
The pieces of information in the Web are arranged as a complex network of
interconnected documents, vaguely resembling the way neurons are connected in
the human brain, or the way our ideas connect to other ideas. But the web is a
source of extraordinarily valuable data. The documents in the web are rich in tables,
diagrams, charts, infographics or simply numbers dropped among dull text para-
graphs. These are all pieces of data. However, these data cannot be exploited in an
efficient manner. First, because they are not always directly accessible. Some
numbers may be given in a pie chart published as a raster image, and they can only
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be extracted with OCR (optical character recognition) techniques and with much
uncertainty. Second, because sometimes data is published as text, but then it lacks
context—it is not information but a collection of meaningless raw numbers. These
pieces of raw data are useless for computer algorithms because they cannot be
systematically extracted and processed.
Different pieces of data referring to the same entity are totally disconnected in
the web of documents and they lack any link that permits increasing the knowledge
on specific entities. Pieces of relevant data in distant locations cannot be thus
automatically related or compared. Whenever global identifiers for entities do not
exist or they are not used, matching pieces of information becomes a cumbersome
task (e.g. Shakespeare, W. vs. William Shakespeare) and is prone to errors. In other
occasions data is well structured in large raw files using well established identifiers
(e.g. ISBN for books), but then they are offered as a bulk file for download, without
the ability to be queried in individual accesses. A large file has to be downloaded
before it can be processed, rendering unpractical its use.
The task of extracting data from Web resources can also be a hard one because
data is offered in a myriad of formats, sometimes described in closed specifications
and in any case specific for different domains and requiring dedicated processing.
All these hurdles make it difficult to effectively use the billions of pieces of data
that as today—in one way or another—are present on the web. In practice, the
potential of the web as a source of data is lost.
Publishers on the Web (from web bloggers to public institutions) are in general
interested in publishing content as fast as possible whereas possible consumers of
data on the Web would like to find carefully described and well formatted,
high-quality data. There is an evident mismatch between occasional data producers
and data consumers with no easy solution. Two opposite approaches have been
proposed.
The first approach places the burden of work on the data consumer: content
publishers are not going to make any effort without reward and data consumers
have to assume they need intelligent tools and more clever search engines, capable
of extracting information even from unstructured content. In a word, the first
approach relies on Google being more intelligent every time. The second strategy
consists of easing the task of high-quality publishing, providing a set of specifi-
cations and good practices for data to be on the web and trusting that at least a
fraction of the data publishers will follow them.
None of these strategies has proved to be the ideal solution, but at least this
second option offers the possibility of producing data within a larger web: the web
of data. This chapter describes the new web of data relying on the specifications of
the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), and its most refined form, known as
linked data.
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1.3 Linked Data
Linked data is only the most refined form of publishing data on the web according
to the W3C specs. The W3C describes 35 good practices for publishing data on the
web (Farias et al. 2017), but only when networked in the web is its value fully
realised. This data network is sometimes referred to as the ‘Web of Data’, a term
with a more practical emphasis than the older but equivalent ‘Semantic Web’. The
‘Semantic Web’ was conceived in 1999 by Tim Berners-Lee, founder of the Web:
I have a dream for the Web [in which computers] become capable of analysing all the data
on the Web – the content, links, and transactions between people and computers.
A ‘Semantic Web’, which should make this possible, has yet to emerge, but when it does,
the day-to-day mechanisms of trade, bureaucracy and our daily lives will be handled by
machines talking to machines. (Berners-Lee and Fischetti 1999)
Soon after, new technical specifications appeared striving to implement the Tim
Berners-Lee dream. These specifications were not, however, aimed at creating an
independent web but at improving the existing one:
The Semantic Web is not a separate Web but an extension of the current one, in which
information is given well-defined meaning, better enabling computers and people to work
in cooperation. (Berners-Lee et al. 2001)
The new data network thereby created has started to grow slowly and silently.
First, enthusiastic researchers and computer scientists started dumping datasets,
then, public institutions followed; finally, for-profit companies joined the effort.
The Web of Data shares with the World Wide Web the same problems, defi-
ciencies and challenges: the information quality is highly irregular, its availability
too unstable and the credibility of the sources uncertain. But few questions that the
Web of Data is the seed of a new paradigm where humans are giving way to
machines in the use of the internet; and a new sphere of communications where
both senders and receivers are intelligent machines and humans play a lesser role.
1.3.1 Universal Identifiers
The first key idea of the Semantic Web is that every entity—animate or inanimate,
particular or abstract—is liable to have an identifier: the universal resource iden-
tifier universal resource identifier or URI. Data in the Web of Data refer to entities
very precisely identified.
URI s are sequences of characters with several parts separated by dots and
slashes. For example, URLs (universal resource locator), which are the web
addresses that are introduced in a web browser to get a page, are also a kind of
URIs. This coincidence that makes URIs to be a superset of the URLs is not
accidental: an expected behaviour of typing a URI in a web browser is that
information on the identified object is retrieved. The string of characters used to
identify a thing, magically retrieves more information on that thing if the HTTP
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protocol is used to query the right computer. We say that a URI resolves when it has
the form of URL and it can be navigated.
Perhaps we have not appraised well enough the importance of the URIs as
identifiers and their ambitions, for URIs aim at naming every object in the world in
a uniform manner. Some people claim ‘there is nothing in a name’, and a rose by
any other name would smell as sweet. However, designating objects is not a neutral
act—in other times this was a sacred act—and it reveals a specific worldview. URIs
tend to assume simple hierarchical relations between authorities. For example, a
fictitious domain mydept.myorganisation.uk actually embodies the idea of
a Department (mydept) organically depending on a certain organisation (myor-
ganisation) in turn located in the UK. Relations are not homogeneous (part-of
vs. located-in) but suggest a tree structure. This tree structure is sometimes used to
classify the type of resources described, in strings like type_of_resource/
identifier.
The feature of URIs being at the same time both identifiers and the means to
retrieve information in an easy manner is an invitation for information to be
retrieved and the whole concept fosters fluent information flows.
1.3.2 Linked Data and RDF
The second key idea of the Semantic Web is that information can be given about
any URI identifier. For example, Thomson Reuters, a giant company whose busi-
ness is information, has collected a database of organizations from all over the
globe called permid. In this database, each organization is identified by a URI.
Thus, a fictitious company, let us say ACME Inc., is identified with the following
URI: https://permid.org/1-4296162760.
If this URI (which is also a URL) is introduced in a web browser, a nicely laid
out webpage will be displayed to the user. Actually, the web page is not impressive
because there is not much information in the permid database: the headquarters
address, the country where it is incorporated and a few other values. Other similar
databases, like crunchbase or opencorporates, offer some more information, like
the relevant shareholders or the people in executive jobs. However, permid’s
ambition is big, as the ultimate purpose is ACME Inc. to be uniquely identified by
the permid URI—replacing one of the functions of a public Commercial Registry.
In some manner, this ambition is being fulfilled, as the acceptance of Thomson
Reuters’ ids has not stopped growing.
But there is more. When a machine resolves that URI, specifically demanding
data, the retrieved answer is not the beautifully formatted HTML document in the
figure above. Rather, a succinct dataset is returned, in a much more precise and
structured format. The next figure reproduces the text message that would obtain a
machine in whose HTTP request headers the proper code is given.
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@prefix tr-common: <http://permid.org/ontology/common/> .
@prefix fibo-be-le-cb:
<http://www.omg.org/spec/EDMC-FIBO/BE/LegalEntities/CorporateBodies/.
@prefix xsd:   <http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#> .
@prefix vcard: <http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#> .
@prefix tr-org: <http://permid.org/ontology/organization/> .
<https://permid.org/1-4296162760> 
a                        tr-org:Organization ;
tr-common:hasPermId      "4296162760"^^xsd:string ;
tr-org:hasActivityStatus tr-org:statusActive ;
tr-org:isIncorporatedIn  <http://sws.geonames.org/6252001/> ;
fibo-be-le-cb:isDomiciledIn  <http://sws.geonames.org/6252001/> ;
vcard:organization-name      "ACME Inc"^^xsd:string .
Details on the meaning of this piece of information are not relevant now, but the
idea is that of having data describing an entity identified by an URI identifier.
The URI https://permid.org/1-4296162760 is special because it is
being used deliberately to identify an entity and it is special because its resolution
offers information suitable for both machines and humans.
The piece of data shown above is in a form known as linked data and it follows
the best Web recommendations for publishing data online. It is not an Excel file, it
is not an excerpt of a relational database. Instead, the piece of data above is RDF
(Resource Description Framework). RDF is not a data format, but an information
model which can be incarnated in different ways—for example XML or JSON.
An RDF graph is a set of units of information known as RDF triples. Each of the
RDF triples represents a sentence, an atomic unit of information linking three
entities. These entities are known as subject, predicate and object, resembling the
equivalent concepts in language studies.
In the daily use of language, however, we often use structures more complex
than a subject, a verb and an object (like in Heracles stole apples). But we can
always chain simple sentences to add information (and that apples were golden).
Thus, using the constituents of one sentence in another sentence, arbitrarily com-
plex pieces of information can be given. If we draw these relations, we see these
RDF triples weave a web of connections. An example of RDF sentence, extracted
from the ACME example, with a subject, a predicate and an object follows:
SUBJECT: <https://permid.org/1-4296162760> 
PREDICATE: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type>
OBJECT: <http://permid.org/ontology/organization/Organization>
The first line above is the subject, and it is a URI identifying ACME. The second
line is the predicate meaning ‘is a kind of’. Finally the third line, the object, is URI
representing the abstract concept of “organization”. We may understand this RDF
triples means ‘ACME is an organization’.
Let us imagine that the Thomson Reuters’ permid database of organizations
exactly devotes 6 RDF triples to ACME. These 6 triples are represented in the
following code excerpt; each of the RDF triples has been shown separated by a
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blank line. The subject in all the triples is <https://permid.org/
1-4296162760>, which is the URI of ACME in the permid database. The
predicate is also a URI in each of those 6 cases, including words like type,
hasActivityStatus, or isIncorporatedIn—words follow each other
without blank space because they are not allowed in URIs. Finally, the object in
each of the RDF triples is either a URI or a value, the former given between angle
brackets and the latter given between quotation marks. Values are also known as
constants or literal values.
<https://permid.org/1-4296162760> 
<http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type>
<http://permid.org/ontology/organization/Organization> .
<https://permid.org/1-4296162760>
<http://permid.org/ontology/organization/hasActivityStatus>
<http://permid.org/ontology/organization/statusActive> .
<https://permid.org/1-4296162760> 
<http://www.omg.org/spec/EDMC-FIBO/BE/LegalEntities
<http://sws.geonames.org/6252001/> .
<https://permid.org/1-4296162760>
<http://permid.org/ontology/organization/isIncorporatedIn>
<http://sws.geonames.org/6252001/> .
<https://permid.org/1-4296162760> 
<http://permid.org/ontology/common/hasPermId> 
"4296162767"^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string> .
<https://permid.org/1-4296162760> 
<http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#organization-name>
"ACME Inc"^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string> .
/CorporateBodies/isDomiciledIn>
The six RDF triples above can be represented in an informal, visual manner in
Fig. 1.2. Resources are represented as ovals, literals with rectangles. Every triple is
represented as an arrow, where the subject of the triple is the origin and the object
the destination. Prefixes have been used to shorten the URIs.1
There are some rules, a few, determining how a RDF triple can be built—the
minimal information unit in the web of data. One of these rules determines that
subjects and predicates in the RDF triples must be URIs, whereas objects can be
either URIs or literal values. Nothing prevents a URI appearing in a triple as subject
to be part of another RDF triple as object, or vice versa. In the sentence ‘Heracles
stole the apples’, ‘the apples’ are the direct object (object in RDF terminology), but
the same apples are the subject in the second exemplary sentence (the apples are
gold). Given that URIs can represent any conceivable entity (resource) and given
that RDF triples can be chained once and again, we can say that RDF can express
any thing about anything. Humans are able to convey much more information with
hardly a few words, but this is due to the fact that we humans share an implicit
1https://www.w3.org/TR/xml-names.
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context, a background knowledge known to both emitter and receiver. But nothing,
at least in theory, would prevent this context to be codified with another set of RDF
triples.
Entities mentioned in an RDF graph can refer to both general ideas and specific
individuals. The following code excerpt displays two out of the six RDF triples
mentioned before, in the same format where each RDF triple is a set of three lines
(S-P-O) separated from the next RDF triple by a blank line.
<https://permid.org/1-4296162760> 
<http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type>
<http://permid.org/ontology/organization/Organization> .
<https://permid.org/1-4296162760> 
<http://www.w3.org/2006/vcard/ns#organization-name>
"ACME Inc"^^<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string> .
The meaning of the first triple is ‘ACME is an organization’. The second triple
means ‘ACME has by organization name ACME Inc.’. ACME can be a real and
concrete organization, whereas organization is just an abstract concept. In fact,
‘organization’ is a common noun while ACME is a proper noun.
Some philosophers in the past debated about the real existence of these abstract
concepts—like organization—and posed the so called problem of the universals.
Thus, the realist school claimed that universals were real, they existed and they
were different from the particulars instantiating them. On the contrary, the nomi-
nalists denied the existence of universals both in an immanent manner (in the
particulars) and in a transcendent manner (out of the particulars). In RDF, which is
nothing but a language, both universals and particulars are in the same plane and
there is no specific difference: a URI can identify both abstract concepts (organi-
zation, city) and concrete concept (Heracles, Japan) without any explicit reference
to their nature.
Fig. 1.2 Six RDF triples represented in a diagram
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1.3.3 Data Models, Ontologies and Ontology Design
Patterns
The distinction between concrete things (the zip code of the ACME headquarters)
and abstract concepts (the idea of organization) is syntactically non-existent in
RDF. However, we shall distinguish between pieces of data and the terms of a
vocabulary.
Any URI can be used in any RDF triple without further limitation. However,
URIs with general ideas such as ‘organization’ are usually URIs which have been
attributed more properties somewhere else, such as a definition, its relation with
other similar concepts, its constituents or other properties inherent to its nature.
Very often, the person or entity specifying the knowledge about a concept proceeds
in the same manner with other concepts in the same domain, covering a specific
area of interest and building one domain vocabulary. The complexity of vocabu-
laries varies between a mere list of concepts and a complete ontology with a large
amount of knowledge having been specified.
Gruber defined ontology as an ‘explicit specification of a conceptualization’
(Gruber 1993), Studer as ‘a formal, explicit specification of a shared conceptual-
ization’ (Studer et al. 1998). Both definitions speak about conceptualizations made
explicit, and the language to make them explicit today is OWL. An OWL (Web
Ontology Language) ontology is asserted as a set of RDF triples, and it is, in fact,
an ontology in the philosophical sense of the word, for it describes a collection of
beings and their properties and relations. Ontologies can cover the whole universe
of knowledge, or they can be limited to a specific area. In the latter case they are
known as domain ontologies. Ontologies aiming at describing any piece of human
knowledge can become huge: for example CYC keeps one of the largest knowledge
base in the world and it describes several hundreds of thousands of terms carefully
organized (Matuszek et al. 2006), competing with Yago (Suchanek et al. 2007) and
others. On the contrary, domain ontologies can be as small as a few dozen triples.
Some of these ontologies are mere catalogues of lexical resources. For example,
WordNet (Miller 1995) comprises one hundred thousand terms, including nouns,
verbs and adjectives. Nouns are related to other nouns that are hyperonyms,
hyponyms, meronyms or holonyms.
Ontologies can cover different needs, from representing the consensus in a
certain domain (namely, keep a list of definitions), to determining the execution of a
computer application. In the latter case, the knowledge base is conceptually divided
into two large blocks: the block with terminological information (or T-Box) and the
block with information about the individuals instantiating those abstract concepts
(A-Box).
There are multiple ways of modelling a reality with ontologies. Likewise, there
are multiple ways of implementing an algorithm or designing a relational database.
However, it is a good practice to solve recurrent problems with common solutions,
because the solutions will have been tested, because others can better understand
one’s work and because there is no need to reinvent the wheel. Much like using
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design patterns is a common practice among software engineers, ontology design
patterns (ODP) should be a common practice among ontologists.
Ontology Design patterns were proposed in 2005 by Gangemi, and since their
inception a few dozen have been described and published online, with the sole
purpose of being reused as building blocks. Their influence, however, is unquan-
tifiable, as the use of patterns is never acknowledged and probably less than what
was expected. The reuse of individual terms have been fostered more actively by
search engines (http://vocab.cc) and ontology repositories (https://
lov.linkeddata.es). Indeed, ontologies have been defined in the legal
domain.
1.3.4 Features of the Semantic Web
In linguistics, semantics is the science that studies the meaning of symbols. If we
hear an ambulance siren wailing, we will probably interpret that a sick person is
traveling inside. If we use now the ACME identifier (https://permid.org/
1-4296162760), the careful reader will know that the headquarter is in the state
of Michigan in the United States. The communication of a set of RDF triples from
one agent (man or machine) to another agent is an act of communication and
therefore words like ‘syntax’ or ‘semantics’ have full validity in this context.
The ACME URI is a linguistic sign, a signifier, which evokes a meaning (the
idea of the company ACME). Computers with access to the web of data have a
precise image of ACME, which can be accounted for, and it is indeed the infor-
mation in the Thomson Reuters database and other possible mentions in the web of
data. Computers might quantify how many facts they know about ACME. We,
humans, are not able to determine what we know about ACME, nor the reactions
that it provokes in us. Some will recall a bad experience with ACME, some will
recall their favourite product from ACME; but no one will be able to know the
subconscious.
The semiotic triangle of Ogden and Richards, applied to the human language,
links three entities: the mental image (my idea of the ACME) with the sign (the
sound of the word ACME Inc.) and both with the real object (the entity ACME).
We may draw an equivalent semiotic triangle for the Semantic Web, as Sowa first
suggested (Sowa 2010). Both are represented in Fig. 1.3, which adapts the figure in
‘The Meaning of Meaning’ by Ogden and Richards (1923).
The symbol invokes a meaning, the meaning refers to a referent. There is no
direct relation between the symbol and the referent other than through the signified,
which is an idea. Making it simpler and applied to the spoken language, the triangle
puts in relation words with worlds with ideas—stressing the influence of language
upon thought. In the human language, Saussure’s concept of arbitrariness holds,
and there is no direct connection between signifier and signified. Save for ono-
matopoeias, words do not resemble real objects. In the Semantic Web, the language
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is not entirely addressed to computers and symbols are not pure numbers but URIs
with some words meaningful to humans in it.
Between humans, the relation between symbol and meaning is a complex one:
the word “rain” may denote “drops of water falling” in its primary meaning, but it
may connote “sadness and melancholy” in subjective meanings. As of today,
machines can only denote primary meanings, and no computer has managed to
emulate the richness of a human spoken communication, with all its ambiguities,
double meanings and implicit connotations. Computers have not reached lyricism.
Syllogisms are structures of valid reasoning that were studied by Aristotle. Thus,
if ‘all men are mortal’ and ‘Socrates is a man’, then we can derive that ‘Socrates is
mortal’. These two premises entail a conclusion. Each of the sentences represents
some knowledge. We might say, that if we represented each of the two first sen-
tences with a single RDF triple (and their simple structure favours that), we may
deduce the third one. These kind of sentences are categorical propositions and their
conveyed knowledge is limited to sentences of the sort ‘some (or all) members of
category A belong to category B’. But other kinds of reasoning are also possible.
In general, symbolic logic is the branch of science that studies valid forms of
reasoning. Logic systems define a language, with an alphabet with symbols and
some syntactic rules that determine which combinations of symbols are well
formed. Logic systems also define inference rules, which can be applied to produce
new formulas from existing ones. Valid reasoning only grants that false premises
will never be derived from true premises—please note that truth and falsehood are
attributes exclusive of the language, and the logical languages are simply lan-
guages. The concepts of truth and falsehood would not exist if there were no
languages at all—the observation was made by Hobbes.
Computer ontologies have a logical foundation that enable some reasoning tasks.
In particular, OWL ontologies are formalized as one of the Description Logics well
described by Baader et al. (2003). The RDF triples can be the proposition in logical
arguments that produce new RDF triples. One RDF triple may say that ‘ACME is
an organization’. One ontology may say that ‘Organizations have Agents as
members’. One reasoner may derive that Action has Agents as members. The
millions of triples in the CYC ontology mentioned before might be used in complex
Fig. 1.3 Ogden and Richard’s triangle adapted to the semantic web
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reasoning. To date, there are not many computer applications using this powerful
knowledge base, but the potential is huge.
The atomic units of information in the Semantic Web, namely, the RDF triples,
do not live in a single location but they are distributed in computers all around the
globe. With a uniform technology one can get access to either ontological assertions
(‘all men are mortal’, ‘organizations have agents as members’) or to mere data
(‘Socrates is mortal’, ‘ACME has headquarters in Michigan’) published by
heterogeneous entities. Data is usually published as datasets, namely collections of
registers about a topic in particular. Thus, the Thomson Reuters dataset on orga-
nizations has a dozen triples for each of the three million organizations they
consider.
The peculiarity of the Semantic Web is that data are interconnected at a global
level. The concept of publishing a collection of data is not a novelty, but the
concept of publishing a collection of data massively connected to data and
vocabulary terms published by others, certainly is. Let us consider as an example
one of the RDF triples mentioned above:
<https://permid.org/1-4296162767>
<http://www.omg.org/spec/EDMC- FIBO/BE/LegalEntities/CorporateBodies/isDomiciledIn>
<http://sws.geonames.org/6252001/> .
This RDF triple can be interpreted as ACME is a legal entity domiciled in a
certain place identified by geonames. The idea of ‘domicile’ is invoked using an
identifier published by a third entity. This triple thus links three entities whose
definitions are given by computers in London, Massachusetts (USA) and Bayern
(Germany). Two of them belong to private companies (Thomson Reuters and
Unxos), the third one to a not-for-profit technology standards consortium (OMG).
In the other triples describing ACME, some more vocabulary terms and data are
referred (defined for example by W3C).
The data published by geonames about the referred entity available under
http://sws.geonames.org/6252001/, namely the USA, happens to be
exactly 167 RDF triples, with information like the name of the place in different
languages, or different coordinates with geolocation. Some of these 167 triples
declare that the entity (USA) matches other records in other datasets, like DBpedia
(Auer et al. 2007). DBpedia is a dataset published by an association (located in
Leipzig) which publishes data extracted from Wikipedia as RDF. DBpedia is the
only link that geonames makes to external data source, but the metadata refers to
other external data, such as the Creative Commons license. The Creative Commons
license is expressed with 90 RDF triples, and it is a dead end in the sense that no
further datasets are linked from it. The information about the USA in DBpedia
consists of 260 triples densely linked to other datasets published by different
sources, like Eurostat, CYC or Freebase (Bollacker et al. 2008)—the number of
accessible triples in a second level is already high.
DBpedia is actually massively linked by other datasets—even permid in some of
their registers. Given that datasets (and vocabularies) reference each other, we may
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think of a graph, a data structure defined by nodes and edges that link them. These
edges are directed, namely, they have a direction (for example from permid to
geonames, but not vice versa). If we draw each dataset as a node and each con-
nection between two datasets as an edge, we may create a figure as follows
(Fig. 1.4).
If a dataset has their entities dereferenceable (the URIs identifying entities
resolve with data when properly browsed with the HTTP protocol) and if these
entities are linked to other datasets, then the dataset qualifies to be part of the
Linked Open Data cloud (LOD). This data is better known then as linked data (the
O in the LOD making reference to the idea of open standards, rather than data being
openly licensed).
The datasets linked in the LOD cloud has not stopped growing in the last few
years. The number of datasets is now so high that it cannot be comfortably fitted
into a sheet of paper or a slide in a presentation—like the Tim Berners-Lee pre-
sentation shown in the next image. DBpedia is still represented at the center of these
diagrams. Not in vain, many see in Wikipedia the Universal Encyclopedia that was
at the core of H. G. Wells’s book the World Brain (Wells 1938).
1.3.5 Rights in the Web of Data
RDF is mostly used to represent facts, positive assertions that can be either true or
false, like the sentence ‘Heracles stole apples’. But we humans also use other types
of expressions, referring to what can be done, to what must be done and to what
must not be done. These permissions, obligations and prohibitions are called
deontic expressions and can be also represented in RDF with proper vocabularies.
For example, the well-known Creative Common licenses have been also rep-
resented as RDF by the Creative Commons foundation using their own vocabulary,
which declares some terms such as cc:Prohibition or cc:Permission.
Fig. 1.4 Reference relations between several datasets
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The Creative Commons vocabulary defines the necessary terms to represent the
most important concepts in Creative Commons licenses, but it does not aim any
further. Other vocabularies are more general, and rights can be in general repre-
sented as linked data (Rodríguez-Doncel et al. 2013). Thus, the Open Digital Rights
Language (ODRL) is a more versatile policy language intended to be used in
different domains: financial information, content in mobile devices, ebooks, news
and others. ODRL was first specified in 2000 as an XML language, but more
recently, the W3C has extended the language and has included a RDF serialization
based on an ontology (Ianella et al. 2018) in its latest version.
The ODRL language permits representing permissions, possibly subject to
certain restrictions (‘you have access to this file but only in France’), prohibitions
(‘do not make derivative works’) and duties (‘you must inform the licensor’); with
remedies if rules are not satisfied and a complete suite of policy types suitable for
agreements, offers of assets (possibly at a certain price) or privacy policies.
ODRL does not provide any mechanism to digitally enforce the rights, mostly
because this operation is not usually feasible beyond the mere access control. Yet,
the value of ODRL should not be underestimated, as it enables the automated
processing and administration of rights, making easier the search-by-license feature
(when looking for images in a Google search, images can be filtered by rights
information), the reasoning on rights expressions (it is possible to compute whether
two licenses are compatible or not, as shown by Governatori et al. in 2013).
Moreover, the mere existence of policy languages with regulatory power and
their acceptance by internet users, is transforming the mere nature of law. The
pragmatic turn (Casanovas et al. 2017), which considers users’ needs and contexts
to facilitate the automated interactive and collective management of knowledge, is
likely to become an element of growing importance in a future linked democracy as
described in the forthcoming chapters.
1.3.6 Government of the Semantic Web
The Semantic Web does not have a different physical infrastructure to the Web.
Linked datasets, ontologies, vocabularies and other resources are said to be in the
Semantic Web as long as they are published following the best recommendations of
the W3C. There is no centralized authority for the Semantic Web other than the
W3C as the editor of purely technical specifications.
Participants in the Semantic Web are companies, public institutions and indi-
viduals alike, and this does not seem to be problematic. Let us consider one of the
RDF triples mentioned before.
<https://permid.org/1-4296162767>
<http://permid.org/ontology/organization/isIncorporatedIn>
<http://sws.geonames.org/6252001/> .
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As we have seen before, the ACME location is given with a reference to an
entity managed by geonames. Geonames.org is a website created by the effort of a
single engineer, Marc Wick, that is now maintained by the Swiss company Unxos
GmbH. Indeed, Unxos might stop providing the service, but this would eventually
be a relatively small problem for Thomson Reuters (publisher of this RDF triple), as
they would change the reference in a short time (possibly to a location in DBpedia).
Above geonames, there is only the upper domain manager, the one in charge of .
org names. The .org domains depend directly on ICANN (Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers), who also manage the top-level domains in the
hierarchical namespace of the Domain Name System (DNS) of the Internet.
As ICANN is the entity who ultimately manages IP addresses and names on the
Internet, it is a key institution for the internet and consequently for the Semantic
Web too.
Legally, ICANN is a non-profit organization, with a mandate to implement from
the US Department of Commerce. After 18 years, as of October 2016, changes
have happened in order to transfer some of its management duties to multisector
agents of the global community. This model, known as MSG or MSI (from
multi-stakeholder governance model or initiative) and described by Savage and
McConnell (2015) tries to involve the different stakeholders in the internet gov-
ernment, much like technical specifications on the internet that are often written
collectively: this is the case of IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) or the W3C
(World Wide Web consortium), where a large community of companies,
researchers and public institutions coexist in a relatively peaceful and productive
relation. The MSG is further described in Chap. 5.
This wide and coordinated participation in the edition of rules is quite a rare
case. If we make an analogy with the road traffic regulations, we should imagine
taxi drivers, truck transporters, local police and Royal Automobile Club members
discussing together and deciding on the traffic regulations that will apply next year.
The role of individuals is not minor in the Semantic Web. Many well-known
vocabularies and ontologies are the result of the work of researchers working alone
or crowd sourced by individuals. Sometimes two vocabularies overlap in scope,
covering the same domain. Over time some will survive and some will fall into
disuse, being ultimately abandoned and their publication discontinued. It is a
notable fact that authority (whether the vocabulary is published by the W3C or by a
single individual) is important but not totally determining in this struggle. Technical
quality and popularity of the resources are sometimes more important factors than
the pure argument of authority. For example, despite the huge investment made by
Cycorp, manager of the CYC knowledge base, CYC is secondary to DBpedia,
created by a collective effort of internet users. This parallels the case of Wikipedia
and the Encyclopædia Britannica, the former being the fourth website most visited
in the world and the latter having fallen into a relative digital oblivion.
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1.4 Government and the Web of Data
1.4.1 Open Government Data
Governments are relevant but not dominant stakeholders in the Web of Data and
their role has been so far more about producing than about exploiting it. The term
Open Government Data (OGD) is often defined as ‘data produced or commissioned
by government or government controlled entities’.
Open Government Data is published in government Open Data portals, which
offer thousands of datasets in an organized manner. These portals either actively
request data from the different government departments and agencies or passively
wait for them to send the datasets. Some of the most relevant portals are the US data
portal (https://www.data.gov/) and the UK data portal (https://
data.gov.uk/). Stemming from Obama’s US Open Government initiative in
2009, the US data portal collects almost 200,000 datasets with the purpose “to
increase public access to high value, machine readable datasets generated by the
Executive Branch of the Federal Government”. The UK data portal, which main-
tains about 40,000 datasets, was created “to help people understand how govern-
ment works and how policies are made” and embraces very warmly the linked data
principles for putting data on the web.
At least three reasons have been identified for opening government data:
transparency (for citizens to know that the government is doing), releasing social
and commercial value (assuming again the idea that data is an asset) and partici-
patory governance (engaging citizens in decision making). The use of OGD for the
latter purpose has also been studied. For example Davies (2010) takes a theoretical
and empirical look to assess who is using OGD and for what purposes, in order to
determine the possible implications for different models of democratic change and
public sector reform. Shadbolt and O’Hara (2013) also evaluated the UK OGD
portal, but participatory governance played a minor role. It is generally agreed that
Open Data Government must satisfy at least the eight principles written in
December 2007 by thirty open government advocates (including Lawrence Lessig,
Tim O’Reilly or Aaron Swartz): that data must be complete, from primary sources,
timely, accessible, machine processable, non-discriminatory, non-proprietary and
license-free.
1.4.2 Linked Open Government Data
Indeed, not every piece of OGD follows the linked data principles. But some
relevant datasets in the Linked Open Data cloud have been produced directly by
public institutions and many others have been re-formatted by third parties. And
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even these third parties have been very often partners in publicly funded research
projects—governments have been supporting the development of the Semantic
Web, especially in Europe.
Besides OGD, there are many other datasets relative to local or national gov-
ernments which have also been published. Actually, the whole scope of OGD has
been questioned as to whether OGD should stand for “(open government) data” or
“open (government data)” (Yu and Robinson 2011). In the latest radiography of the
Linked Data Cloud, in 2014, 183 datasets were classified as “government-related”,
amounting to 18% of the total (Schmachtenberg et al. 2014). Some of the datasets
include the Brazilian politicians (de Souza et al. 2013), the debates in the Italian
legislative cameras, data from the Greek police (Bratsas et al. 2011) or European
Parliament debates (van Aggelen et al. 2017), to name a few.
We may define the term linked open government data as the intersection
between government data (which is itself only a fraction of eGovernment), linked
data and open data.
1.4.3 eGovernment and eDemocracy
The concept of eGovernment is about the better provision of services by public
sector organisations by using digital technologies. In a wider sense, and according
to the World Bank, “e-Government refers to the use by government agencies of
information technologies […] that have the ability to transform relations with cit-
izens, businesses, and other arms of government”. eGovernment can benefit from
Semantic Web technologies in many ways. As an example, RDF vocabularies for
the definition of public services offered by municipalities in Europe may help
migrants to recognize the same service that is differently named in different regions.
As of 2018, about 49% of European citizens have used at least once an online
service offered by a public institution,2 and there is a public determination towards
increasing this rate. The implementation of eGovernment is systematically evalu-
ated by the public authorities in Europe. For example, the eGovernment Benchmark
Study3 monitors the development of eGovernment in Europe, evaluating indicators
such as the number of services online, their degree of transparency, or the ability to
make administrative processes fully available online. Important declarations have
been signed (like the Tallinn Ministerial Declaration on eGovernment) as well as
specific action plans (EU eGovernment Action Plan 2016–2020). Thus, on March
2017, the European Interoperability Framework (EIF) was adopted, focused on
making digital public services more interoperable. Interoperability in that EIF was
understood at four different levels: legal interoperability (which exists when
2Eurostat Information Society Indicators, April 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/
graph-european-society-indicators.
3http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=48587.
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legislation does not impose unjustified barriers to the reuse of data), organizational
interoperability (which exists when formal agreements rule cross-organisational
interactions), semantic inteoperability (which exists when there is a common
understanding of exchanged data) and technical interoperability (which exists when
information systems allow the free flow of bytes). Whereas this chapter has focused
on semantic interoperability, the overall schema is reviewed with more detail in
Chap. 5.
When information and communication technologies are specifically applied to
empower deliberative democracy, the term eDemocracy is used instead. In
eDemocracy, citizens go online to communicate opinions or complaints to the
public administrations. The term eDemocracy is the preferred one when information
technologies are used in one of the following cases: (i) as tools to strengthen
deliberative democracy; (ii) as tools to communicate to the public institutions any
kind of complaints, preferences or incidents or (iii) as a space to exercise political
rights and participate in the political life. We will also suggest in Chap. 5 to place
these different regulatory dimensions under the provisions of the rule of law (i.e. the
meta-rule of law).4
The Semantic Web technologies have been postulated as a helpful tool to
retrieve some meaning out of the online chatter about politics (Hilbert 2009), and it
has been said to support the self-organization of people with joint political goals.
For example, Belák and Svátek (2010) provided a core ontology for the description
of political programs, commitments and trust between people. This work helps
people to analyze, compare and discuss political programs, already in great data-
bases like the Manifesto Project. The Manifesto Project offers the policy positions
of parties derived from a content analysis of their electoral manifesto, covering over
1000 parties from 1945 until today in over 50 countries (Volkens et al. 2016).
Similarly, the Constitute Project5 (Elkins et al. 2014), offers as RDF, almost every
constitution which has been in force anywhere in the world in the past 200 years.
Legislation is offered as linked data in the UK and the Netherlands, with partial
engagement also in the USA (Casellas et al. 2011a, b) and Canada (Desrochers
2012) and non-official support in many other countries.
However, there is also a reasonable concern about these tools and datasets
remaining at a technical level, without actually reaching the masses. For example,
the Linked Leaks datasets, containing information about 200,000 offshore entities
that were part of the Panama Papers investigation, were released in 2016 as richly
linked data; yet they have not been widely used.
4See Casanovas (2015), and Casanovas et al. (2016) for a comprehensive state of the art of
Semantic Web applications in the legal domain.
5http://www.constituteproject.org/.
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1.4.4 The Open Data Principles
Most of the data in the Linked Open Data cloud has been published as open data,
namely, licensed under very liberal terms. This is the most natural option, as in the
Web of Data building on others’ resources is the most common practice.
The limits for what is considered open data and what is not open data have been
well defined. Open data is data that anyone can access, use and share, according to
the Open Data Institute (ODI) whereas openness is defined by Open Knowledge
Foundation (OKFN) as situations when anyone can freely access, use, modify and
share for any purpose (subject, at most, to requirements that preserve provenance
and openness). Both OKFN and ODI have listed the well-known licenses (e.g. from
Creative Commons or Open Data Commons) that comply with their definitions and
have created visual labels to be easily recognized. In essence, open licenses grant
that data can be used without legal barriers.
In the collective conscious, the open software movement has been associated
with individual champions such as Linus Torvalds, Richard Stallman or Aaron
Swartz. However, the open data movement is being promoted by global institutions.
For example, the Group of Eight (G8) has signed in 2013 the “G8 Open Data
Charter” outlining a set of five core open data principles to be followed by gov-
ernments, the World Bank has devoted large resources to promote the adoption of
the open data principles and the United Nations has drafted a development agenda
called UN Data Revolution largely based on open data. Consistently, governments
of most countries have enacted laws for publishing public sector information as
open data, under the general principle that data produced with public funding must
be openly published.
Open data has some downsides, though. First, it might favour inequality as the
strongest become stronger. In theory, individual citizens have free access to
information. In practice, only large companies with data science teams can extract
actual value from it. These companies will leverage the open data resources for their
own benefit, to the detriment of the rest. Second, the risk of re-identifying indi-
viduals in anonymised personal data is higher. The fact is that whereas the open
data movement is energetically supported by public institutions, internet users and
citizens in general have shown little enthusiasm.
1.4.5 Business Intelligence in the Public Sector
In the last decades, the relevance of data has increased as more and more decisions
have been entrusted to computers and decision support systems.6 Many large
6For a review of decision support systems using the Web of Data as presented in this book, see
Blomqvist (2014).
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companies make their biggest corporate decisions based on the results of complex
computer processes that chew tons of apparently worthless data —this is known as
business intelligence (BI).7
Decisions are usually taken as a result of a process in which different sorts of
questions have to be answered. First, descriptive questions portray a certain reality
(what is happening? how much? when? where?). In a second place, diagnostic
questions look for explanations (why something has happened?). Then, predictive
questions help forecasting the future (what will happen if I don’t do anything?).
Finally, prescriptive questions determine the best possible action (what should I
do?). These answers can feed either a decision support system, where the ultimate
decision is taken by a human, or a decision automation system where actions are
executed without human intervention. Some data analytics applications stop at the
descriptive stage, some power fully automated systems, like the management
systems of the stocks of a retailer.
Most of the data that a company bases its decisions upon (like figures of sales or
the customers’ location) have an intrinsic value that is zealously protected—they
are an intangible asset and its dissemination may favour other competitors. Data, as
a commodity, can be also traded in a data market (“i.e. the marketplace where
digital data is exchanged as products or services derived from raw data”)8 in
exchange for money. Data markets are being fostered by governments.9
But for several reasons, data can also be publicly available under open licensing
modalities. Many of the datasets relevant to BI processes had been always avail-
able, although not digitally—only as printed statistical yearbooks or in other
non-digital forms. In the last few years, data has been massively dumped in the web
and its full potential is yet to be realized.
Public administrations lag behind in the application of business intelligence to
their decisions and there is not much literature in the area.10 However, intelligent
analyses are quietly being used by public administrations for the better provision of
the services they offer (e.g. a municipality optimally planning the transport system).
The growth of the amount of available data and the advances of the Artificial
Intelligence (AI) algorithms will enable business intelligence to play a more
important role in the decisions taken by public administrations in the years to come.
These techniques introduce a slight novelty in a long-standing question: the
relation between experts in possession of scientific knowledge and politicians. In
the most simplistic approach, the politician takes decisions and the expert provides
7The term predates computers. Business intelligence was defined as “the ability to collect infor-
mation and react to it accordingly” in Cyclopaedia of Commercial and Business Anecdotes,
R. Millar Devens (1865).
8European Data Market study, SMART 2013/0063, IDC 2016.
9As an example, see “Building a European Data Economy”, COMM(2017), 9 (final).
10See the overview of possible applications by Wowczko (2016) or how business intelligence is
being applied by the public institutions in the UK (National Archives 2016).
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technical advice on how to execute them.11 But the progress of technology not only
rationalizes the means to implement the decisions, but also reduces the scope of
politics: some of the questions, originally entrusted to the political sphere, can be
optimized as well. The space of pure political decision-making is thus reduced by
technological advances. The novelty in this question is that experts are also being
replaced, in many of their functions, by intelligent machines. Further, the role of
professional experts is even further diminished, as the expertise of a crowd of
non-professionals is now available in the Internet era.
1.5 Conclusion
Data plus the right algorithms equals information, the right information used in a
decision-making process is knowledge—at least according to the data/information/
knowledge pyramid model. The power of algorithms is not usually in the hands of
individuals, but of large corporations with server farms and dedicated professionals.
These algorithms, as almost any other modern technology, are no longer used to
control the natural world, but to control other humans. In particular, political
campaigns all over the world have allegedly been in recent years strongly influ-
enced by intense data analytics processes powerful enough to tilt the scale.
Before this gloomy scenario, an unexpected actor can still play a role: a cloud of
linked data enabling distributed knowledge and facilitating collective intelligence.
The Web of Data, and more specifically, the linked data cloud, is a growing
universe of connected information published about any matter in any language and
accessible by anyone. The open data movement, initially sparked to increase the
transparency of public administrations, has gained momentum and its economic and
social value is now fully revealed. Public administrations, large and small enter-
prises, foundations, universities and individuals alike are contributing to creating a
web of data, sharing the features of the web that we know is heterogeneous and
diverse.
Much of the open source and free software movements have yielded first-class,
high quality operating systems such as Linux, and the idea of open content has led
to the release of millions of works now published under Creative Commons
licenses, the open data movement combined with the semantic web technologies is
creating a new data resource available to all. Maybe in the future, machine learning
and data mining algorithms running over this pool of data will be also standard
tools in the hands of individuals or self-organised collectives.
11This decisionist model of the the relation between politicians and experts has been compared
with the technocratic model and Dewey’s pragmatist one by Habermas (1974).
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Chapter 2
Deliberative and Epistemic
Approaches to Democracy
Abstract Deliberative and epistemic approaches to democracy are two important
dimensions of contemporary democratic theory. This chapter studies these
dimensions in the emerging ecosystem of civic and political participation tools, and
appraises their collective value in a new distinct concept: linked democracy. Linked
democracy is the distributed, technology-supported collective decision-making
process, where data, information and knowledge are connected and shared by
citizens online. Innovation and learning are two key elements of Athenian
democracies which can be facilitated by the new digital technologies, and a
cross-disciplinary research involving computational scientists and democratic the-
orists can lead to new theoretical insights of democracy.
Keywords Deliberative democracy  Epistemic democracy  Semantic web 
Institutions  Participatory ecosystems
2.1 Introduction
Semantic Web engineers have often complained that building ontologies is hard. To
build an ontology for a given domain—for example, tort law—one needs to recruit
experts in that domain, elicit their legal knowledge, and then reach a shared, explicit
consensus of how such legal knowledge will be represented and formalised so that
computers can ‘understand it’. It is not an easy task, indeed, especially if ontologies
have to be designed from scratch and the subject matter is complex.
If it is hard to build ontologies, mapping the conceptual domain of deliberative
and epistemic theories of democracy is not less harder. In fact, it is quite the
opposite. In the last thirty years, political philosophers and scientists have produced
an oceanic body of literature on the justification, mechanisms, and outcomes of
democracy based on a number of procedural and cognitive arguments. They have
done so at different levels: normative (discussing the foundational values), theo-
retical (formulating hypothesis), and empirical (developing case studies and testing
new institutional arrangements). Successive generations of scholars have expanded,
© The Author(s) 2019
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refined, or remixed their different approaches with extraordinary sophistication. As
a result, any attempt to represent the domain of contemporary models of democracy
will necessarily be limited and selective. Like the making of the 19th century
Oxford English Dictionary, or the 21st century Wikipedia, the effort would require
the involvement of hundreds if not thousands of dedicated volunteers.
This chapter will take an oblique route by briefly considering the debates in
democracy theory over the last decades that have explored the meaning and practice
of democratic participation. The discussions about the role of citizen participation
are sometimes structured into a binary between ‘procedural’ and ‘epistemic’
accounts of democratic practice, or, with a different terminology, between ‘ma-
joritarian’ and ‘populist’ approaches. Hélène Landemore has proposed a more
expressive dichotomy: the ‘talkers’ and the ‘counters’ (Landemore 2013, 53).1 The
‘talkers’ walk the path of ‘deliberation followed by majority rule as a fallible but
overall reliable way to make collective decisions’; the ‘counters’ explore ‘the
epistemic properties of judgement aggregation when large groups of people are
involved’ (Landemore 2013, 54–55). Yet, an analysis of the most recent literature
will reveal that subsequent debates have reconciled aspects of these two positions as
the impact of empirical research, developments in cognitive sciences and digital
technologies have opened up new research questions.
In this chapter we will focus on the alignment between deliberative and epistemic
democratic theory and practice in order to consider, in Chap. 3, the varieties of wider
citizen participation promoted by digital platforms which, interestingly enough, are
typically agnostic about these philosophical debates. The findings of both delibera-
tive and epistemic theories will help us to develop a matrix of civic and political
participation tools and will guide further research into technology-enabled demo-
cratic participation. From this standpoint, we will consider how our notion of ‘linked
democracy’—as a distributed, technology-supported collective decision-making
process—can provide a framework to structure the current plurality of civil and
political participation practices. Linked democracy is about turning this plurality into
a participatory ecosystem where data, information, and knowledge are connected and
shared. Drawing from the experience of both ‘talkers’ and ‘counters’, we will suggest
that ‘connectors’ are also needed to make the most of distributed crowd intelligence.
As Josiah Ober has shown with his insightful analysis of classical Athens, ‘making
good use of dispersed knowledge is the original source of democracy’s strength’
(Ober 2008a, 2). Our 21st century democracies have challenges that were absent in
classical Athens, and scale is notably one of them. Yet, our democracies have tools to
address them that are truly unique 21st century innovations. And both the similarities
and the differences are fascinating to explore.
1As Landemore’s book acknowledges Jacob Levy for suggesting this very decipherable dichotomy
to her, we want to preserve the attribution chain and thank him as well.
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2.2 Deliberative Approaches to Democracy
In the early 1990s, political theorists began to suggest an expanded role for citizens
in democratic processes based on the principles of public deliberation (Benhabib
1996; Bohman 1996; Dryzek 1994; Estlund 1993, 1997). The so-called ‘delibera-
tive turn’ went beyond an acceptance of democratic practice as the simple aggre-
gation of voter preferences for representatives at elections. It was argued that
‘deliberation’ through public and individual reflection and dialogue should inform
and transform voter preferences or judgments and thus collective decision-making.
Deliberation is about ‘processes of judgment and preference formation and trans-
formation within informed, respectful, and competent dialogue’ (Dryzek and
Niemeyer 2010, 2). The ideal is that ‘inclusive, non-coercive and reciprocal dis-
cussion’ on relevant issues should influence ‘individual preferences and shape
public policy’ (Kuyper 2015). Public deliberation by ‘free and equal’ citizens
provides legitimation for political decision-making, therefore, justifications for
proposed decisions, policies and laws need to be publicly given and debated to
inform the voting public. This does not render voting (or the aggregation of pref-
erences) as meaningless but situates it as ‘a phase of deliberation’ in a democratic
process (Bohman 2009, 28).
The concept of deliberation is already present in Aristotle’s writings and,
according to Christian Koch, both deliberation (boulē, bouleusis) and deliberate
choice (proairesis) are the key notions that ‘link Aristotelian rhetoric, ethics, and
politics together’ (Koch 2014, 13).2 Generally, Jensen Sass and John Dryzek (2014)
acknowledge that ‘deliberation’ as a political concept extends from Athens to
contemporary Western liberal democracies. While the modern literature on delib-
erative democracy offers many definitions of the term, Hélène Landemore notes that
“the reasoning aspect of exchange of arguments” in Aristotle’s deliberation res-
onates in the definition by Joshua Cohen (one of the early proponents of deliber-
ative democracy), the ‘public use of arguments and reasoning’ (Cohen 1989, cited
in Landemore 2013, 91).
Since the first formulations of the ‘deliberative turn’ in democracy theory, there
have been a number of overlapping turns within the turn. As John Dryzek and Simon
Niemeyer have synthesised, an ‘institutional turn’ has focused on small-scale
deliberative forums; a ‘systemic turn’ has instead reflected on large-scale systems; a
‘practical turn’ has bridged the gap between deliberative democracy and real politics
and, finally, an ‘empirical turn’ aims at refining the theoretical claims with empirical
2“Deliberation is the kind of reasoning that precedes deliberate choice, for which Aristotle’s term
is proairesis (…). Proairesis literally means ‘taking something rather than (something else)’. What
makes these concepts so important to Aristotle’s ethical thinking is that the individual’s deliberate
choices are what primarily determines that individual’s ethical worth. Rhetoric, however, is also
about deliberate choice, but of a different kind, i.e., collective choices by people organized in
groups like the polis. (Koch 2014: 13).
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testing (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2010, 6–10). More recently, Stephen Elstub (2015)
and Jonathan Kuyper (2015) have identified three similar turns or generations of
deliberative democracy theories. Elstub distinguishes between (i) normative foun-
dations as set by Habermas (e.g. 1985, 1991) and Rawls (1999, 2001); (ii) institu-
tionalisation of deliberative democracy with inclusion of other types of
communication beyond public reason (e.g. Bohman 1996; Gutmann and Thompson
1996; Sanders 1997; Young 2000), and (iii) empirical turn and institutional design
(e.g. Dryzek 1994, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013). Elstub also anticipates a fourth gen-
eration inspired by the leading work of Jane Mansbridge and John Parkinson on
large-scale deliberative systems (Mansbridge and Parkinson 2012) and argues that,
by becoming more pluralistic and fragmented, deliberative democracy has become
much less distinctive as a theory but, at the same time, is adaptive to change in ideas
and interpretations (Elstub 2015, 101). Similarly, Jonathan Kuyper considers the
works of Jürgen Habermas and Joshua Cohen that explore the ideals of deliberative
democratic practice as the first stage; in the second stage, research focuses on ‘em-
pirical and practical applications’ to mediate theoretical positions with the realities of
liberal democracies and to test claims for deliberative practices; in the current third
stage, there is an attempt to accommodate the values as well as the means and ends of
deliberative democracy into large-scale systems to develop a ‘system-wide’ model.
Following the framework set by Mansbridge et al. (2012), Kuyper also suggests a
system-wide model with many discrete but interconnected components cohering into
a complex whole and proposes a ‘division of epistemic labor’ (Kuyper 2015, 55).
Based on the assumptions that—no individual citizen is knowledgeable about all
relevant issues, and has diverse interests and priorities as well as discrete areas of
expertise—the model proposes that citizens can self-select or exit from a wide-range
of discussions, polls, panels and problem-solving arenas. A high level of knowledge
and competence amongst citizens is not a prerequisite for participation as epistemic
diversity serves to address individual bias and enhance individual knowledge levels.
In addition, non-deliberative events have an ‘augmenting’ or disruptive role and can
contribute indirectly to a citizen’s learning and decision-making ability. The primacy
of ‘rational deliberation’ is downplayed in favour of ‘layered deliberation’ that
accommodates a range of styles and levels as well as multi-site deliberation (Kuyper
2015, 60). Likewise, in a revision of previous models positing more restrictive
definitions of deliberation (e.g. Dryzek and Niemeyer (2010) requiring authentic,
inclusive and consequential components) Sass and Dryzek (2014) also seek to extend
the notion of deliberation onto a cross-cultural landscape and identify examples in
non-western contexts of practices that they consider ‘deliberative’, but not neces-
sarily consequential. This extended coverage also reveals how influential the delib-
erative paradigm and its multiple forks remain after more than two decades, inspiring
institutional innovations that are currently deployed across the world.
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2.2.1 Deliberative Democracy in Action: Some Institutional
Innovations
The empirical turn in deliberative democracy has sparked a number of institutional
innovations that are currently being deployed and replicated at different levels of
governance in many democratic countries. These innovations, usually referred to as
‘mini-publics’ (Goodin and Dryzek 2006; Geissel and Newton 2012; Gröndlund
et al. 2014), involve randomly-selected microcosms of citizens that are convened to
deliberate on public issues.3 As Robert Goodin and John Dryzek put it,
mini-publics are ‘designed to be groups small enough to be genuinely deliberative,
and representative enough to be genuinely democratic (though rarely will they meet
standards of statistical representativeness, and they are never representative in the
electoral sense)’ (Goodin and Dryzek 2006, 220).
The expression ‘mini-publics’ is an umbrella term that covers a variety of
deliberative entities, some of them already in place before the ‘deliberative turn’. As
Gröndlund et al. note (2014, 2), Citizen Juries (in the US), Consensus Conferences
(in Denmark) or Planing Cells (in Germany) have existed since the 1970s, while
Deliberative Polls © (DP) and 21st Century Town Meetings © are newer designs.
In their review of definitions of mini-publics, Matthew Ryan and Graham Smith
distinguish between (i) restrictive definitions focusing exclusively on Deliberative
Polls (Fishkin 2009); (ii) intermediate definitions including citizens’ assemblies,
citizen juries, planning cells, consensus conferences, and 21st Century Town
Meetings (Goodin and Dryzek 2006); and (iii) expanded definitions that cover
participatory budgeting and community meetings (Fung 2003; Ryan and Smith
2014, 12). In a previous account, Graham Smith also distills the common design
features of ‘mini-publics’: (i) use of random or quasi-random sampling techniques
(sortition); (ii) short-time events (typically 2–5 days, with the exception of longer
citizens’ assemblies); (iii) facilitation of the debates by moderators in order to
ensure procedural fairness; (iv) cross-examination of expert witnesses presenting
evidence to citizens; (v) deliberation in plenary and/or small-group sessions (Smith
2012, 90). Likewise, most of them (although not DPs) may conclude with a report
that summarises a number of recommendations to the convenors (Smith 2012, 91).
Let us briefly examine Deliberative Polls, which in the words of Mansbridge are
‘the gold standard of attempts to sample what a considered public opinion might be
on issues of political importance’ (Mansbridge 2010, 53). The idea of DPs was
initially conceived by James Fishkin in 1987 during his stay at the Stanford Center
for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences and went live one year later in the
form of a ‘National Issues Convention’ broadcasted on a PBS television program
3In After the Revolution, political scientist Robert Dahl proposed to ‘seriously consider restoring
that ancient democratic device [lot] and use it for selecting advisory councils to every elected
official of the giant polyarchy’ (1970, 122–123) and, later on, he suggested the idea of deliberative
‘mini-populi’ in Democracy and Its Critics (Dahl 1989, 342).
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(Fishkin 2009, x–xi). The process followed in DPs is best explained by Fishkin
himself as he describes the election of the PASOK’s (Greek Socialist Party) official
candidate for mayor of Marousi (metropolitan Athens) in June 2006:
First a random sample of a population (in this case eligible voters) responded to a telephone
survey, then they were convened together for many hours of deliberation, both in small
groups and plenary sessions, directing questions developed in small groups to competing
candidates, experts, or policymakers in the plenaries, and then, at the end of the process,
they filled out the same questionnaire as the one they had been given when they were first
contacted in their homes. In this case, the questionnaires were supplemented with a secret
ballot in a separate polling booth because the process was more than a poll. It was an
official decision. (Fishkin 2009, 10)
To Mansbridge, DPs are ‘are strongest in representativeness, very strong on
outcome measurement, and equal to any other in balanced materials, policy links,
and the quality of space for reflection’ (Mansbridge 2010, 53). However, as gov-
ernments, large foundations, or the media industry are the usual funding sources for
DPs they also tend to ‘not provide the deliberators with radical left or right alter-
natives that are not within the currently feasible political process’ (idem). Relying
on a previous typology of mini-publics (Elstub 2014), Marit Böker and Stephen
Elstub argue that ‘of the different types of mini-publics, DPs allow the least citizen
control and decision making impact. Indeed, rather than opening up a space in
which citizens can voice critique, the rationale for DPs typically focuses on
changing, almost correcting, participants’ views’ (Böker and Elstub 2015, 134).
The authors also review DPs and other mini-publics in the light of the selection
method, activities, outputs and recipients of the outputs, and conclude that ‘of the
most common types of mini-publics, CCs [Consensus Conferences] and CAs
[Citizen Assemblies] tend to have the greatest emancipatory potential based on
these features, whereas DPs so far seem to have had the least’ (Böker and Elstub
2015, 136).
Generally, DPs and other mini-publics have also been critically scrutinised from
the point of view of legitimacy (even if they aim at greater representativeness,
mini-publics have no delegate power and can’t speak on behalf of the broader
population), legitimation of intended policies, and misuse (of the process or the
outcomes by the authorities that set the consultation process).
Without precluding the value of mini-publics for research or a variety of public
purposes (such as influencing public debate), Cristina Lafont has recently chal-
lenged Fishkin’s approach to DPs as a shortcut, proxy, or second best for realising
the ideal of quality deliberation, yet at the expense of mass participation. Fishkin’s
approach is designed to tackle what he refers to as the ‘trilemma of democratic
reform’: is it possible to design constitutional reform processes that are able to
satisfy simultaneously the three key democratic principles of political equality,
mass participation, and deliberation? To date, Fishkin acknowledges, any system
attempting to fulfill any of two principles inevitably misses the third: political
equality and mass participation deny deliberation (there are no incentives to con-
sider competing arguments); deliberation and mass participation deny political
equality (participants may be self-selecting and not representative); political
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equality and deliberation deny mass participation (numerically impossible).
The ‘trilemma’ is that all three principles cannot be achieved simultaneously
(Fishkin 2011, 248). For Fishkin, deliberative microcosms (and DPs in particular)
operate as a remedial modality to address these tensions, the rationale being—if a
microcosm were chosen on the same principles of random survey participants, it
offers a scaled version of a deliberative polity that is generalizable to the wider
population. It is this scaled version that raises Lafont’s concerns. First, following a
previous point made by Parkinson (2006), she argues that members of deliberative
microcosms ‘participate as individual citizens with total freedom to express
whichever views and opinions they have and to change them in whichever way they
see fit. But, for that very same reason, they are in no way accountable to citizens
outside the poll group’ (Lafont 2015, 52). Second, Lafont suggests that ‘delibera-
tive democrats should welcome the proliferation of empirical research on
micro-deliberative innovations, so long as it is not accompanied by the proliferation
of the normative view that mass participation in quality deliberation is optional or
dispensable for the realization of deliberative democracy’ (Lafont 2015, 59).
However, and from a sociological perspective, Caroline Lee makes the opposite
claim. In her book Do-it-yourself democracy, an account of a five-year fieldwork
research on participatory processes in the US, she points out the pitfalls of what she
refers to as ‘the expanding market for public participation’ and the role of
engagement experts and facilitators (Lee 2015, 4). While recognising the positive
effects of public participation events, she also argues that these may be only
short-term, leading to the paradox of ‘how public engagement can be authentically
real and disempowering at the same time’ (Lee 2015, 29) as the demands on
citizens’ time and commitment are not matched with actual impact on decision
making and public policy.
Despite the generally admitted shortcomings of mini-publics when it comes to
meet the normative, aspirational standards of deliberative democracy, there is a
widespread agreement about their empirical value or the role they play in refining
the theoretical underpinnings of the deliberative paradigm. For example, for Böker
and Elstub ‘mini-publics have been the democratic innovation from which the
majority of empirical evidence on deliberative democracy has derived’ (Böker and
Elstub 2015, 130). Embracing the recent ‘systemic turn’, Böker and Elstub con-
clude that ‘the systemic perspective that promises to subject future experimentation
with mini-publics to a dynamic democratic momentum marks nothing less than the
cutting edge of recent deliberative democratic theory’ (Böker and Elstub 2015,
140). The steps that Böker and Elstub propose are:
First, mini-publics can be evaluated and re-designed towards greater citizen control over the
process, more open types of outputs, and more direct channels to formal decision-making.
Second, the practice of mini-publics ought itself to be subjected to bottom-up deliberative
processes. By conceptualising mini-publics as part of an overarching network of deliber-
ative exchanges that evaluate and respond to one another, the emphasis shifts towards the
establishment of a generally more active, transparent, and democratic system, whose
ongoing evolution need not depend on top-down steering and control. (Böker and Elstub
2015, 140)
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In a similar vein, Kuyper has also proposed a system-wide model with many
discrete but interconnected components cohering into a complex whole and proposes
a ‘division of epistemic labor’ (Kuyper 2015, 55). To be sure, the system-wide
model of deliberation provides a conceptual conduit towards the research that has
considered the nature and impact of ‘collective intelligence’ and ‘distributed
knowledge’ and the role of networked public spaces in political decision-making. In
the next section we review the arguments mobilised by contemporary theorists of
epistemic democracy that have re-interpreted ‘epistemic’ in light of a new research
emphasis on distributed knowledge and collective intelligence.
2.3 Epistemic Approaches to Democracy
The contemporary origins of epistemic approaches to democracy are interweaved
with those of deliberative democracy and, in fact, they have evolved in the same
way. The dichotomy between ‘talkers’ and ‘counters’ might eventually be more
apparent than real as the two paradigms diversify and overlap. This may create
some confusion to readers. For example, Joshua Cohen is often quoted as one of the
leading proponents of deliberative democracy but his seminal 1986 paper is titled
‘An epistemic conception of democracy’. In this paper, Cohen presents ‘an epis-
temic interpretation of voting’ with three components: ‘(1) an independent standard
of correct decisions—that is, an account of justice or of the common good that is
independent of current consensus and the outcome of votes; (2) a cognitive account
of voting—that is, the view that voting expresses beliefs about what the correct
policies are according to the independent standard, not personal preferences for
policies; and (3) an account of decision making as a process of the adjustment of
beliefs, adjustments that are undertaken in part in light of the evidence about the
correct answer that is provided by the beliefs of others.’ (Cohen 1986, 34). Cohen,
however, would eventually abandon this explicit formulation, and hence the
potential confusion. Melissa Schwartzberg has helped to clarify this issue by noting
that ‘as Cohen wrote the essay he had become skeptical about the idea that
democracy was fundamentally about aggregating opinions about the content of the
‘independent standard’ (Schwartzberg 2015, 189).
Another issue about the ‘independent standard of correctness’ is that there are
different versions of this core theoretical tenet in the epistemic democracy literature.
As David Estlund explains, ‘one version might say that there are right answers and
that democracy is the best way to get at them. Another version might say that there
are right answers and there is value in trying collectively to get at them whether or
not that is the most reliable way. Yet another: there are no right answers inde-
pendent of the political process, but overall it is best conceived as a collective way
of coming to know (and institute) what to do. There are others’ (Estlund 2008, 1).
The more pragmatic approaches to the standard seem to have prevailed, though.
Jack Knight has recently conceded that ‘there’s a growing number of people who
probably think that getting at ‘the truth’ is too strong a claim to make for democratic
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institutions, but who do think that democracy has epistemic value in producing
better decisions. Here the ‘better decisions’ would mean the enhancement of
democratic decisions through discussion’ (Knight et al. 2016, 138). Knight’s last
sentence also offers an additional clue by highlighting the role of deliberation in the
contemporary epistemic approaches. In her account, Schwartzberg states that
epistemic democracy emerged as a response to social choice theory to defend ‘the
capacity of ‘the many’ to make correct decisions’ (Schwartzberg 2015, 187–188)
and remarks that ‘epistemic democracy does not position itself as an alternative to
deliberative democracy but instead generally resituates deliberation as instrumental
to the aim of good, or correct, decision making’ (Schwartzberg 2015, 189).4
Similarly, Landemore argues that ‘epistemic democracy is both a subset of delib-
erative democracy and goes beyond it because it includes things that deliberative
democracy doesn’t necessarily include’ (Knight et al. 2016, 142). According to
Landemore, the epistemic models aim “to emphasize the knowledge-producing
properties of democratic institutions and procedures; and specifically (…) to assume
that those procedures are good at tracking a procedure-independent standard of
correctness, which is sometimes called ‘truth’” (Knight et al. 2016, 141).
Most contemporary epistemic democrats, in short, assume an independent
standard of correctness in their models, but they do so in different ways. Depending
on how it is formulated, democratic decision making will produce ‘true’, ‘right’,
‘good’, ‘correct’ or ‘better’ outcomes (provided that appropriate mechanisms are in
place, as we will see). Regardless of the tonality that the standard adopts, it is hardly
surprising if this is the cause of major theoretical debates. Can we rely on inde-
pendent standards of what is true, or right, or good, or better, when diversity of
opinions, values, and interests are the fabric of our plural democracies? If that is the
case for some questions (let us say, questions involving core democratic principles
or values) but not for others, how do we discern between them? As Schwartzberg
put is, ‘there may not be such an independent standard of correct decisions—or if
such standard exists, we might not have any way of knowing whether we had
reached it.’ (Schwartzberg 2015, 198). Or, alternatively, in Landemore’s view, it is
possible for epistemic-democratic theories to ‘conceptualize the truth, goodness, or
correctness of democratic decisions or solutions’ through diverse options: ‘you can
conceptualize it in terms of good governance, human rights, social justice, perhaps
a developmental index, a happiness index or something like that, or something else
entirely.’ (Knight et al. 2016, 143). From this perspective, political scientists and
social sciences in general could contribute to measure those achievements even
though, as Nadia Urbinati objects, ‘the measurement is always open to judgment
and my judgment can be different from yours because in the domain of political
4In a similar vein, Estlund acknowledged that group dynamics could produce ‘pathologies’ leading
to catastrophic decisions and insisted that this could mediated by ‘proper deliberative procedures’
and decision evaluation (Estlund 2008: 2). Ron Levy also suggests that the binary tensions that
result from counterposing different governance models are ‘to some extent illusory’ as some
accommodations can develop models which simultaneously encourage procedures, participation
and deliberation (Levy 2013, 355).
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opinion we don’t have a mathematical measurement after all’ (Knight et al. 2016,
149). The lack of conclusive answers or still insufficient empirical support leads
Schwartzberg to conclude that epistemic democrats ‘may wish to temper the
strength of their claims’ and that ‘relinquishing the independent standard of cor-
rectness ought to be a first step’ (Schwartzberg 2015, 201).5 Ultimately, this more
tempered approach seems to permeate Landemore’s response to the criticism that it
is difficult to ascertain whether a decision is good or not at the moment it is made:
‘In the here and now, at time T—the time of the decision—your only alternative is
to involve one, few, or many people in the decision procedure. All I’m saying is
that at time T you’ll likely better off with the decision that involves the greatest
number of people.’ (Knight et al. 2016, 146). In this nuanced account, the focus is
now placed on the mechanisms of aggregation of preferences and, particularly, on
exploring the conditions under which hypotheses such as ‘more is smarter’
(Landemore 2012a, 265) or ‘it is often better to have a group of cognitively diverse
people than a group of very smart people who think alike’ (Landemore 2012a, 260)
can be successfully tested.
2.3.1 Some Mechanisms of Aggregation in Epistemic
Approaches
The epistemic-democratic literature explores a number of mechanisms that can
support the argument for the epistemic properties of aggregation. The most popular
are the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) and its different variants and, most recently,
the ‘miracle of aggregation’ (e.g. Converse 1990; Surowiecki 2004), and the
Diversity Trumps Ability (DTA) theorem by Hong and Page (2004). Let’s briefly
review the three of them.
The Jury Theorem proposed by Condorcet in 1785 draws from the law of large
numbers and applies to issues that offer only two options, with one correct answer.
There are a number of variants of the CJT, including a generalisation of the theorem
from majority voting over two options to plurality voting over many options (List
and Goodin 2001). As Landemore presents it in its standard formulation, the
majority of voters will be “virtually certain to track the ‘truth’” if three conditions
are met: ‘(1) voters are better than random at choosing true propositions; (2) they
vote independently of each other; and (3) they vote sincerely or truthfully’
(Landemore 2012a, 265). The CJT has been largely scrutinised for its ‘value for
democratic theory’. For example, David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks first
5Alternatively, Schwartzberg proposes a more limited, ‘deflationary model’ that denominates
‘judgment democracy’: ‘Like most epistemic democrats, judgement democrats would agree that
individuals’ beliefs should derive from deliberation, while emphasizing the value of aggregation as
a means of affirming each individual’s dignity. (…) In doing so, the judgement model evinces the
respect for citizens than epistemic democrats have long displayed. But it does so without the yoke
of an implausible an unachievable independent standard.’ (Schwartzberg 2015, 201).
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questioned the assumption of voters’ sincerity as in a number of models since
voting failed to be informative and rational; instead, they suggested that ‘the
appropriate approach to problems of information aggregation is through game
theory and mechanism design, not statistics’ (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996, 44).
Also using a formal demonstration, Franz Dietrich and Kai Spiekermann have
contended that the ‘asymptotic conclusion’ of the CJT (the probability of a correct
majority decision converging to one as the group size tends to infinity) is ques-
tionable: ‘If the asymptotic conclusion applied directly to modern democracies with
their large populations, these democracies would be essentially infallible when
making decisions between two alternatives by simple majority’ (Dietrich and
Spiekermann 2013, 88). Dietrich and Spiekermann tackle one of the most signifi-
cant concerns in the CJT literature—the potential violation of voters’ independence
via exchange of information and deliberation—and note that it is ‘not always
obvious whether deliberation overall increases or decreases dependence, another
reason why the classical CJT literature struggles so much with deliberation’
(Dietrich and Spieckermann 2013, 106). Their proposal consists on a new notion of
independence, based on causal networks models, where deliberation not only does
not undermine independence but also augments voters’ competence:
‘Consequently, a group of deliberating economists may perform better because they
are more likely to face decisions they tend to get right, while isolated economists
may not’ (Dietrich and Spieckermann 2013, 106). Whereas this model reconciles
deliberation and competence with epistemic arguments for democracy based on jury
theorems there is still, as Schwartzberg notes, a lack of systematic testing of these
models and thus empirical evidence to demonstrate how judgements are achieved as
well as their epistemic value (Schwartzberg 2015, 195–197).
The ‘miracle of aggregation’ is another application of the ‘law of large numbers’
evident in different models. A simple explanation is the one offered by Marc
Keuschnigg and Christian Ganser: ‘the central tendency of a set of independent
estimates represents the truth more closely than the typical individual estimation’
(Keuschnigg and Ganser 2016, 1). Landemore reviews three versions of this model,
which she denominates ‘elitist’, ‘democratic’, and ‘distributed’. The first version is
labeled as ‘elitist’ as it relies on the presence of ‘informed people’ in the group to
arrive at a ‘right answer’ and thus is a form of ‘elite’ extraction. In the second
‘democratic’ version by Page and Shapiro (1992) no elite has the right answer and
everyone is roughly correct (the errors cancel each other and the collective decision
is more accurate than the individual guesses). In the ‘distributed version’, instead,
‘the right answer is dispersed in bits and pieces among many people’ (Landemore
2012a, 267). The objections that Landemore raises to these ‘miracle of aggregation’
versions regarding their relevance for democratic theory are twofold: (i) concern
about the assumption of independence of individual judgements (as with the CJT);
and (ii) empirical defeasibility of the hypothesis of random or symmetrical distri-
bution of errors (Landemore 2012a, 268).
The third mechanism, the ‘diversity trumps ability theorem’ (DTA) was first
formulated by Hong and Page (2004) and later discussed extensively in Page’s
book The Difference (2007). The DTA model focuses on ‘functional diversity’
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(‘differences in how people encode problems and attempt to solve them’) and
identifies the conditions under which ‘when selecting a problem-solving team from
a diverse population of intelligent agents, a team of randomly selected agents
outperforms a team comprised of the best-performing agents’ (Hong and Page
2004, 16386). In other words, ‘random collections of intelligent problem solvers
can outperform collections of the best individual problem solvers’ (Page 2007, 10).
The conditions (slightly modified in the 2007 version of the DTA) are that: ‘(1) The
problem must be difficult; (2) the perspectives and heuristics that the problem
solvers possess must be diverse; (3) the set of problem solvers from which we
choose our collection must be large; and (4) the collection of problem solvers must
not be too small’ (Page 2007, 10). In a recent replication of the DTA model,
Keuschnigg and Ganser have found a particular case where ‘ability’ remains rel-
evant: ‘in determining collective accuracy, diversity is crucial only in large groups
and/or in cases of aggregation via averaging. Hence, if forced to plurality vote in a
small group—which is often the case in decision-making committees in both firms
and public administrations—the electorate must contain highly competent indi-
viduals’ (Keuschnigg and Ganser 2016, 8). The DTA theorem, nevertheless, has
been criticised from different angles. Abigail Thompson has rebutted the mathe-
matical proof provided by Hong and Page and states that, under the proposed
conditions, randomness, and not diversity, is what trumps ability (Thompson 2014).
In another exposition of the theorem, John Weymark has noted that DTA does not
apply in situations involving binary choices and, when there are more than two
options to choose from, the assumption about non-strategic behaviour (decision
makers sharing information truthfully) may be as questionable as it is with CJT. He
concludes by suggesting caution, for DTA ‘offers no comfort to those who want to
use it to argue for the collective decision to be made by an inclusive set of indi-
viduals rather than by an epistocracy’ (Weymark 2015, 508).
Landemore considers both the CJT and the ‘miracle of aggregation’ as accounts
or mechanisms of collective intelligence drawing from statistics and probability
theory. The DTA theorem, instead, would be a more ‘cognitive account’ as ‘it
opens the black box of voters’ (Landemore 2012a, 268). However, this categori-
sation might be slightly confusing for two different reasons, as we will see.
First, although ‘account’ and ‘mechanism’ seem to be used indistinctively in her
essay, Landemore initially states that “‘mechanism’ is a loose term by which we
mean to refer to the concrete institutions that channel collective wisdom, such as
expert committees, deliberative assemblies, deliberative communities like
Wikipedia, majority rule, information markets, or the ranking algorithms of search
engines such as Google’ (Landemore 2012b, 12). However, the examples that
Landemore conflates are distinct: expert committees, deliberative assemblies, or
deliberative communities are institutions in the sense of groups of individuals
following ‘action-guiding rules’ (Ober 2008a, 8), while majority rule, information/
prediction markets, or ranking algorithms are formalised methods, processes, or
techniques. The different versions of CJT and ‘the miracle of aggregation’, there-
fore, are formal arguments, methods, or techniques to aggregate individual pref-
erences into a collective outcome, but not institutional mechanisms involving real
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people and both formal and informal action-guiding rules. Likewise, the DTA
theorem offers a mathematical argument for collective decision making (rather than
a cognitive account) and Page himself, in his answer to Thompson’s rebuttal,
refuses the accusation of misusing mathematics by assuring that ‘In my [Difference]
book, I caution readers to apply mathematical models carefully, highlighting the
subtleties of moving from the starkness of mathematical logic to the richness of
human interactions’ (Page 2015, 10). Very much like mini-publics are regarded as
living laboratories to test the theoretical principles of deliberative democracy,
epistemic democrats ask for more ‘empirical testing [of] the conditions under which
groups of ordinary citizens are most likely to produce wise decisions’
(Schwartzberg 2015, 197). Yet, none of the two approaches seem to fully
acknowledge Page’s call to take subtleties into account. In our view, those sub-
tleties translate into the contextual, intermediate level that shapes human decisions
and delimits their implementation, that is, the institutional layer of democratic
systems. Human interactions within ad hoc mini-publics cannot be disconnected
from the institutions that create them, set their governing rules, and apply (or not)
their carefully deliberated outcomes. Since micro-deliberations do not happen in a
vacuum, institutional agendas, policies, goals, expectations, and values are part of
the analysis too. The systemic approach calls for an ethnography of the institutions
as much as for empirical white-room testing or simulation modelling.
Let us illustrate this point with a real story about randomness and quizzes
extracted from Leonard Mlodinow’s book The drunkard’s walk: How randomness
rules our lives (Mlodinow 2009). The main character in this story is Marilyn vos
Savant, an American columnist and author listed in the Guinness Hall of Fame for
having scored the ‘World’s Highest IQ’ when tested as a child. Marilyn vos Savant
has also successfully run the Parade magazine column ‘Ask Marilyn’ since 1986,
replying to questions posted by readers on a vast number of topics. On September
1990, a reader (inspired by a popular television game show called Let’s Make a
Deal) asked Marilyn:
Suppose you’re on a game show, and you’re given the choice of three doors. Behind one
door is a car, behind the others, goats. You pick a door, say #1, and the host, who knows
what’s behind the doors, opens another door, say #3, which has a goat. He says to you, “Do
you want to pick door #2?” Is it to your advantage to switch your choice of doors?6
When Marilyn replied ‘Yes; you should switch. The first door has a 1/3 chance
of winning, but the second door has a 2/3 chance’ all hell broke loose. Marilyn
reported to have received more than 10,000 letters, some 1000 of them from
angered PhDs and academics accusing her of ‘propagating mathematical illiteracy’,
inviting her to check ‘a standard textbook on probability’ or arguing their case with
the more succinct ‘You are the goat!’ (Crockett 2015). According to Mlodinov,
92% of Americans ‘agreed that Marilyn was wrong’ (Mlodinov 2009, 44). Yet, she
was right, and her response was not only supported by mathematical proof and
computer simulations, but with data from the game show: ‘those who found
6As quoted in http://marilynvossavant.com/game-show-problem/.
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themselves in the situation described in the problem and switched their choice won
about twice as often as those who did not’ (Mlodinov 2009, 55). The reason why
Marilyn got it right and proved some of the best and brightest mathematical brains
of our time—including Paul Erdős—wrong lies outside Page’s ‘starkness of
mathematical logic’. Rather, it has to be found in the intermediate level of
‘action-guiding rules’. The rules of the TV game show entitled the program host to
intervene in an initially random process by using his inside knowledge to bias the
result, thus violating randomness (idem). None of Marilyn’s outraged critics did
factor in the contextual rules that altered the abstract conditions of their models.
As Mlodinov puts it, ‘to a mathematician a blunder is an issue of embarrassment,
but to a gambler it is an issue of livelihood’ (Mlodinov 2009, 56). As citizens (and
voters) living in polities, we probably keep being a perpetual source of embar-
rassment to our political philosophers, although we’re not in permanent gambling
survival mode either. Most of the time, we play predictably by interacting with
shared action-guiding rules. In other words, when it comes to real scenarios, either
deliberative or not, there is no mathematical logic capable to fully contain the
dynamic interplay between people’s behaviours and rules and the emergent prag-
matic properties of such an interplay. If that is the case, we still need an institutional
theory of democracy to explain how collective intelligence emerges from a myriad
of micro-interactions and contributes to produce an epistemically advanced form of
government.
Second, what does ‘collective intelligence’ (CI) mean in the epistemic approa-
ches we have reviewed so far? The notion of ‘collective intelligence’ gained its
current popularity with the publication of Pierre Lévy’s book L’intelligence col-
lective (1997) who defined CI as a ‘universally distributed intelligence, constantly
enhanced, coordinated in real time, and resulting in the effective mobilization of
skills’ (Levy 1997, 13). Lévy’s premise is that ‘no one knows everything, everyone
knows something, all knowledge resides in humanity’ (Levy 1997, 13–14). This
premise resonates with Edward Hutchins’ work on socially distributed cognition
(Hutchins 1995) and his effort to resituate the focus of cognitive science as a study
of ‘the social and material organization of cognitive activity’ rather than the solitary
individual. Other frequently quoted definitions approach CI as ‘the capability for a
group of individuals to envision a future and reach it in a complex context’ (Noubel
2008, 233); ‘groups of individuals doing things collectively that seem intelligent’
(Malone 2008); or ‘the general ability of a group to perform a wide variety of tasks’
(Woolley et al. 2010). In a review discussing the recent literature on CI in humans,
Juho Salminen highlights the multidisciplinary character of this emergent paradigm
and identifies three levels of abstraction: the micro-level (CI as ‘a combination of
psychological, cognitive and behavioral elements’); the macro-level (CI as a ‘sta-
tistical phenomenon’) and the level of emergence between the two which ‘deals
with the question of how system behavior on the macro-level emerges from
interactions of individuals at the micro-level’ (Salminen 2012, 3–5). If we follow
this categorisation, most of the epistemic approaches to democracy that draw on the
notion of CI use it in the sense of a macro-level ‘statistical phenomenon’. Yet, as we
have argued, this may exclude the middle level that emerges from individuals
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interacting with other individuals and rules: institutions. By considering institutions
as a key instance of CI, we also expand our notion of ‘epistemic’ when referring to
democratic systems. Thus, by ‘epistemic’ we do not refer to the properties of
aggregation, the majority rule, or to truth-seeking or better-than-something-else
mechanisms of CI. Rather, we understand ‘epistemic’ in the broader sense of
knowledge that is openly shared, used, and remixed. In this regard, we heavily rely
on the works of Josiah Ober when he explores the connections between democracy
and knowledge using classical Athens as a case in point. And we also borrow from
Henry Farrell and Cosma Shalizi’s outline of what they defined as ‘cognitive
democracy’ (Farrell and Shalizi 2015). We discuss both approaches in the next
section.
2.4 Knowledge, Cognition, and Democracy
Josiah Ober’s approach to the relationship between democracy and knowledge can be
better illustrated by his proposal to revisit its original meaning (Ober 2008b). Ober
considers that it is ‘reductive’ to define democracy as ‘the power of the people (…) to
decide matters by majority rule’ since it makes democracy ‘vulnerable to well-known
social choice dilemmas, including Downs’ rational ignorance and Arrow’s impos-
sibility theorem’ (Ober 2008b, 3). He then proposes revisiting the concept by
returning to the Greek sources of the term and rendering it ‘less vulnerable to the
problems associated with aggregating diverse preferences by voting’ (Ober 2008b,
3). As opposed to other political terms, Ober notes, ‘the term demos refers to a
collective body’ rather than a number (one, a few, or many) (2008b, 4) and “kratos’,
when it is used as a regime-type suffix, becomes power in the sense of strength,
enablement, or ‘capacity to do things’” (Ober 2008b, 6). Demokratia, therefore
‘refers to a demos’ collective capacity to do things in the public realm, to make things
happen’ (Ober 2008b, 7). To make things happen in the public realm, Ober argues,
‘democratic Athens depended directly and self-consciously on actively deploying the
epistemic resources of its citizenry’ (Ober 2012, 118), something quite different from
our current political practice that ‘often treats free citizens as passive subjects by
discounting the value of what they know’ (Ober 2008a, 1).
Consequently, a definition of democracy as people’s ‘capacity to do things’, not
majority rule, raises the major question of how people can mobilise knowledge to
do things, or ‘how we put knowledge to work’ (Ober 2008a, 3). Ober uses the word
‘knowledge’ rather than ‘intelligence’ since, drawing from organisational theory,
his notion of knowledge covers ‘a matrix of experience, expertise, and information’
that is possessed by individuals but which is also ‘located in social networks and
reproduced by institutional processes’ (Ober 2012, 119). The advantage of classical
Athens, in Ober’s view, was to put knowledge in action ‘by transforming raw data
and unprocessed information into politically valuable knowledge’—which is
aligned with the definition of knowledge in Chap. 1 as ‘information used to make a
better decision’. Politically relevant knowledge consists of ‘people’s beliefs,
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capabilities, experience, and information, organized in ways that can be reproduced
and shared within and among collectivities’; and it ‘conjoins social/interpersonal
and technical/expert forms of knowledge that are possessed by the organisation as a
whole (in the form of institutionalized processes and formal codes) and by indi-
viduals (both explicit and latently)’ (Ober 2008a, 91).
As Ober notes, the Athenian processes are ‘quite different from core political
processes of modern democratic nation-states’ (Ober 2008a, 97). Representative
democracy or political parties were not part of the Athenian landscape, and voting
for candidates seeking public office did not have the weight it has in our democratic
systems. Yet, Ober identifies three problems in the organisation of politically
valuable knowledge that are very familiar to any contemporary reader: (i) dispersed
latent knowledge problem; (ii) unaligned actions problem, (iii) transaction costs
problem. The solution to these three problems relies on institutional designs capable
to articulate three different institutionalised epistemic processes: aggregation,
alignment, and codification (Ober 2008a, 18). The three of them involve both
innovation (‘generation of new solutions’) and learning (‘socialisation in routines of
proven value’) (Ober 2008a, 19) and are defined as follows:
– Aggregation: the process of collecting the right kinds of dispersed knowledge in
a timely manner for purposes of decision making.
– Alignment: [the process of] enabling people who prefer similar outcomes to
coordinate their actions by reference to shared values and a shared body of
common knowledge.
– Codification: the process by which implemented decisions become
action-guiding rules capable of influencing future social behavior and inter-
personal exchanges. (Ober 2008a, 26–27).
Ober presents knowledge aggregation in a large participatory democracy as a
collective action problem where, for any rational individual, the costs of sharing
knowledge exceed the potential benefits. To reverse that situation, some conditions
must be met. The first one is more of a precondition: access to low-cost commu-
nication technologies that keep the burden to share information to a minimum.
Second, either material or immaterial incentives (or a combination of both) to share
knowledge must be in place. Third, successful aggregation requires an ‘epistemic
sorting device’, that is, filtering mechanisms that are ‘context sensitive’ and retain
valuable knowledge while leaving irrelevant or useless knowledge out (Ober 2008a,
120). As the costs of aggregating knowledge increase with complexity and scale,
both coupled and fine-tuned processes of routinisation and innovation are required.
Routinisation preserves the stock of knowledge by ‘archiving data, establishing
standard protocols, and socializing members into ‘the way we do things around
here’’ (idem). As routinisation may also hinder adaptiveness to changing envi-
ronments, institutions must be able to preserve diversity and the capacity to absorb
external knowledge so that they can innovate and stay competitive.
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Alignment in participatory democracy is about ‘carrying out plans in the absence
of command-and-control mechanisms’ (Ober 2008a, 168). Ober argues that clas-
sical Athens used a combination of mechanisms allowing a seamless transition from
decision-making to implementation of decisions: (i) informed leader following;
(ii) procedural rules following, and (iii) institutional commitments following.
Athenian citizens thus managed to align their behaviour by ‘learning a substantial
body of common knowledge, following informed leaders, mastering a set of simple
procedural rules, and accepting the credibility of others’ precommitments’ (Ober
2008a, 171). Publicity was critical in the process, for it ‘made relevant knowledge
commonly available for uptake’ (idem). But so was the legal system. By using a
legal case study (a trial for treason in 330 B.C.) Ober highlights how the legal
system ‘played a key role in building useful social knowledge and publicizing
commitments, but also in regulating the system by offering reasonable safeguards
against socially disruptive cascades of accurate following’ (Ober 2008a, 182).
Codification encapsulates the process of bringing social knowledge into statu-
tory, written form. In Athens as in modern societies, Ober argues, codification can
be approached as a mechanism to reduce transaction costs in productive exchanges
or, following the work of Ronald Coase, making them ‘as frictionless as possible’
(Ober 2008a, 217). Nevertheless, as there are other complementary instruments
which also serve that purpose, the epistemic process of codification is expanded to
include not just formal rules, but also dispute resolution procedures, standard
exchange media (coinage, measures, weights, etc.), open-access facilities (markets,
communications, transports, etc.) and third-party rents (e.g. taxes). Codified
democratic rules, therefore, aimed at providing predictability to market exchanges
but, ultimately, embodied fairness (or the mutually shared guarantee that similar
situations would be treated similarly). A codified principle of fairness helped to
consolidate ‘a mass/elite social equilibrium’ and made Athenian democracy more
resilient to ‘endemic hostility among social classes’.
In describing the three epistemic processes of aggregation, alignment, and
codification, Ober emphasises the role of distributed social and technical knowledge
as the fertiliser to the ‘flourishing of democratic organisations’ (Ober 2008a, 265)
or, as he will later conceptualise, as a key contributor to ‘efflorescence’, defined as
‘increased economic growth accompanied by a sharp uptick in cultural achieve-
ment’ (Ober 2015, 2). Democratic processes enabling widely distributed knowledge
and the efficient interplay between economic growth and cultural achievement also
made citizens willing to become ‘sharers in a democratic culture’ by ‘rationally
[choosing] to participate in the productive work of citizenship’ (Ober 2008a, 267).
What are the implications of Ober’s analysis of democracy in classical Athens?
The first one is that a more active, engaged citizenship is possible.
If management of knowledge, distributed among a diverse population through the operation
of participatory institutions, helped to promote high performance in the competitive world
of classical Greece, there is less reason to assume that the role of the citizen in a modern
democracy need be limited to occasionally choosing among competitive elites on the basis
of their party affiliation (Ober 2008a, 267–268).
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In addition, the Athenian lessons also suggest that adequate mechanisms of
coordination do not inevitably require command-and-control structures in place, as
technocratic and elitist arguments would presuppose. Emergent models of
commons-based production systems and peer-to-peer (P2P) structures of gover-
nance as the ones described, among others, by Benkler (2003, 2006), Bollier (2008,
2014) or Kostakis and Bauwens (2014) provide evidence of similar coordinating
mechanisms in absence of centralised authorities. In many cases, low-cost com-
munication technologies and information filtering systems do not just mitigate
transaction costs, but actually enable transactions to happen. Likewise, they may
help to reduce the increased scale issues that Ober points out. Interestingly, Ober’s
closing remarks acknowledge that ‘the full potential of modern information tech-
nology for facilitating knowledge aggregation and public action in democratic
contexts remains to be explored’ (Ober 2008a, 268). In a similar vein, as Henry
Farrell and Cosma Shalizi have suggested in their outline of ‘cognitive democracy’:
The rise of the Internet makes this an especially good time for experimenting with
democratic structures. Democracy is uniquely fitted to help people with highly diverse
perspectives come together to solve problems collectively. Democracy can do this better
than either markets or hierarchies because it brings these diverse understandings into direct
contact with each other, allowing forms of learning that are unlikely either though the price
mechanism of markets or the hierarchical arrangements of bureaucracy (Farrell and Shalizi
2015, 211).
Precisely, exploring the potential of some of our state-of-the-art information
technologies for democracy is the core aim of this book. In our approach, we
consider that linking digital data, information, and knowledge could be one of the
mechanisms contributing to a renewed version of knowledge distribution in our
contemporary societies. The following chapter will provide some examples and
suggestions in this direction.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined two mainstream approaches to democratic theory. Despite
their differences, both deliberative and epistemic theories of democracy have more
common roots and share more normative ideals than their readings might initially
suggest. As Jose Luis Marti argues, a defender of deliberative democracy ‘cannot
actually hold a pure proceduralist conception’ while at the same time an ‘adequate
epistemic conception of deliberative democracy’ must combine intrinsic and
instrumental principles (Marti 2006, 28). This confluence of procedural principles
and deliberative outputs is also traceable in the experimental design of mini-publics
or in the cases that Ober selects to illustrate the unfolding of the epistemic processes
of aggregation, alignment, and codification in classical Athens.
The ‘linked democracy’ perspective proposed in this book does not contradict
these previous approaches. Rather, it builds on them to develop the foundations for
a theory of the meso level, or an institutional theory of democracy in the digital era.
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In this attempt, it largely borrows from these two major contributions to propose, in
line with Farrell and Shalizi, a ‘broader agenda for cross-disciplinary research
involving computational scientists and democratic theorists’ (Farrell and Shalizi
2015, 212). These borrowings notwithstanding, our linked democracy approach
analogy will require an institutional analysis of democracy (or a meso-level anal-
ysis): platforms, apps, blockchains, or digital data are just the technology compo-
nent of an emergent participatory ecosystem. We need to better understand the
properties that emerge through the interaction between people, digital tools and data
in order to bridge the gap between technology and institutions, since only the latter,
if consistently linked, can propagate the knowledge required to enhance civic action
and, ultimately, bring isegoria (the equal say of every citizen) into the democratic
system.
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Chapter 3
Multilayered Linked Democracy
An infinite amount of knowledge is waiting to be unearthed.
—Hess and Ostrom (2007)
Abstract Although confidence in democracy to tackle societal problems is falling,
new civic participation tools are appearing supported by modern ICT technologies.
These tools implicitly assume different views on democracy and citizenship which
have not been fully analysed, but their main fault is their isolated operation in
non-communicated silos. We can conceive public knowledge, like in Karl Popper’s
World 3, as distributed and connected in different layers and by different connec-
tors, much as it happens with the information in the web or the data in the linked
data cloud. The interaction between people, technology and data is still to be
defined before alternative institutions are founded, but the so called linked
democracy should rest on different layers of interaction: linked data, linked plat-
forms and linked ecosystems; a robust connectivity between democratic institutions
is fundamental in order to enhance the way knowledge circulates and collective
decisions are made.
Keywords Linked democracy  Multilayered linked democracy  Linked data 
Linked platforms  Linked ecosystems  World 3  Institutions
3.1 Introduction
Contemporary democracies face growing scepticism about their capacity to manage
complex societal problems. Financial crises, inequality and poverty, climate change
and armed conflicts routinely test the resilience of our democratic systems.
Researchers are predominantly expressing concern about the developments of the
last decade. Larry Diamond draws from Freedom House data to argue that we are in
a ‘mild but protracted democratic recession’ since 2006 (Diamond 2015, 144).
Roberto Foa and Yascha Mounk analyse World Values Surveys to conclude that
citizens in Western democracies have ‘become more cynical about the value of
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democracy as a political system, less hopeful that anything they do might influence
public policy, and more willing to express support for authoritarian alternatives’
(Foa and Mounk 2016, 7). John Boik et al. warn that traditional democratic insti-
tutions are failing and that ‘the versions of democracy attempted by newly
democratizing nations have been even less effective’ (Boik et al. 2015). Globally,
voter turnout—a standard proxy to measure citizens’ satisfaction with democratic
institutions—has been steadily but consistently declining since the 1960s (IDEA
International 2016).
This sceptical outlook coexists with some unprecedented technology trends: by
2020, about 1.7 megabytes of new information will be created every second, for
every human being (Forbes 2015); there will be more mobile phone subscriptions
than people on the planet and more than 6 billion of these devices will be smart-
phones (ITU 2015). Digital technologies not only disrupt business models, they
now shape the way we access information, knowledge, and increasingly, the way
we exercise our rights. In doing so, they also transform civic action and enable new
forms of citizenship.
Political science, media and culture studies, and ICT disciplines have already
produced a vast literature on civic participation online (e.g., see meta-analysis by
Boulianne 2015; Gil de Zúñiga and Shahin 2015; Martin 2014). In contrast,
democracy and citizenship studies have largely ignored the cyberspace and its
implications for broader theories and practices of democratisation and citizenship
(Polat and Pratchett 2014; Isin and Ruppert 2015; Theocharis and Van Deth 2016).
Yet, the new venues for civic and political participation enabled by the geomobile
revolution find their roots in well-established traditions. Different conceptions of
citizenship derived from liberal, republican, deliberative, and epistemic political
theories of democracy are now implicitly embedded in a myriad of tools and apps
designed to support a number of activities, such as accessing information, moni-
toring representatives, making petitions and requests, or engaging in deliberation or
document drafting. Are these spaces the seeds of an emergent ecosystem where
data, information and knowledge will circulate seamlessly across platforms? At the
moment, the organic growth of participatory tools looks more as a fragmentary,
disjointed, and disconnected multiplicity of digital silos than an interdependent
system of entities with different functionalities and complementary strengths.
As new tools for democratic participation continue to populate the cybersphere,
they offer potential alternatives for mass participation. At one end of the spectrum
there is a scenario of persistently enclosed silos (filter bubbles and echo chambers,1
in the worst case) that reinforces both atomisation and reverberation. At the other
end there is a dynamic ecosystem that leverages data to generate information and
mobilise knowledge for coordinated civic action and collective decision making.
We call this second alternative ‘linked democracy’ as digital technology enables
1Your Filter Bubble is Destroying Democracy. Wired, Nov. 2016. https://www.wired.com/2016/
11/filter-bubble-destroying-democracy/.
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multidimensional connections within the ecosystem: data with data; people with
data; people with people; people with government, etc.
3.2 Knowledge Discovery: On the Shoulders of World 3
Explorers
In 1986, Don Swanson, Dean of the Graduate Library School at the University of
Chicago, coined the term of ‘undiscovered public knowledge’ to refer to independent
fragments of knowledge that ‘are logically related but never retrieved, brought
together, and interpreted’ (Swanson 1986, 103). Swanson considered ‘undiscovered
public knowledge’ to be part of what Karl Popper had conceptualised as ‘World 3’ in
his 1975 bookObjective Knowledge. Popper, not without cautioning his readers from
“taking the words ‘world’ or ‘universe’ too seriously” (Popper 1975, 106) used them
to refer to three different domains. Hence, World 1 was the world of physical objects
or states; World 2 referred to states of consciousness or mental states; World 3,
finally, was the world of ‘objective contents of thought’ (idem). The contents of
Popper’s World 3 are vast and ever-growing. Among them, we find scientific
knowledge, problems, arguments, poetic thoughts, or works of art. As this universe
of human knowledge is continuously expanding, Swanson argues, it can also ‘yield
genuinely new discoveries’ (Swanson 1986, 103). In this sense, his working
hypothesis foresees ‘vast areas of World 3 not yet discovered solely because of our
limited ability to index, organize, and retrieve information’ (Swanson 1986, 107).
This anticipates contemporary work on informational retrieval and on computational
creativity, a branch of Artificial Intelligence exploring ‘the use of computers to
generate results that would be regarded as creative if produced by humans alone’
(Boden 2015, v). In Swanson’s view, ‘information retrieval is necessarily incom-
plete, problematic, and therefore of great interest—for it is just this incompleteness
that implies the existence of undiscovered public knowledge’ (Swanson 1986, 109).
Since a ‘total exploration of World 3’ in search of all information relevant to a theory
(or its refutation) will always be unattainable, information retrieval techniques cir-
cumvent total exploration ‘by assigning each piece of recorded information (or
‘document’) different ‘points of access’ or ‘searchable attributes’ such as title words,
index terms, descriptors, subject headings, or classification symbols’ (Swanson 1986,
113). In doing so, Swanson acknowledges that ‘it is illusory to think that such handles
can encode either the meaning or the relevance of a document with respect to all
problems or theories to which it is logically related, especially to problems and
theories not recognized or formulated at the time the document is created’ (idem).
Again, Swanson’s point about the essential incompleteness and uncertainty of
information retrieval is relevant to linked open data. Today’s explorers of World 3
have standardised routes to navigate data, but new knowledge that awaits discovery
(and most important, application) will remain elusive without the emergence of
institutions supporting the processes of aggregation and alignment as described by
Josiah Ober (Ober 2008).
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Swanson’s account of undiscovered public knowledge was based on scientific
knowledge (and, more especifically, medical knowledge) but the Web 2.0 and the
explosion of user-generated contents makes it possible to extend his notion to other
areas. The cybersphere is now a trove of the most varied forms of undiscovered
knowledge, including political knowledge that has been produced in a particular
context but remains untapped beyond that boundary. Yet, this knowledge could be
useful for deliberation and decision-making purposes in another context, provided
that it continues to be relevant in the new scenario (e.g. it covers a similar topic, a
similar issue or process, etc.). A mass scale deliberation on how to regulate food
packaging in Norway, for example, can provide relevant insights for a similar dis-
cussion being held in Canada. But how do we discover that? And how do we identify
(and translate!) key ideas, issues, or suggestions debated in the Norwegian case? Do
we need to read thousands of posts by the order they were posted? From our per-
spective, making this emergent knowledge available whenever necessary is a key
challenge, and one that can only be addressed by combining different strategies at
different levels.
3.3 Data, People, Institutional Arrangements
Open data and linked open data are essential resources in a linked democracy
approach as they provide both the elementary contents and the connecting archi-
tecture. For the sake of clarity, we adopt here the well-established distinction
between data, information, and knowledge that is standard in the domains of
knowledge management and information systems. Yet, this process is not automatic
nor spontaneous. It requires additional arrangements—such as agreements about
what type of data are relevant in any particular context, the human computing
procedures to work with them and the rules that will guide the overall process.
We consider these arrangements as ‘institutional’ for they require: (i) multiple,
repeated interactions between people, technology, and data, and (ii) guidelines,
procedures and rules to coordinate behaviour, execute processes, make decisions,
and manage misalignment and conflict. Institutional arrangements can be
pre-existent to the design and development of digital tools or they may emerge and
evolve with them. If pre-existing, we have established institutions (for example,
local councils, state, and national governments) supporting the design and devel-
opment of a digital tool with a particular purpose—public consultation, deliberation,
voting, etc. This can be part of a broader e-government program or strategy. Some
parliamentary bodies have also followed that path. An example of this is Wikilegis,
one of the participatory platforms created by LabHacker, a technology unit of the
Brazilian Parliament that designs and develops digital tools to facilitate online
participation of citizens in the early stages of legislative processes (Ferri 2013).2
2http://labhackercd.net/.
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Where institutional arrangements are not pre-existent, we have emerging movements and
organisations building their own tools, procedures, and rules as they grow. A growing body
of literature is now exploring the rise of digitally-savvy political parties such as the Pirate
Party in some European countries, Podemos in Spain, or the Five Star Movement in Italy
(e.g. Postill 2017; Simon et al. 2017; Tormey and Feenstra 2015). A more recent example is
DIEM25, launched in February 2016 as pan-European movement for “democratising
Europe in general and the European Union institutions in particular” (not a political party
but a movement supporting third party candidates in national elections across Europe.3
DIEM25 relies on both an online platform for transnational coordination and on sponta-
neous collectives (DSCs) to promote the movement locally.
This can also be illustrated with the case of #BlackLivesMatter, the movement
that started in 2012 as a Twitter hashtag to protest against the fatal shooting of
African-American Trayvon Martin and the subsequent acquittal of George
Zimmerman. The hashtag resurfaced on Twitter in 2014 following the deaths of two
other African Americans: Michael Brown in Ferguson, and Eric Garner in New
York City. The movement, founded by community activists Alicia Garza, Patrisse
Cullors and Opal Tometi now has 37 chapters in the US, one in Canada, and has
gained traction with support rallies in cities such as Sydney and Melbourne in
Australia. #BlackLivesMatter also defines the movement as ‘an online forum
intended to build connections between Black people and our allies to fight
anti-Black racism, to spark dialogue among Black people, and to facilitate the types
of connections necessary to encourage social action and engagement’.4 One of the
offshoots of #BlackLivesMatter is WeTheProtesters.org, which describes itself as a
‘hub and a source of information’, as well as ‘a space for protestors nationwide to
access the tools and resources to mobilize and organize’.5 Among the available
sources of information is Mappingpoliceviolence.org,6 a digital map of police
violence in the US, built on top of other Web sources. The mappers deploy different
procedures to visualise and locate violent incidents, including aggregation of
crowdsourced datasets, social media monitoring, and information retrieval:
This information has been meticulously sourced from the three largest, most comprehensive
and impartial crowdsourced databases on police killings in the country: FatalEncounters.
org, the U.S. Police Shootings Database and KilledbyPolice.net. We’ve also done extensive
original research to further improve the quality and completeness of the data; searching
social media, obituaries, criminal records databases, police reports and other sources to
identify the race of 91% of all victims in the database.7
3https://diem25.org/organising-principles/.
4http://blacklivesmatter.com/.
5http://www.wetheprotesters.org/exe-sum-and-overview.
6http://mappingpoliceviolence.org/.
7Idem.
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As the civil rights activists put it ‘we were able to almost create an alternative
institution that did a better job of collecting [data on this issue] than the federal
government’ (Peters 2016). In a related project that aims to hold police chiefs and
mayors accountable for violent incidents,8 activists also deployed a micro-tasking
strategy:
‘There’s actually no national database of local elected officials, what their dis-
tricts are, what their contact information is, and that’s a huge issue when we’re
talking about policing, which is predominantly local,’ he says. ‘So all of those
things can be crowdsourced, broken up into manageable tasks that anyone can
complete’. People with some specialized skills—attorneys or designers, for
example—will be connected with more specialized tasks. (Peters 2016).
#BlackLivesMatter and WeTheProtesters.org evolve fluidly as they attract more
participants, release and test new tools, and deploy different procedures to achieve
different aims as emergent civil rights movements (raising awareness, monitoring,
reporting, campaigning, advocating, etc.). While the aims remain the same as their
predecessors in this domain, members of the new movements interact with data and
tools in innovative ways, such as leveraging social media, deploying crowdsourcing
and microtasking methods, or producing and releasing open data with an intended
ripple effect.
These cases certainly deserve a more detailed analysis of the emerging institu-
tional arrangements, but they help to shed light on the claim that our linked
democracy approach is multidimensional and pays attention to different layers of
connections and connectors, which is another way to refer to the new explorers of
digital World(s).
3.4 Connections and Connectors: A Multilayered Linked
Democracy
Our linked democracy approach builds on a multilayered ecosystem of connections
and connectors. Since both connections and connectors are dynamically related,
different analogies are possible. The concept of ‘layer’, widely used in Web science,
is one of them. For example, the Internet is usually visualised as a three-layered
architecture (with its three main infrastructural, logical, and social layers).
Likewise, the Semantic Web is typically represented as a stack of different tech-
nologies and languages, and both platforms and apps are now said to be built ‘on
top of’ open data Fig. 3.1.
Linked democracy could also be represented as a three-layered structure that
would include: (i) Linked Open Data (LOD); (ii) Linked Platforms (LP), and
(iii) Linked Ecosystems (LE). While “linked’ in LOD implies the use of stan-
dardised technologies (such as URIs to identify entities, HTTP to retrieve resources
8http://www.checkthepolice.org/#review.
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or descriptions of resources, or RDF specifications to structure and connect data that
describe things in the world), the concept is not used in the same way in LP and LE,
where it refers to loosely connected institutions and ecosystems (and therefore,
without the technical infrastructure that characterises LOD). In the remaining pages
of this chapter we will present these three layers with more detail. We will argue
that the recent developments in LOD are appreciable in many areas, whereas the
efforts to link platforms and build linked ecosystems are much less discernible. Yet,
a comprehensive linked democracy requires a full-fledged connectome, to borrow
the concept that has sparked the mapping of the neural connectivity within the brain
(Hagmann 2005). Sebastian Seung, one of the leading researchers in the emerging
area of connectomics, defines the connectome as the ‘totality of connections
between the neurons in a nervous system’ (Seung 2012, vii). Our claim is that a
robust connectivity between democratic institutions is fundamental to enhance the
way knowledge circulates and collective decisions are made. Such connectivity
exists and can be mapped now at the data layer, but since our digital platforms
remain largely disconnected that knowledge is kept inside silos.
3.4.1 Linked Open Data (LOD)
In our approach, the Linked Open Data cloud described in Chap. 1 is a key
component of a linked democracy ecosystem. Politically relevant knowledge pre-
mised on the LOD cloud is critical for monitoring, deliberating, or making informed
decisions. In the last few years, governments, international organisations, and other
public and private entities have contributed to the growth of LOD by releasing an
increasing number of datasets in LOD formats.
Linked open government data (LOGD) comes with a number of potential ben-
efits, such as ‘the reuse of government data, opening up new business opportunities,
enhancing government transparency and citizen engagement, and distributing the
cost of government data processing to communities’ (Ding et al. 2012, 11). The US
and the UK portals (Data.gov and Data.gov.uk) and the EU Open Data Portal were
among the early adopters of LOGD at the start of this decade and have developed a
number of mandates and policies ever since. Other initiatives currently developing
Fig. 3.1 Internet layers
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in this area are The Talk of Europe (TOE), a project that curates the multilingual
proceedings of the European Parliament, enriches this data with biographical and
political information on the MPs, and converts these data to RDF, so they can be
linked with other parliamentary records or further resources in other European
countries (Hollink et al. 2015). Another European project exploits the LOD service
for pre-legislative documents available at the EU Publications Office to enable
citizens’ participation in public consultations within the EU decision-making pro-
cess (Schmitz et al. 2016). In the US, the Library of Congress makes available its
entire collection as a Linked Data Service,9 and the Department of Veterans Affairs
is also using Linked Data ‘to integrate over 35 years of health data from over 1200
care sites’10 (Richards 2015).
The public effort to produce, collect, and make LOD publicly available does not
necessarily lead to immediate uptake by other organisations, the private sector, or
citizens at large. Although research is still scarce in this area, there are some studies
analysing the impact of open data and LOD at the country level. For example, in
their review of open data for higher education in South Africa, van Schalkwyk et al.
note, ‘the open data that are made available by government is inaccessible and
rarely used’ (van Schalkwyk et al. 2016, 68). To mitigate such ‘data viscosity’, they
argue, intermediaries are essential. As they put it, “intermediaries are found to play
several important roles in the ecosystem: (i) they increase the accessibility and
utility of data; (ii) they may assume the role of a ‘keystone species’ in a data
ecosystem; and (iii) they have the potential to democratize the impacts and use of
open data” (idem). ‘Keystone species’ in the open data ecosystem are ‘actors who
bridge institutional boundaries and translate across disciplines, or (…) creators of
value in ecosystems by creating platforms, services, tools or technologies that offer
solutions to other actors in the ecosystem’ (van Schalkwyk et al. 2016, 77). These
findings are consistent with another study on UK citizens’ perceptions of the
usability of open data, which reports that the ‘rawness’ of open data makes citizens
‘unable to use the data for any meaningful purpose relating to their life events or
decisions’ (Weerakkody et al. 2017). The authors argue that both the advanced
analytical skills required to analyse open data and the generic nature of most data
repositories are barriers to citizens’ use of such data for public policy making debate
or decision making. Nevertheless, the different filtering operations required to make
data usable for citizens also offer opportunities to develop efficient platforms and
interfaces (idem). In his interesting ethnography of the Open Knowledge
Foundation in Germany, Stefan Baack observes that ‘raw data’ typically means ‘as
collected’ and does not imply any ‘objective’ or ‘unbiased’ nature (Baack 2015, 4).
Baack also notes that the open data community has largely adopted the model of
open source projects and communities, and this has an impact on the way they
conceive the relation between open data, participation, governance, and democracy:
9http://id.loc.gov.
10http://vistadataproject.info.
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Taken together, the way [open data] activists apply the open source model of participation
to governance results in a notion of a more open and flexible form of representative
democracy. ‘Open’ refers to a higher degree of transparency (by sharing raw data) and the
openness of political decision-making processes for public participation. ‘Flexible’ means
that activists think that the inclusion and coordination of citizens’ voluntary, ‘self-selective
participation’ should be adapted to the issue at hand and to the local context. (…) From the
perspective of democratic theory, they negotiate between representative models of
democracy—in which participation is mainly limited to periodic voting—and direct models
of democracy, where entire electorates vote on certain proposals. (Baack 2015, 5)
Baack equally points to the key role of ‘empowering intermediaries’ in nurturing
a ‘data-driven’ paradigm of citizen empowerment (Baack 2015, 6). We refer to
these different ‘keystone species’ or ‘empowering intermediaries’ as ‘connectors’,
that is, agents whose operations with data and technology enable the creation of
more accessible, contextualised, and reusable contents. Connectors have also been
referred to as ‘infomediaries’, or ‘intermediate consumers of data (…) [that] play an
essential role in making sense of, and creating value out of raw data’ (Wessels et al.
2017, 62).
Examples of connectors are journalist networks and organisations that engage in
data-driven journalism, such as the Global Investigative Journalism Network
(GIJN),11 ProPublica,12 Internews,13 The Intercept,14 or Bellingcat.15 In the leg-
islative domain, the platform Digital Democracy makes California and New York
state bills, hearings, committees, speakers, and related organisations searchable by
keyword, topic, speaker, organization, or date. Videos in the platform are tran-
scribed and can be annotated by its users.16 Other examples of connectors are
Data.world (a social network facilitating collaborative discovery of data), Citygram.
org (a platform transforming open data from cities in human readable format), or
sites such as Extractafact.org,17 ResourcesProjects.org,18 the US Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative, and OpenOil.net19 (analysing open data from
extractive industries). In the area of financial data (budgets, public expenditure,
public procurement, etc.) examples include platforms such as OpenSpending.org
(tracking and analysing public financial information globally),20 OpenContracting
11https://gijn.org/.
12https://www.propublica.org/.
13https://www.internews.org/data-journalism.
14https://theintercept.com/.
15https://www.bellingcat.com/.
16https://www.digitaldemocracy.org.
17https://www.extractafact.org/.
18https://www.resourceprojects.org/.
19https://openoil.net/.
20https://openspending.org/ (see Höffner et al. 2015).
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(publishing government contracting data with the ‘Open Contracting Data
Standard’ and reporting information for different countries),21 GosZatraty22 (using
Russian public expenditure data to examine, understand and detect abuse or cor-
ruption in public procurement), OpenCorporates (an open database with data from
about 110 million companies in 115 different jurisdictions)23 and ProductOpenData
(building a public database of product data). Vafopoulos et al. (2016) have recently
proposed a top-level ontology (Linked Open Economy (LOE)) to link open eco-
nomic data. The ontology models the flows in public procurement together with
market processes and prices. The LOE ontology, according to its proponents, ‘is
designed to be a compact common ground established for developers, journalists,
professionals and public authorities to use and customize open economic data’
(Vafopoulos et al. 2016, 9). As a top-level ontology, LOE could provide ‘a baseline
to develop new systems, to enable information exchange between systems, to
integrate data from heterogeneous sources and to publish open data related to
economic activities’ (idem).
The role of connectors is also referred in the literature as ‘data activism’ (Milan
and Van der Velden 2016, Schrock 2016). In this perspective, data activism is a
distinctive form of digital activism that ‘embraces the composite series of
sociotechnical practices that, emerging at the fringes of the contemporary activism
ecology, interrogate datafication and its socio-political consequences’ (Milan and
Van der Velden 2016, 3). Data activism can imply different tactics: positive action
(‘affirmative engagement with data’) but also ‘resistance to massive data collection’
(idem). Schrock’s data activism is conflated with advocacy and includes ‘request-
ing, digesting, contributing to, modeling, and contesting data’ (Schrock 2016, 581).
In Schrock’s perspective, data activists are seen as both civic hackers who ‘trans-
gress established boundaries of political participation’ and ‘utopian realists
involved in the crafting of algorithmic power and discussing ethics of technology
design’ (idem). While many open data initiatives may find their practices and
rhetorics well rooted in the civic hacking soil, this characterisation entails the risk of
leaving a number of other relevant connectors out of the picture. Authors such as
Coleman (2013) and Baack (2015) have already emphasised in their studies the
heterogeneity of hackers’ communities. Especially when it comes to the adoption
and further deployment of LOD, the active involvement of governments, interna-
tional institutions, non-for profit organisations, public and private research funding,
etc. makes the landscape significantly more complex than it was a decade ago. The
broad range of stakeholders, ultimately, is also an essential component of a linked
democracy.
21http://www.open-contracting.org/.
22https://clearspending.ru/.
23https://opencorporates.com/.
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3.4.2 Linked Platforms
Since Berners-Lee’s first paper on design issues in Linked Data (Berners-Lee
2006), there has been a vast effort over the past decade to build and enlarge LOD
infrastructures. Data in the Web are now more linked than ten years ago and the
LOD ecosystem is expanding, but silos persist in many areas. Civic engagement
technologies are one of them. As John Gastil has written, ‘Dozens—and possibly
hundreds—of online platforms have been built in the past decade to facilitate
specific forms of civic engagement. Unconnected to each other, let alone an inte-
grated system easy for citizens to use, these platforms cannot begin to realize their
full potential’ (Gastil 2016, 1).
There is no easy solution to this disconnect. The platforms, apps and portals that
have proliferated with the advent of the Web 2.0 are usually stand-alone solutions
enabling a vast range of civic activities (e.g. signing a petition, voting and/or
debating an issue, reporting an issue, following parliamentary activity, etc.). We
have elsewhere referred to these tools as crowd-civic systems (McInnis et al. 2017),
which can be defined as socio-technical systems blending people, digital tech-
nologies, and data for civic engagement purposes: information management,
large-scale deliberation, decision making, etc.
Crowd-civic system designers, developers, and users may not explicitly link
their digital tools to any conceptual model of democracy and citizenship. Yet, it is
possible to connect present crowd-civic systems with different visions of citizenship
derived from liberal, republican, deliberative, and epistemic theories of democracy.
Highlighting these linkages can help to elucidate the current discussions around
‘digital citizenship’ that are taking place in a number of academic disciplines
(political sciences, sociology, media and communication studies, etc.). As Engin
Isin and Evelyn Ruppert have succinctly argued, “any attempt at theorizing ‘digital
citizens’ ought to begin with the historical figure of the citizen before even shifting
focus to the digital” (Isin and Ruppert 2015, 19).
Table 3.1 frames a subset of 130 crowd-civic systems (52 of them open source)
within different political theories of democracy and their related visions of
citizenship. The categorisation of the models (liberal, republican, developmental,
and deliberative) draws from previous work by Geoffrey Stokes (2002). We also
have added the ‘epistemic’ model (together with the deliberative one) since some of
the crowd-civic systems (e.g. constitution-drafting platforms) combine mass-scale
deliberation functionalities with the aggregation of structured ideas, issues, or
contents via microtasking (for example, they invite their users not only to discuss
the pros and cons of a suggested article, but also to draft a new version of it).
The suggested taxonomy is far from exhaustive. To be sure, an extended survey
would certainly help to discover a much larger number of tools currently in use. It is
not categorical or clear-cut either, as a number of tools may be linked to more than
one model and/or scope. If that is the case, then we consider the core functionality
of the tool to determine its most adequate position in the Table 3.1.
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We have followed two basic criteria when including digital tools in Table 3.1.
First, we have included civic, grassroots, foundations, research, or start-up initia-
tives aimed at citizens’ participation, as opposed to a number of local, state, and
national government-supported consultation platforms (e.g. the ones by states such
as South Australia (YourSAy),24 or by local councils in Mexico City, Barcelona or
Madrid (Constitución CDMX,25 Decidim Barcelona,26 Decide Madrid27), to name a
few. Likewise, initiatives by parliaments such as Wikilegis in Brazil,28 or Mi
Senado in Colombia29 have been left out of our scope. Nevertheless, it is important
to note that governments at different levels have currently deployed some of these
platforms included in the table. For example, a number of Spanish municipalities,
including Barcelona and Madrid, use the open source platform Consul, while some
others have opted for Civiciti, which is not open source but offers a free version to
small municipalities.
Second, our taxonomy includes tools that leverage some form of crowdsourcing.
In this particular context, crowdsourcing methods can consist of outsourcing input
information from the general public—e.g. collecting data about candidate repre-
sentatives and political parties—, collecting ideas, comments, and petitions in a
particular area, or designing more elaborated forms of microtasking where partic-
ipants are requested to complete a specific task—e.g. reporting incidents for elec-
tion monitoring tasks (with Ushahidi), or providing their version of an article in a
proposal for a new legislation, bill, or constitution (e.g. LaConstituciondeTodos.cl
or unanovanonstitucio.cat).
These different models of democracy and visions of citizenship (or ‘scopes’) are
synthesized in Table 3.1. Tools marked in with an asterisk in the figure are open
source.
A cautionary note is required here, for this synthesis is a highly simplified
version of models and conceptualisations that democracy theorists, coming from
different philosophical traditions, have been elaborating over the past decades. We
are also mindful of Mark Warren’s cautioning words: “democratic theorists usually
think in terms of “models of democracy”—a strategy that encourages us to center
our thinking on an ideal typical feature of democracy, such as deliberation or
elections, and then to overextend the claims for that feature (Warren 2017, 39). Our
synthesis of models should therefore be read through Warren’s lens.
Under a liberal, minimalist vision of citizenship, citizens are basically expected to
vote in elections, so that access to information (and limited deliberation) is instru-
mental to that purpose. Hence, when it comes to the scope of the liberal vision, we
24https://yoursay.sa.gov.au/.
25http://www.cdmx.gob.mx/constitucion.
26https://www.decidim.barcelona/.
27https://decide.madrid.es/.
28http://beta.edemocracia.camara.leg.br/wikilegis/.
29http://www.senado.gov.co/historia/item/26548-senado-lanza-app-mi-senado-un-paso-mas-hacia-
la-modernidad-y-la-transparencia.
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consider these two dimensions: access and vote. ‘Access’ includes tools that aim at
collecting and structuring the data and information that citizens need to know to cast
informed votes in political elections. These data can be sourced from open datasets, if
available, or crowdsourced from the public. ‘Vote’ contains those tools whose core
functionality (while not necessarily focusing on political processes) is to facilitate the
design of and implementation of online elections, polls, or surveys.
Republicanism constitutes a long and rich tradition in political philosophy,
inspiring different conceptions of citizenship over time (e.g. Held 2006). From a
republican perspective, the protection of the ‘public interest’ or the ‘common good’
generally demands greater involvement of citizens in politics, and hence a more
proactive role to deter arbitrary abuses of power. As Philip Pettit—one of the main
proponents of contemporary ‘civic republicanism’—summarised, the protection of
republican freedoms and the common interest relies ‘on the existence of an active,
concerned citizenry who invigilate the exercise of government power, challenge its
abuses and seek office where necessary’ (Pettit 2003). In this same vein, Frank
Lovett points out that ‘through collective political action, citizens can bring
instances of domination to public attention; they can support laws and policies that
would expand republican freedom; and they can do their part in defending
republican institutions when called upon to do so’ (Lovett 2017).
This vision also resonates with John Keane’s notion of ‘monitory democracy’,
which he defines a as “‘post-Westminster’ form of democracy in which
power-monitoring and power-controlling devices have begun to extend sidewards
and downwards through the whole political order’ (Keane 2009). The list of
monitory bodies is extensive and includes, for example, ‘public integrity com-
missions, judicial activism, local courts, workplace tribunals, consensus confer-
ences, parliaments for minorities, public interest litigation, citizens’ juries, citizens’
assemblies, independent public inquiries, think-tanks, experts’ reports, participatory
budgeting, vigils, ‘blogging’ and other novel forms of media scrutiny’ (Keane
2009). Although crowd-civic systems are out of the scope of Keane’s work, the
tools we list in Table 3.1 under the ‘republican’ vision are monitorial in Keane’s
sense: tools that enable citizens to ask questions to their representatives, monitor,
report and/or map people and political processes (e.g. elections, parliamentary
activity, deployment of policies, etc.).
In the developmental vision of democracy, the proactive role of citizens is not
restricted to the political realm. Rather, citizens adopt an expansive, far-reaching
commitment to enhance the conditions of their (online and offline) communities. In
other words, there is a high expectation that citizens will be able to contribute to the
betterment of their polity at any of its levels (local, national, or supranational).
This broader consciousness of community and its collective concerns expands to
areas where only very recently the Web 2.0 has enabled citizens’ involvement at a
large scale (for example disaster management or citizen science30). The crowd-civic
30For a survey of digital tools and platforms for crowdsourced disaster management, see Poblet
et al. (2017).
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systems considered under this vision aim at engaging citizens to network (e.g.
Brigade), participate in detecting community issues and improving the local envi-
ronment (e.g. CityFlag, CitySourced, FixMyStreet, Neighbor.ly, SeeClickFix) or in
supporting both local and global petitions and campaigns (e.g. Aavaz.org, Change.
org, GlobalCitizen.org).
Deliberative democrats situate deliberation as the underpinning principle of their
theories. Although an ocean of literature has provided multiple definitions and
principles over the past two decades, John Dryzek and Simon Niemeyer (2010)
have outlined what they consider to be the essential components that constitute
deliberative systems. Thus, deliberation is supposed to be: (i) authentic (debate,
discussion, or dialogue in non-coercive ways, encouraging reflection and accom-
modation of diverse views; (ii) inclusive (all ‘affected actors’ may participate), and
(iii): consequential (can determine outcomes such as laws, policies and decisions).
Public deliberation by ‘free and equal’ citizens provides legitimation for political
decision-making, therefore, justifications for proposed decisions, policies and law s
need to be publicly given and debated to inform the voting public.
Epistemic models have developed in parallel to these visions and the body of
literature is not less impressive. Melissa Schwartzberg (2015, 187-88) contends that
‘epistemic democracy does not position itself as an alternative to deliberative
democracy but instead generally resituates deliberation as being instrumental to
meet the aim of good, or correct, decision making’. Similarly, Hélène Landemore
argues that ‘epistemic democracy is both a subset of deliberative democracy and
goes beyond it because it includes things that deliberative democracy doesn’t
necessarily include’ (Knight et al. 2016, 142).31 According to Landemore, the
epistemic models aim ‘to emphasize the knowledge-producing properties of
democratic institutions and procedures’ (Knight et al. 2016, 141). An epistemic
vision of democracy, therefore, is consistent with citizens playing an active role in
producing contextually relevant knowledge in collaborative ways (e.g. making
proposals, drafting of legal texts, etc.).
From this perspective, crowd-civic systems in the last column of Table 3.1
enable the emergence of collective knowledge about topics under discussion. By
leveraging different design features that facilitate interaction, debate, and content
creation, these systems aim at overcoming the limits of mainstream social media as
flagged by a number of studies (e.g. Gürkan et al. 2010; Klein 2015; Iandoli et al.
2016; 2017). For example, as Mark Klein (2015) has aptly pointed out, social media
predominance of time-centric discussions (where contents are organised based on
31Elsewhere, Landemore argues that epistemic approaches in both democratic and
decision-making theory have an extensive genealogy that is evident in argumentation ‘running
from Aristotle to Dewey… in a deliberative direction’. Acknowledging the selective nature of her
exercise, Landemore cites examples from a divergence of theorists from Aristotle, Machiavelli,
Spinoza, Rousseau, etc. to make the ‘epistemic case for democracy’ constructing a linkage to
contemporary theory regarding ‘collective intelligence’ (2013, passim).
66 3 Multilayered Linked Democracy
the time they are posted) tend to produce low signal-to-noise ratios, insular ideation,
balkanisation, non-comprehensive coverage, etc. that may hinder functional
deliberation.
To address these issues, a number of crowd-civic systems have incorporated the
alternative designs to time-centric systems that Klein (2015) identifies: (i) ques-
tion-centric systems (Pol.is, UNU.ai) (ii) topic-centric systems (e.g. All Our Ideas,
Cohere); (iii) debate-centric (e.g. Consider.it, Common Ground for Action,
DebateGraph, Debatepedia); (iv) argument-centric systems, (e.g. Argunet,
Carneades, Deliberatorium, Whysaurus). In addition to that, we can also refer to
some systems as ‘microtask-centric’, as they invite users to complete a task
(PyBossa) or draft/amend a small text (e.g. Dastoorikurdistan.org,
LaConstitutiondeTodos.cl, Unanovaconstitucio.cat). Some tools are also ‘internally
sequential’, that is, they provide a voting system once the deliberation phase con-
cludes (e.g. Assembl, Consul, Civiciti, DemocracyOS). Whether they are also
externally ‘sequential’ in Dryzek and Niemeyer’s sense (determining outcomes such
as laws, policies and decisions) (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2010), or externally ‘aligned’
in Josiah Ober’s one (facilitating a seamless transition from decision-making to
implementation of decisions) (Ober 2008) can only depend on institutional com-
mitments, arrangements, and procedures that are external to the platforms.
Platforms and apps such as the ones in Table 3.1, and more recently blockchain
deployments (for example, blockchain-based political parties such as MiVote32 and
Flux33 in Australia) are just the technology component of an emergent participatory
ecosystem. Linked Open Data, as we have seen, is another component, although not
necessarily connected to these tools. As Baack puts it, ‘even though civic tech-
nologies do not always depend on open data, data is key to their functioning in two
ways: first, the availability of open data creates more opportunities to develop civic
technologies (for example, when they require traffic data); second, they often datafy
the activities they are concerned with, i.e. they often create new data’ (Baack 2015,
7). Much as this interplay between digital tools and open data is a key condition to
increase connectivity across crowd civic platforms, it still falls short of achieving
the goal of building a ‘civic commons’ (Gastil 2016) for the benefit of democratic
institutions. Working in this direction would also require building ecosystems
where people co-produce and share data and knowledge in particular contexts and
for specific decision-making purposes. The examples below may help to shed some
light in this direction.
32https://www.mivote.org.au/.
33https://voteflux.org/.
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3.4.3 Linked Ecosystems
In January 2016, the Parliament of Mexico approved a constitutional amendment to
grant the capital of the country, Mexico City, the enactment of its first constitution.
The Mayor of Mexico City started the constitution-making process by appointing a
group of 30 experts (many of them with a legal academic background) to discuss and
draft a proposal.34 In order to open up the drafting process to the citizenry, the City
Council made available a collaborative editing tool where citizens were able to
provide feedback on the specific topics posted by the drafting group.35 Moreover, as
crowdsourced legal drafting does not typically attract a large number of citizens, this
approach was complemented with other participatory strategies, namely a survey and
a collaboration with Change.org to collect petitions relevant to the constitutional text
(at the closing date of the process, 280,678 people had supported 129 petitions). The
Constitution of Mexico City was finally published on 5 February 2017,36 although at
the time of writing the Supreme Court ofMexico is hearing a number of appeals to the
constitutional text (with 40 out of 70 articles being challenged) by the federal gov-
ernment, two political parties, and other organisations.37
The constitution-making process in Mexico City echoes the one in Iceland five
years earlier, when the meetings and workings of a Constitutional Council of 25
individuals (drafted by sortition from a larger pool of citizens) were made publicly
available in the Council website for comments via social media and e-mail. It also
reminds of the Moroccan constitutional reform of 2011 that engaged more than
200,000 Facebook and Twitter users (although in this case the process was not led
by a government or a parliament, but by grass-root activists who had launched the
platform reforme.ma to collect popular input on the process). These earlier exam-
ples sparked a wave of crowdsourced constitution-making processes across the
world (Gluck and Ballou 2014; Deely and Nesh-Nash 2014; Luz et al. 2015) with
varied levels of engagement and success.
Compared to previous initiatives, the most recent example of Mexico City takes
an interesting approach to participation by acknowledging that citizens may have
different motivations, interests, skills, availability, etc. when engaging in partici-
patory processes. As digital tools come with different affordances and functional-
ities, the repertoire of political participation in democratic societies is broadening
rapidly (Theocharis and van Deth 2016). Mexico City residents could chose to
attend off-line forums and roundtables, use collaborative editing tools, fill surveys,
and propose and sign online petitions. This approach can be seen as a linked
participatory ecosystem where participants interact in both offline and online
environments, leveraging different tools and co-producing a collective outcome.
34https://www.constitucion.cdmx.gob.mx/constitucion-cdmx/#grupo-trabajo.
35https://www.pubpub.org/pub/constitucioncdmx-principios.
36http://www.cdmx.gob.mx/storage/app/uploads/public/589/746/ef5/589746ef5f8cc447475176.pdf.
37http://eleconomista.com.mx/sociedad/2017/06/12/debate-publico-constitucion-cdmx.
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Strikingly, both the Icelandic and Mexican crowdsourced constitutional drafts
had similar fates, coming to a standstill as other institutional bodies were involved.
In Iceland, the constitutional text went a bit further than the Mexico City one in the
procedural stages. While two-thirds of the voting population approved the text in a
referendum in late 2012, it eventually stalled in Parliament. And so it remains,
despite the efforts by the Icelandic Pirate Party to renew the approval process.
Presented as a new, unconventional form of political participation, the Icelandic
and Mexican processes have not lived up to the early expectations of effectively
translating the collected political wisdom of the crowds into law. Why is there such
a gap between initial hopes and final outcomes? As both cases show, there is no
guarantee that embedding participatory components and digital technologies into
the process will eventually have an impact on decision making and, ultimately, will
lead to more bottom-up, inclusive decisions. The lessons that can be drawn from
such experiments are multiple and involve aspects of political opportunity and trust,
institutional design, or experts’ involvement (e.g. Valtysson 2014; Landemore
2015; Suteu 2015). Furthermore, as Gianpaolo Baiocchi and Ernesto Ganuza write,
‘the literature seldom shines a light on the process of implementing participatory
instruments themselves or the conflicts these efforts generate within administra-
tions’ (Baiocchi and Ganuza 2017, 14).
Another recent example, the Irish Constitutional Convention (2012-2014) may
help to shed some light to this missing link. Like its Northern neighbours in Iceland,
Ireland went through intense political turbulence in the immediate aftermath of the
economic meltdown of 2008. The general election of 2011 marked the collapse of
Fianna Fáil, in a defeat that Michael Marsh et al. (2017, 2) have described as one of
the ‘largest experienced by a major party in the history of parliamentary democ-
racy’, and the subsequent emergence of a large parliamentary coalition eager to
adopt a broad reform agenda. In this context, the newly-elected government gave
green light to a Constitutional Convention (ICC) that would be tasked to discuss
and make recommendations to the national Dáil on eight major issues (such as the
voting age, the electoral system, the representation of women in politics or marriage
equality). The ICC was composed of 66 randomly selected citizens mixed with 33
self-selected politicians, plus an independent chair. This combination was a notable
departure from previous experiences—notably the British Columbia and Ontario
citizen assemblies of 2003–2004, which explicitly excluded politicians. The ICC
would meet on a series of weekends to deliberate and their members would cast
their votes by secret ballot. The Convention plenary meetings were broadcasted live
and then archived on the official website,38 which also enabled submissions from
the general public on each particular issue. Twitter users could contribute and
follow discussions with the hashtag #ccves (or #MarRef for the topic of marriage
equality). Digital technology and social media, as in Iceland, extended the reach of
the ICC and amplified the debate among a much larger audience. In the specific
case of the referendum on marriage equality, it was finally passed in 2015, through
38https://www.constitution.ie/.
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heavy social media use coupled with extended global media coverage (Elkink et al.
2016).
At its closing date on early 2014, the Irish Constitutional Convention had pro-
duced 41 recommendations and nine reports. In a summary of the status of these
outcomes, David Farrell (2016) reported that 17% of proposals had been accepted
(and 17% rejected), but 63% remained unresolved. As per the reports, which the
government had committed to bring to the Dáil for debate within four months of
receipt, he also recounted that ‘of the five that were responded to in the Dáil, this
was generally in the form of a ministerial statement (in the most recent instance
made by a junior minister) crammed into the final hour or so of a Dáil session just
before a recess, when many members had already left for their constituencies’
(Farrell 2015). Farrell, who had been involved in designing and analysing the
process together with other academics from the Political Studies Association of
Ireland, concluded that while the Convention and its deliberative method brought a
real constitutional change (the inclusion of marriage equality), the overall record
was mixed and made ‘imperative that tighter guarantees are made to require the
government to treat [any future Convention] with a lot more respect than it has
treated this one’ (Farrell 2016).
Farrell’s criticism reveals the tensions that novel participatory mechanisms bring
into current representative models of democracy. Tensions between participation,
representation, and legitimacy are not easy to resolve and require both incentives
and alignment mechanisms. Incentives are critical: why should people commit their
weekends to deliberate on recommendations that most likely will end up gathering
ministerial dust? Should their advice be given for free? How is this voluntary,
sortition-based, unpaid deliberation body going to be regarded by professional,
elected, and remunerated politicians? On the other hand, we should not assume that
the goals of each institution are aligned, because alignment does not happen
spontaneously or by mere goodwill. It requires mechanisms that make sure that
decisions made by one institution travel across the ecosystem and are effective
included in other decision-making processes. This ‘alignment by design’, so to
speak, is the direction taken by the municipality of Utrecht in the Netherlands with
regard to its citizen panels:
The key feature of this process of political innovation is that citizens were randomly
selected to participate, they received remuneration for their participation and they could be
regarded as an alternative form of citizen representation. In contrast with many other forms
of participation such as citizen panels, the advice was not ‘free’: local government had
committed beforehand to follow this advice and to translate it to an energy policy plan. Our
empirical analysis of this case shows that an interplay between idealist and realist logics
explains why they are ‘accepted’ by the institutionalized democratic system.” (Meijer et al.
2017, 21)
Another example of ‘alignment by design’ is vTaiwan, the open consultation
process started in Taiwan in December 2014. The consultation process started at the
request of one of the ministers of the government to gov0, the Taiwanese civic tech
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community that had already launched civic participation processes as part of the
2014 Sunflower movement (Hsiao et al. 2018). The consultation process follows a
sequence of flexible steps.
vTaiwan process consists of four successive stages: proposal, opinion, reflection and leg-
islation. There is no strict policy in the vTaiwan process to move from one stage to the next.
The transitions between stages are decided by consensus from the vTaiwan community.
This open format principle enables meaningful deliberation when all stakeholders are ready
and willing to collaborate and iterate on solutions. The methodology of the
participant-oriented agenda and rolling correction substantially engages citizens and public
servants. (Hsiao et al. 2018, 2)
According to the authors, ‘an issue will not move into the vTaiwan process
without a government authority being accountable for the issue and a facilitator
taking charge of the issue.’ (Hsiao et al. 2018, 2) This approach, therefore, aligns
stakeholders within the community network with members of the executive willing
to champion the issue and activate the institutional mechanisms to take the out-
comes of the consultation to the legislative stage. As a result of this process, ‘26
national issues have been discussed through the vTaiwan open consultation process,
and more than 80% have led to decisive government action’ (Hsiao et al. 2018, 3)
3.5 Conclusion
The examples considered so far can be depicted as political ecosystems where
different actors and institutions exhibit some linkages and levels of connectivity.
Nonetheless, we have seen that deploying civic tools for large-scale participation or
selecting conventions or panels by sortition does not ensure any real influence on
either rule making or policy making unless alignment mechanisms are in place.
Moreover, it leaves issues of power and inequality largely untouched. Open data
can be celebrated to make governments more transparent and accountable, but it
takes more than access to data to remove corrupt ministers from office or effectively
prosecute illegal donations to political parties. Likewise, we may choose to run our
councils, parliaments and event governments by lottery, but that will not make them
less exposed to self-inflicted, inequity-prone policies dictated by financial markets
and rating agencies, as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain or Italy—and many other
countries before 2008—know very well. Any model of democracy, and ours is not
exception, should be aware of the conditions that threaten to turn democratic sys-
tems into ill-disguised technocracies or oligarchies.
In the following chapter we will discuss some principles that may help to
underpin a linked democracy model. We consider these principles as a place to start
an investigation that contributes to a multidisciplinary dialogue on how to
strengthen both democratic theory and practice.
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Chapter 4
Towards a Linked Democracy Model
Abstract In this chapter we lay out the properties of participatory ecosystems as
linked democracy ecosystems. The goal is to provide a conceptual roadmap that
helps us to ground the theoretical foundations for a meso-level, institutional theory
of democracy. The identification of the basic properties of a linked democracy
eco-system draws from different empirical examples that, to some extent, exhibit
some of these properties. We then correlate these properties with Ostrom’s design
principles for the management of common-pool resources (as generalised to groups
cooperating and coordinating to achieve shared goals) to open up the question of
how linked democracy ecosystems can be governed.
Keywords Linked democracy  Common-Pool resources
4.1 Introduction
In previous chapters we have suggested that our model of linked democracy can be
represented as a three-layered, overlapping structure of Linked Open Data (LOD),
linked platforms, and linked ecosystems. A linked democracy model represents the
distributed interplay between people, digital technologies, and data (see Fig. 4.1).
We have also provided examples of digital platforms and ecosystems that exhibit a
certain degree of connectedness by tapping on LOD, on open data, or on crowd-
sourced data produced elsewhere.
Breaking silos down is a common, distinctive feature of the examples we have
reviewed. But are there any other properties than we can distill from these exam-
ples? Moreover, is it possible to turn those properties into design principles that
help to orchestrate a linked democracy model? Design principles should guide the
implementation of a linked democracy model; they should also capture the insti-
tutional arrangements needed to produce aligned decision making in a given
domain, either local or global. As we have seen with the Icelandic or Mexico City
examples, a lack of institutional endorsement of carefully designed participatory
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outcomes can bring crowdsourced constitutional processes to a deadlock. Linked
democracy is about finding ways out of locked democracy.
We are fully aware that generalizing specific design principles for the efficient
functioning of a linked democracy would require an exhaustive, large-scale survey
of case studies. We have examined some illustrative examples in the previous
chapters, but this falls short of providing a comprehensive panorama. Therefore, in
this chapter we will first identify some distinctive properties of a linked democracy
model based on our previous examples. Second, we will map these properties onto
the well-established set of design principles that Elinor Ostrom identified as
enabling effective management of ‘common-pool resources’ (CPR) groups (Ostrom
1990, 90–102). Recently, David Wilson et al. reviewed Ostrom’s principles from an
evolutionary perspective to argue that they ‘have a wider range of application than
CPR groups and are relevant to nearly any situation where people must cooperate
and coordinate to achieve shared goals’ (Wilson et al. 2013, 522). We consider
linked democracy ecosystems to be one of those situations involving cooperation—
in performing a wide range of tasks—and coordination—of large groups of indi-
viduals, so the principles can guide further empirical research in this area. An
additional advantage of looking at linked democracy models through these lenses is
that the notion of ‘politically relevant knowledge’ that we have been repeatedly
borrowing from Josiah Ober in previous chapters of this book (Ober 2008; 2015)
can be also seen as ‘knowledge commons’, that is, as a shared resource of ‘intel-
ligible ideas, information, and data in whatever form in which it is expressed or
obtained’ (Hess and Ostrom 2007, 7).
Ultimately, the linked democracy model that we propose is partially descriptive.
It builds on properties underlined from real examples in politics, law, and policy
making. Yet, none of the examples reviewed exhibit all the properties listed below.
Fig. 4.1 A linked democracy model
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Thus, we argue that our model has a prescriptive component, one that helps us to
establish some theoretical foundations for what we consider to be a fully opera-
tional linked democracy.
4.2 Properties of a Linked Democracy Model
The properties we propose here are distilled from the different participatory sce-
narios examined throughout the pages of this book. We highlight here the properties
that we consider most relevant for analysing participatory ecosystems from the
perspective of a linked democracy model. These properties can be described as
follows:
(i) Contextually-bound. Interactions between people, technologies, and data
always occur at specific settings. To borrow Simon’s classical concepts,
these interactions constitute the ‘inner environment’ (Simon 1969; 1988)
that can be ‘represented by a set of given alternatives of action’ (Simon
1988, 70). At the same time, people are identifiable as individuals or groups
coming together with a common purpose. Depending on the purpose, they
may be geographically concentrated or, rather, dispersed across the globe
(or both). Either way, people are connected online and the networks they
form are traceable; technologies include specific devices and tools (social
media platforms, deliberation platforms, participatory apps, distributed
protocols, sensors, etc.); data comprises particular datasets with different
formats (unstructured data, open data, linked open data, etc.) and licenses of
use.
(ii) Open ended. Even if contextually bound, participatory ecosystems are also
highly dynamic: the interactions between people, technologies, and data
evolve and adapt as the context changes, as if in a perpetual beta state.
Interests and objectives of individuals, groups, and institutions are not
necessarily stable either. A myriad of digital tools are continuously tested;
some are adopted widely, some others become niche, and some others are
quickly abandoned. As regards data, it is now commonplace to characterise
data flows with the 4Vs (volume, velocity, variety, and veracity). The
interactions between these three different dimensions are complex, in the
sense that the behavior of the ecosystem as a whole cannot be predicted by
the behavior of the individual components. If any, a theory of linked
democracy is a theory of complex adaptive systems (Holland and Miller
1991).
(iii) Blended. Interactions between people take place seamlessly, both offline
and online. Global initiatives, or local initiatives that become transnational,
may set local chapters where people can meet offline, organise, and discuss
(e.g. the European movement DIEM25 or #blacklivesmatter). For Bennet
and Segerberg, this hybrid component is a distinctive trait of new models of
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‘digitally networked action’ that leverage digital media as organizing agents
(Bennet and Segerberg 2012; 2013). And this is true not just for political
initiatives. Massive open online courses (MOOCs) attracting thousands of
students across the world typically invite enrolled members to form local
groups, organise meetups in physical places and engage in collective
learning (Goldberg 2015).
(iv) Distributed. Participatory ecosystems can be represented as distributed
communication networks with multiple nodes (Baran 1964). The distinction
between ‘decentralised’ and ‘distributed’ models is not always clear. While
the two concepts are often used synonymously, distributed models can also
be considered as a subset of decentralised systems (e.g. Eagar 2017).
Ultimately, the use of one term or another depends on the choice of a
combination of technical specifications—architectural and logical features—
and governance models—decision-making processes, regulations, and
politics. In our perspective, in distributed participatory ecosystems indi-
viduals, groups, and communities can be identified as horizontal nodes,
although it is also possible to portray communities as clusters of edges or
links. As de Reus et al. have noted, ‘link communities have been reported
for several empirical networks, including metabolic networks, mobile phone
networks and social networks, and have been shown to highlight different
subsystems than node-based communities’ (de Reus et al. 2014). Such an
‘edge-centric perspective’ allows for the identification of both ‘community
hot spots’ and redundancies: links from different communities may con-
verge at a single node and a node may belong to more than one single
community (idem). This is the perspective currently adopted to map the
human ‘connectome’, a concept first coined by Olaf Sporns and colleagues
to refer to ‘the comprehensive structural description of the network of
elements and connections forming the human brain.’ (Sporns et al. 2005). If
we extend the analogy to our participatory ecosystems, we can suggest that
different participatory ecosystems will exhibit different connectivity maps—
or participatory ‘connectomes’. Likewise, we will need to develop and
refine an appropriate ‘connectomics’ (Seung 2013) to map and analyse their
structuctural connections.
(v) Technologically agnostic. Participatory ecosystems rely on tools and tech-
nologies that can be replaced at any time. Technologies can fail, become
banned, or its supply be interrupted. Nevertheless, it is possible to use,
adapt, or develop alternatives in the light of the new conditions. Much as
successive bans on Napster and other services did not deter Internet users
from sharing files in peer to peer networks, political and civic actors typi-
cally find alternative ways to connect and engage in new spaces. The
Catalan referendum for independence of 1st October, 2017 offers another
interesting example of activists’ use of distributed, encrypted technologies
to circumvent censorship of pro-referendum websites and to avoid eaves-
dropping of communications (Poblet 2018).
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(vi) Modular. Participation and civic engagement are fluid concepts that take
multiple forms. Digital tools now support a vast range of options for citizens
and groups: data collection, fact checking, monitoring, signing petitions,
crowdfunding, ideating, deliberating, drafting, voting, etc. (see Table 3.1
for a taxonomy of these tools). In a modular participatory ecosystem, these
options are available to cater for different levels of interest and engagement.
Some forms of engagement will likely attract large numbers of participants,
while some others, requiring more time, cognitive effort, or dedication, will
appeal to smaller crowds. Participation is therefore the combined outcome
of modular engagement. The crowdsourcing of the constitution in Mexico
City offers an example of designed modular engagement by combining
different participatory tools (e.g. a survey tool, a crowdsourcing platform,
Change.org, and social media) that target heterogeneous forms of engage-
ment. Likewise, the vTaiwan initiative adopts a modular approach in its
four-stage procedure of open consultation, with flexible use of digital tools
along the process (Hsiao et al. 2018).
(vii) Scalable. Participatory ecosystems should be able to accommodate
increasing numbers of nodes (participants, technologies, data) and interac-
tions between them without compromising connectivity and effectiveness.
While scalability has many definitions and attributes, from a linked
democracy perspective scalability implies an organizational dimension
(adding more nodes to the pool of resources); a functional dimension
(adding more functionalities); and a geographical dimension (adding more
geographical and digital areas and communities).
(viii) Knowledge-reusing. Participatory ecosystems tap into collective intelli-
gence to produce new forms of collective, commons-based knowledge. This
knowledge may adopt multiple formats: unstructured conversation threads
in forums, websites, social media, portals; annotated documents and
wiki-documents, crowdsourced legislation and policy drafts, proposals,
manifestos, etc.; infographics, reports, case-study repositories, podcasts,
videos, etc. Both deliberation and epistemic approaches to democracy
assume the need to find and reuse knowledge in deliberation and
decision-making processes. Josiah Ober adds to this necessity the dimen-
sion of problem solving, in the sense that untapped knowledge can only be
‘discovered’ in relation to a particular political issue by making a connec-
tion of relevance between that knowledge and the issue at hand (Ober 2008;
2015). From a linked democracy approach, we are interested in the potential
application of principles and protocols of linked open data to make these
connections relevant and possible.
(ix) Knowledge-archiving. To reuse politically relevant knowledge, participa-
tory ecosystems need to find ways to trace and reproduce such knowledge.
Traceability, reproducibility, and accountability are essential components of
collective, commons-based knowledge. This is not different from scientific
knowledge. In the last few years, archivists and scientists have renewed
their concerns about the importance of keeping provenance and granting
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reproducibility of research data and research objects in general (not just
data, but research protocols, pre-prints, articles, code, software, etc.) (e.g.
Corcho et al. 2012). Provenance and reproducibility of scientific knowledge
is now supported by the semantic web technologies and standards described
in Chap. 1. Taking stock of advances in this area, the idea is that every
valuable knowledge product of a participatory ecosystem should be stored
along with provenance information, that is, complete metadata information
on the authorship, creation date, etc. If a ‘research object’ now contains
everything necessary to reproduce in silicon a scientific experiment, the
‘political knowledge object’ to be preserved should contain everything
necessary to ground every political decision to be made (data about when a
decision was made, argumentations, votations, documents produced, etc.).
To date, there are only a few examples of knowledge-archiving systems in
the space we are considering. Among them, the Manifesto Project, which
provides policy positions from over 1000 political parties in 50 countries
since 1945;1 the database Parties and Elections in Europe,2 which collects
data about legislative elections in Europe since 1945; the Constitute Project,
a database of nearly 200 constitutions across the world;3 or Parlgov.org4 (a
database for parties, elections and cabinets for EU and OECD countries).
Nevertheless, these initiatives, while providing highly valuable data points,
still fall short of elaborating the ‘political knowledge object’ we are sug-
gesting to be traced, reproduced, reused, and accounted for.
(x) Aligned. Participatory ecosystems may emerge bottom-up, as civic
engagement initiatives, or top-down, from legislative or open government
initiatives. In any case, only if institutional arrangements are in place there
will be the consequential decision making and feedback loops that charac-
terise aligned processes. The only example we found of bottom-up initiated,
aligned participatory ecosystem is vTaiwan, stemming from the initiative of
the Taiwanese civic-tech community (Hsiao et al. 2018). At the other end,
there are two cases of top-down generated participatory ecosystems
exhibiting alignment: the Irish Citizen’s Assembly, whose recommendation
of the topic of marriage equality led to a national referendum, and the case of
Utrecht’s citizens panels, where members are remunerated and the local
council commits to incorporate the panels’ advice on the policy (Meijer et al.
2017). Perhaps if we had considered cases of participatory budgeting—an
institutional innovation from the late 1980s—the results would have been
different. Yet, participatory budgeting seems to offer contradictory results.
1http://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/.
2http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/.
3https://www.constituteproject.org/.
4http://www.parlgov.org/.
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Sónia Gonçalves has identified a trend where Brazilian ‘municipalities using
participatory budgeting favored an allocation of public expenditures that
closely matched popular preferences’ (Gonçalves 2014). For Gianpaolo
Baiocchi, instead, the relationship between different forms of participatory
budgeting and the administration is rather ambiguous: ‘If citizens cannot
debate and change the rules, if there is no plural inclusion of citizenry, or if
decision-making procedures are not transparent, then participatory budget-
ing may conceal a new form of domination that has nothing to do with a new
process of democratization’ (Baiocchi 2015, 10).
In Fig. 4.2 below we represent the properties of a linked democracy ecosystem
with a graphic model that clusters them in several dimensions.
The linked democracy ecosystem is framed by its specific context, but its
boundaries (dotted frame) are open ended and porous, as both the inner and the
outer environment evolve dynamically [contextually-bound/open ended]. At the
bottom, there is a layer of blended, distributed interactions between people, tech-
nologies, and data. On top of this layer, agnostic, scalable and modular technologies
can be incorporated from the outer context. By leveraging these technologies,
blended and distributed networks produce collective, commons-based knowledge
that can be reused and archived with ongoing updates. When decisions are made
based on this knowledge, the outcomes are consequential and extend their reach to
the outer context, aligning with and informing external processes of decision
making.
Fig. 4.2 A relational model
of properties of a linked
democracy ecosystem
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4.3 Linked Democracy Ecosystems and Ostrom’s Core
Design Principles
The properties highlighted above are just conceptual artifacts to capture crucial
developments in current participatory ecosystems. These properties do not translate
into design principles or institutional rules: we have focused on participatory
ecosystems capable of producing collective, politically relevant knowledge, not on
how these systems are managed or could be managed. Yet, if we consider linked
democracy ecosystems as entities capable of self-managing different forms of
commons-based knowledge, we can then check how their properties relate with
Ostrom’s design principles for the effective management of common pool resource
institutions or systems (CPRs). Ostrom’s eight design principles have triggered a
vast amount of research since they were formulated in 1990. In a nutshell, these
principles are (Ostrom 1990, 90):
– Clearly defined boundaries
– Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
– Collective-choice arrangements
– Monitoring
– Graduated sanctions
– Conflict-resolution mechanisms
– Minimal recognition of rights to organize
– For large social systems, nested enterprises (appropriation, provision, enforce-
ment, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple
layers of nested enterprises).
In revisiting this work two decades later, Michael Cox and colleagues contended
that ‘although there has been substantial support for the principles, some scholars
have criticized their theoretical grounding or argued that they are overly precise
with respect to the range of conditions to which they might be applied’ (Cox et al.
2010: 251). Following their review, Cox et al. proposed a modified version of the
principles by splitting three of them in their basic components: in principle 1 they
distinguish between ‘user boundaries’ and ‘resource boundaries’; principle 2 is also
divided into two basic conditions—‘congruence between rules and local conditions’
and ‘congruence between appropriation and provision rules’ and in principle 4 a
similar distinction is made between ‘monitoring users’ and ‘monitoring the
resource’) (idem, 274). A further revision of the principles, as we mentioned earlier,
was done by Wilson, Ostrom and Cox, who used an evolutionary framework to
extend them beyond CPRs, thus covering many of the situations that involve
cooperation and coordination (Wilson et al. 2013, 522).
Both the principles and the analytical framework connected to them are
appropriate in the domain we are exploring in this book. In Hess and Ostrom’s
words:
This framework seems well suited for analysis of resources where new tech-
nologies are developing at an extremely rapid pace. New information technologies
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have redefined knowledge communities; have juggled the traditional world of
information users and information providers; have made obsolete many of the
existing norms, rules, and laws; and have led to unpredicted outcomes. Institutional
change is occurring at every level of the knowledge commons. (Hess and Ostrom
2007, 43).
Figure 4.3 puts the linked democracy (LD) properties next to CPR principles
(Ostrom 1990; Cox et al. 2010). Even if they operate at different dimensions (LD
properties are features drawn from participatory ecosystems, while CPR design
principles are governance principles) there are some relevant connections to
underline.
First, LD (i) and (ii) [contextually-bound and open-ended systems] are con-
nected with CPR-P1: they imply boundaries, even if more fluid and porous than the
‘clearly defined’ ones that Ostrom initially posited. Yet, our LD (i) and (ii) are still
congruent with the requirement of a group being able to ‘determine its own
membership’ (Ostrom 2010, 223). Other studies have noted that boundaries are
fuzzier rather than rigid in some CPRs (Cox et al. 2010). Ultimately, as Wilson
et al. put it, in absence of seemingly clearly defined boundaries, ‘the important
criterion is for the identity of the group and the parameters of the shared endeavor to
be clearly delineated within each context” (Wilson et al. 2013, 525).
Second, LD (iii) and (iv) [blended and distributed systems] align with all CRP
principles as later work from Ostrom and Hess (2007) includes the online dimen-
sion. Moreover, CPR principles (and CPR8 in particular) apply to groups whose
governance mechanisms are decentralized, even if the specific implementation may
differ from group to group (e.g. polycentric governance, subsidiarity, etc.) (Wilson
et al. 2013).
Third, technology-agnostic, scalable and modular properties (LD (v), (vi) and
(vii)) are connected to CPR-P2 to P8 as enablers of large-scale coordination and
cooperation activities in relation to those principles. In blended ecosystems, issues
Fig. 4.3 Connections between LD Properties and CPR Principles
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of large scale coordination and cooperation become even more complex: for
example, how to coordinate a participatory online process to introduce new legis-
lation involving tens or hundreds of thousands of participants?
Fourth, LD (viii) and (ix) properties [knowledge reusing and archiving] can be
applied to adjust and fine-tune any of the CPR-Ps to the particular participatory
ecosystem. As Wilson et al. note, ‘there is a striking correspondence between the
principles derived by Ostrom for CPR groups and the conditions that caused us to
evolve into such a cooperative species in the first place’ (Wilson et al. 2013, 526).
Among those conditions, ‘our capacity to transmit learned information across
generations’ (idem, 525). As we have seen in Chap. 1, reusing and archiving are
among the core purposes of the Web of Data. For a linked democracy ecosystem,
reusing and archiving properties augment our capacity to share and retrieve polit-
ically relevant knowledge across and from other ecosystems.
Finally, LD (x) is connected with CPRs P7 and P8. For linked democracy
ecosystems to be aligned, it is critical to have internal rules acknowledged and
respected in the outer environments (CPR-P7). Likewise, nesting local decision
making into multiple layers of governance may help to render those decisions more
efficient (CPR-P8). Mansbridge (2014) has shown that these two principles may
lead to different interpretations of how Ostrom perceives the role of the state. Thus,
Ostrom’s alleged ‘anti-state’ views could be inferred from her wording of CPR-7
[“The rights of appropriators to design their own institutions are not challenged by
external government authorities” (1990, 101), cited in Mansbridge 2014, 8]. Yet,
Mansbridge also concludes that Ostrom sees the role of the state in many occasions
as ‘proactive’ and she further examines the different functions it accomplishes in
managing CPRs (namely, threatening to impose solutions, providing relatively
neutral information, offering an arena for negotiation, and helping with monitoring
compliance) (Mansbridge 2014).
Our reading of these two principles, to be sure, is neither ‘anti-state’ nor
‘pro-state’. We rather read them with the lens of a linked democracy ecosystem and
the collective knowledge it produces. If that knowledge is ignored or distorted,
alignment with other layers of governance will not be achieved and the epistemic
benefits of democratic participation and engagement will be lost.
4.4 Conclusion
Our goal in this chapter is to provide a conceptual roadmap that helps us to ground
the theoretical foundations for a meso-level, institutional theory of democracy. We
have mapped the basic properties of a linked democracy ecosystem drawing from
different examples that, to some extent, exhibit some of these properties. We then
correlate these properties with Ostrom’s design principles for the management of
common-pool resources (as generalised to groups cooperating and coordinating to
achieve shared goals). As Wilson et al. have argued, ‘[Ostrom] design principles
cannot be implemented in a cookie cutter fashion but require a local adaptation to
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find the best implementations’ (Wilson et al. 2013, 527). This approach helps us to
raise our next set of questions: how can linked ecosystems be governed? What role
does law play? Is a new rule of law emerging from the interplay between people,
technology, and data? If so, how does it look like? We try to address these questions
in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Legal Linked Data Ecosystems
and the Rule of Law
Abstract This chapter introduces the notions of meta-rule of law and socio-legal
ecosystems to both foster and regulate linked democracy. It explores the way of
stimulating innovative regulations and building a regulatory quadrant for the rule of
law. The chapter summarises briefly (i) the notions of responsive, better and smart
regulation; (ii) requirements for legal interchange languages (legal interoperability);
(iii) and cognitive ecology approaches. It shows how the protections of the sub-
stantive rule of law can be embedded into the semantic languages of the web of data
and reflects on the conditions that make possible their enactment and implemen-
tation as a socio-legal ecosystem. The chapter suggests in the end a reusable
multi-levelled meta-model and four notions of legal validity: positive, composite,
formal, and ecological.
Keywords Web of data  Socio-legal ecosystem  Rule of law  Meta-rule of law 
Semantic languages  Governance  Linked democracy  Semantic web regulatory
models  Regulatory quadrant  Legal validity
5.1 Introduction: The Rule of Law in a New Brave World
Wewill expand in this chapter someways of implementing linked democracy on legal
and political bases. Linked democracy is not only a theoretical approach incorpo-
rating open linked data to theories of democracy. It consists of practices and the real
behaviour of people exercising their political rights on everyday bases. Thus, it also
possesses a personal and cultural dimension that should be valued and protected. Law
is an obvious element. Behaviour on the web should be ‘fair’ and ‘legal’. What does it
mean? Different states have different jurisdictions, and despite the international trends
of the global market, law has been, and still is, dependent on national states.
How could we incorporate regulatory forms of empowering people on the web?
How could algorithmic governance, data analytics, and semantics be used to
foster the principles of linked democracy that we have just presented at the end of
Chap. 4?
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We will contend that there are two ways to reach such objectives: (i) embedding
the principles of the substantive rule of law into the web of linked data (what we
will call the meta-rule of law), and (ii) incentivising the creation of socio-legal
ecosystems, i.e. the social conditions that are required to implement the meta-rule of
law online and outline them among all stakeholders and users.
We admit that this can be easier said than done. These two objectives might have
an idealistic flavour. A few corporations have a dominant position on the web, they
can trade and invade privacy, and they usually do. As Shadbolt and Hampson
(2018) have nicely put it, we live in a hyper-complex environment, shaped by our
own tools. This is a good breeding ground for elites to thrive. They also point out
that “what has changed is human potential, thanks to our transformative new tools.
[…] The point is not that machines might wrest control from the elites. The problem
is that most of us might never be able to wrest control of the machines from the
people that occupy the command posts” (Shadbolt and Hampson 2018, 63).
Power is certainly a problem. In our hyper-connected world, we barely know in
advance what will come next. But there are protections to be put in place, and rights
and duties to be implemented. Some of them differ depending on the country and
legal culture. For instance, the common law version of the rule of law is not
completely equivalent to its civil law counterpart, more top-down (stepwise)
designed, and connected to the structure of the state [Rechtsstaat, État de droit,
Stato de diritto, Estado de derecho]. There also are striking dissimilarities related to
the meaning and the scope of rights (what is meant by the content of rights). For
instance, privacy and data protection are considered fundamental rights in Europe,
but not in the USA. This affects the level of protection.
Empowering people seems to be the first step to shelter them from democratic
erosion. We have drawn in Table 5.1 a raw alignment of the rights and protections
of the substantive rule of law1 to the linked democracy properties and principles of
Ostrom’s Common-Pool Resources (CPR) that we have already introduced at the
end of Chap. 4.
This table is what a lawyer is expected to do. Freedom and liberty are
pre-conditions for all rights. However, our hyper-connected world is no longer the
world we had known before. Enhancing rights and making officers and citizens
compliant within a commonly shared regulatory framework constitutes another
challenge that we know in advance will not be accomplished in the short run.
Law and Society scholars have highlighted the obstacles that hamper the social
and political uptake of the rule of law—the “unrule of law” or “rule by law” in
totalitarian regimes, the use of a “regulatory rule of law” as a liberal strategy to
contrive a transnational global order, and rule of law abuses in Western states.2
1According to Tamanaha (2004, 2009, 2011) there is a “thin” or “formal” definition of rule of law
—set forth in advance, public, general, clear, stable and certain, and applied to everyone according
to its terms—and a more substantive one “embracing fundamental rights, democracy, and/or
criteria of justice”. See also Carothers (1998).
2See Ginsburg and Tamir (2008), Gel’man (2004), Uildriks (2010), Cheesman (2015), Merry
(2017), Taylor (2017), Abel (2018).
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Notwithstanding this, the positive side and protections of the rule of law are deemed
to transcend the boundaries of national states to become a general paradigm, an
institutional ideal to be embedded into the making of markets, institutions, and
human relationships at a global level (Palombella 2009, 2010).
We can assume this ideal, under two conditions. First, we should treat it is as a
design ideal, not as a fact (i.e. as a series of principles to be nested into the Internet
and the Web through the algorithms and the languages of the Web of Data).
Second, we should be able to make compatible two competing legal theories of law
and regulation operating since the 20th century, namely, formal (jurisprudential)
Table 5.1 Alignment of LD properties and CPR Principles with the Rule of Law
Contextually bounded CPR principles Rule of law principles
(i) Contextually bounded 1. Clearly defined [user and
resource] boundaries
I. Right to assemble
(ii) Open ended 2. Rules in use matched to local
needs and conditions;
[congruence between
appropriation and provision
rules, or benefits and costs]
II. Rules in use matched to the
protections and boundaries of
the rule of law, privacy, and
data protection
(iii) Blended 3. Individuals affected by these
rules usually participating in
modifying the rules
III. Rights of voting and free
speech
(iv) Distributed 4. System for self-monitoring
members’ behaviour [and
resource monitoring]
IV. Right of self-regulation;
privacy, and data protection
(v) Technology-agnostic 5. Graduated system of
sanctions
V. Right of self-regulation;
privacy and data protection
(vi) Modular 6. Access to low-cost
conflict-resolution mechanisms
VI. Access to justice
(vii) Scalable 7. Right of community
members to devise their own
rules respected by external
authorities
VII. Sovereignty, checks and
balance of powers, and free
speech
(viii) Knowledge-reusing 8. Nested enterprises (multiple
layers)
VIII. Right to education and
access to knowledge
(innovation); privacy and data
protection
(ix) Knowledge-archiving IX. Right to education and
access to knowledge
(innovation); privacy and data
protection
(x) Aligned X. Legal compliance
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and empirical (sociological) approaches to regulations.3 This is another ideal that
has not yet been completely reached, and whose complexity should not be
underestimated.
Figure 5.1 depicts a preliminary general framework in which regulations (in-
cluding hetero-, co-, and self-regulations) (i) coexist with new instruments of social
and political governance on the Web; (ii) are created, implemented and eventually
enforced through three regulatory dimensions: legal, social, and linguistic (Web
languages); (iii) and are embedded into regulatory models which take into account
the “hybrid” interface between human and machines across the Web, the social
Web (2.0) and the Web of Data (3.0). It is still preliminary, but the next step seems
to be the Intelligent Web (4.0), connecting the Internet of Things, Multi-Agent
Systems (MAS), and blockchain technologies with linked and big data—also called
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) (Xu et al. 2018). It is worth noting that policies,
standards and, especially, ethics and values embedded into the systems are expected
to play an increasing regulatory role in this new environment. End-users have
always been a primordial orientation for semantic web developers (d’Aquin et al.
2008; Domingue et al. 2014).4
A few cautionary notes are worth mentioning: (i) the political nature of the rule
of law must not be forgotten (the identities and boundaries of individuals,
self-constituted social groups, and communities raise different problems of
Fig. 5.1 Dimensions of regulatory models
3See on the “new realism” “which aims selfconsciously to theorize the bridge between the world
and legal institutions without reducing one to the other”, Nourse and Shaffer (2009). See also
Selznick (2003), Erlanger et al. (2005), Macauley (2005), Miles and Sunstein (2008).
4Cfr. Re-Coding Black Mirror Workshops, e.g. Troullinou et al. (2018). See also Taylor and
Boniface (2017), EU H2020 Project e-Sides, https://e-sides.eu/e-sides-project.
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sovereignty); (ii) principles and values cannot be fully modelled and embedded into
computer systems5 (as the present attempts to code Privacy by Design show)6;
(iii) the list of legal principles is not exhaustive, and many of them can be combined
and applied at every layer of the table (Fig. 5.1); and (iv) there are so many
jurisdictions and policies—from constitutional issues to intellectual property, tort
law, security and data protection—that it is currently impossible to deal with all
specific legal regimes of the web of data at the same time.7
Web 3.0—in short, the web of data on the Internet—is constituted by a myriad
of languages enacted by the users who produce, use, transform, trade, operate, and
interact performing legal and political acts.8 How might this behaviour be regu-
lated? How can the protections of the meta-rule of law be implemented in this brave
new world?
We should first distinguish between systemic and semantic interoperability.
Second, we should consider the insights of cognitive science on how artificial
agency and human action can be coordinated to attain collective goals. Third, we
should merge legal and political governance, now in separate silos. Fourth, we
should re-conceptualise regulatory and legal compliance according to these
guidelines. And finally, we could suggest a meta-model bringing all these elements
together.
5.2 Governing Linked Democracy: Interoperable
and Legal Governance
5.2.1 Semantic and Systemic Interoperability
Semantic interoperability refers to the creation of a common meaning for infor-
mation exchange across computational systems. Systemic interoperability points at
the ability of complex systems to interact, share, and exchange information. The
latter focuses on the coordination of practices, including human behaviour,
organisational structures, tools, languages, and techniques (Kun et al. 2008;
Mathews 2017; Casanovas et al. 2017b). Both dimensions should be analytically
distinguished for a co-integration of the computational and social dimensions into
the specific ecosystems created through this mutual interface.
5Cfr. Li (2012), esp. Koops and Leenes (2014), Koops et al. (2016).
6See the results of the W3C Workshop on Privacy organised by R. Wennig and S. Kirrane, https://
www.w3.org/2018/vocabws/report.html.
7We carried out a preliminary analysis for Europe in Rodríguez-Doncel et al. (2016).
8The Web 2.0 includes services, platforms and applications, end-users, prosumers (both producers
and consumers of information), citizens, and social networks that constitute the grassroots of the
new digital neighbourhood. The Web 3.0 includes the methods, languages and computer devices
that allow turning content—the information spread over the web—into structured information, that
is, into shareable and reusable knowledge.
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Computer science and society co-evolve in intertwined ways. From this per-
spective, we can also distinguish between computational requirements and social
(behavioural, organisational) conditions. Computational requirements focus on the
description of computationally tractable elements in some language. For example,
object-oriented analysis applies object-oriented programming and visual modelling
through development lifecycles. Goal-oriented requirements engineering “is con-
cerned with the use of goals for eliciting, elaborating, structuring, specifying,
analysing, negotiating, documenting, and modifying requirements” (van
Lamsweerde 2001, 2009). Both techniques stress the relationship with end-users
and stakeholders to enrich the knowledge acquisition process.
Social conditions imply an empirical description and a theoretical account of
social issues, statuses, and conflicts. Turning them into modelling requirements is a
non-trivial task of a theoretical nature.9 It refers to what E. Feingenbaum called “the
knowledge acquisition bottleneck” (Feingenbaum 1982), and R. Hoekstra “the
knowledge reengineering bottleneck” (Hoekstra 2010). As Hoekstra is suggesting,
the rapid increase of linked data poses new challenges for the whole Semantic Web
project at the cost of control. Knowledge reuse is more de-contextualised now, and
ontology building methodology is becoming more complex as users participate and
expert knowledge is diversified, scaling up to more complex forms of cooperation
between experts and citizens (Corcho et al. 2015).10 Citizen science, crowdsourced
people’s participation in scientific endeavours, is gaining strength and posing more
challenges too, i.e. the role that volunteers play in true collaborative co-creation
processes at all stages of the scientific design (Celino et al. 2018).
From a democratic perspective, law and legal systems could be shaped in such a
way to create incentives for innovation and change. Semantic interoperability
between all jurisdictions in national and international legal systems is an important
component; the next layer of interoperable laws, as we have shown in previous
chapters. But anchoring them into different organisations and social communities
poses different types of problems: it requires systemic interoperability and new
forms of responsive, better and smart regulations to foster citizens’ participation and
community building. In a big data era, we should not lose sight of how close social
bonds are built up:
[…] we risk overlooking the much more important story here, the real revolution, which is
the mass democratisation of the means of access, storage and processing of data. This story
isn’t about large organisations running parallel software on tens of thousands of servers, but
about more people than ever being able to collaborate effectively around a distributed
ecosystem of information, an ecosystem of small data. (Pollock 2013)
9See the complete account edited by Motta (2013) on 25 years of knowledge acquisition research.
10Their classification (Corcho et al. 2015, 15): (i) upper-level ontology engineers (deep knowledge
about formal logic and philosophy); (ii) heavyweight ontology engineers (domain experts);
(iii) lightweight ontology engineers (develop vocabularies to be used in the linked data context);
(iv) SKOS (Simple Knowledge Organization System) concept scheme developers (interested in
developing thesauri and other types of classifications); (v) web developers contributing to Schema.
org.
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As highlighted in Chaps. 2 and 3, the meso-level, the institutional implemen-
tation layer that is also required to operationalize linked democracy has not yet been
considered in the legal domain. Linked Open Data (LOD) is being implemented,
but not Linked Platforms or Linked Ecosystems (LE). The big “connectome” is still
the administration. Case law and legislation identifiers, such as the European ECLI
and ELI, can be situated on top. There are also serious attempts to link legal
multi-lingual resources. CELLAR stores all metadata and digital content managed
by EurLex, the EU Publications Office (Francesconi et al. 2015). This is the first
step to generate reusable knowledge. For instance, the Law Enforcement Agency
Identifiers Crosswalk (LEAIC) is a USA programme addressed to merging crime
sources from cities under the county level.11 It facilitates linking reported crime
data with socio-economic data. This does not hail from citizens’ organisations, but
from government agencies to implement criminal policies. But it facilitates more
accurate studies on the use of force by the police (Garner et al. 2018).
The legal domain is a complex one, related to normative and legal theories.
There is a top-down drive amongst legal scholars and computer scientists to rep-
resent its content as a whole. Thus, the requirements for rule interchange languages
presented in Table 5.2 are based on concepts elaborated in normative theory (e.g.
defeasibility, validity, and lifecycle of norms). LegalXML, RuleMarkup Language
(RuleML), Semantics of Business Vocabulary and Business Rules (SBVR), the
Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL), the Rule Interchange Format (RIF), and
the Legal Knowledge Interchange Format (LKIF) are rule interchange languages for
the legal domain.12 Originally, the Rule Interchange Format (RIF) aimed to create a
standard for exchanging rules among rule systems. In contrast to other SW stan-
dards (such as RDF, OWL and SPARQL) it was clear that a single language would
not cover all paradigms for using knowledge in knowledge representation and
business modelling (WWW 2013), although the media of exchange between dif-
ferent rule systems is XML.13
Gordon et al. (2009) conceptualised ten years ago the main legal components as
requirements that rule interchange languages needed to comply with. Yet, they also
highlighted that there is no language able to satisfy all of them simultaneously.
Table 5.2 summarises their results.14
This framework was grounded on a positivistic approach, but it addressed new
problems and challenged what ‘law architecture’ or ‘legal system’ had meant so far,
at every layer of the table. Legal drafting, ruling and contracting are still activities
carried out through natural languages, and so are legal outcomes. As noticed by
Lam et al. (2016), even from this perspective, there are problems with handling the
11https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/35158/datadocumentation.
12See Casanovas et al. (2016) for the state of the art for web semantics in the legal domain.
13See the WWW RIF Overview (second version, February 2013) at
https://www.w3.org/2013/pdf/NOTE-rif-overview-20130205.pdf.
14The content of the table is reproduced slightly modified in Balke et al. (2013). The authors
explicitly assert that these aspects “contribute to classifying norms and can be extended to other
normative domains besides the law”.
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Table 5.2 Requirements for rule interchange languages
1. Isomorphism A one-to-one correspondence between the rules in the formal model
and the units of natural language text which express the rules in the
original legal sources
2. Reification Rules are objects with properties:
a) Jurisdiction: limits where the rule is authoritative, and its effects
are binding
b) Authority: ranking status of the rule within the sources of law
(constitutional rule, or statute…)
c) Temporal properties: (i) time when the norm has been enacted,
(ii) time when the norm can produce legal effects, (iii) time when
the normative effects hold
3. Rule semantics Semantics allows for correctly computing the legal effects that
should follow
4. Defeasibility When the antecedent of a rule is satisfied by the facts of a case, the
conclusion of the rule presumably holds, but is not necessarily
true). Defeasibility breaks down into:
a) Conflicts (rules may lead to incompatible legal effects): (i) one
rule is the exception of the other, (ii) rules have different ranking
status, (iii) rules have been enacted at different times.a
b) Exclusionary rules (some rules provide one way to explicitly
undercut other rules, namely, to make them inapplicable)
5. Contraposition If some conclusion of a rule is not true, the rule does not sanction
any inferences about the truth of its premises
6. Contributory reasons
or factors
It is not always possible to formulate precise rules for aggregating
the factors relevant for resolving a legal issue
7. Rule validity Rules can be or become invalid. Deleting invalid rules is not an
option when it is necessary to reason retroactively with rules which
were valid at various times over a course of events: (i) the
annulment of a norm is usually seen as a kind of repeal which
invalidates the norm and removes it from the legal system as if it
had never been enacted (the effect of an annulment applies ex tunc:
annulated norms are prevented from producing any legal effects,
also for past events); (ii) an abrogation on the other hand operates
ex nunc (the rule continues to apply for events which occurred
before the rule was abrogated)
8. Legal procedures Rules regulate also whether or not some action or state complies
with other, substantive rules): (i) procedures that regulate methods
for detecting violations of the law, (ii) procedures that determine
the normative effects triggered by norm violations (reparative or
compensatory obligations)
8. Normative effects Such as obligations, permissions, prohibitions and also more
articulated effects) e.g.:
a) Evaluative, there is a value to be optimized or an evil to be
minimized
b) Qualificatory, which ascribe a legal quality to a person or an
object
c) Definitional, which specify the meaning of a term
d) Deontic, which, typically, impose the obligation or confer the
permission to do a certain action
(continued)
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deontic effects that are needed in legal practice.15 For instance, the basic assumption
of legal isomorphism16 is meant to bridge the gap between the contents of nor-
mative texts and the rules describing them.17 OASIS standards for LegalXML and
LegalRuleML have been based on this isomorphic assumption. OASIS Legal
RuleML highlights that “the legal text is the only legally binding element [our
emphasis] the connection between text and the rule(s) (or fragment of rule) guar-
antees the provenance, authoritativeness, and authenticity of the rules modelled by
the legal knowledge engineer” (Athan et al. 2015). Thus, it embraces legal
hermeneutics as a fundamental set of privileged techniques to produce legal
knowledge (Athan et al. 2014).18
This is a convenient assumption, but not generalizable to all possible environ-
ments and relationships between subjects, as there is no direct translation from the
Table 5.2 (continued)
e) Potestative, which attribute powers
f) Evidentiary, which establish the conclusion to be drawn from
certain evidence
g) Existential, which indicate the beginning or the termination of
the existence of a legal entity
h) Norm-concerning effects, which state the modifications of norms
(abrogation, repeal, substitution…)
9. Persistence of
normative effects
Some normative effects persist over time unless some other and
subsequent events terminate them
10. Values Some values are promoted by the legal rule
Simplified reconstruction, Source Gordon et al. (2009)
aAccordingly, rule conflicts have been traditionally resolved using principles about use priorities:
(i) lex specialis (it gives priority to the mores specific rule), (ii) lex superior (it gives priority to the
rule from the higher authority), (iii) lex posterior (it gives priority to the rule enacted later)
15RuleML is an XML-based standard language that enables users to use different types of rules
(such as derivation rules, facts, queries, integrity constraints, etc.) to represent different kinds of
elements according to their needs. However, so far, “it lacks support for the use of deontic
concepts, such as obligations, permissions and prohibitions, making it impossible to handle cases
with contrary-to-duty (CTD) obligations (or reparational obligations), which is not uncommon in
legal contracts.”
16According to Palmirani et al. (2012) isomorphism is “the concept to associate any rule to its
provision(s) in order: (1) to have a relationship between rule(s) and legal provision(s) that origi-
nated it/them; (2) to have a clear explanation, supported by the original legal text, to provide to the
end user as outcome of the legal reasoning process (demonstration). The original legal provision is
the only legal binding text; (3) to help the maintenance of the rules knowledge base when the text
changes (change management)”.
17Cfr. Bench-Capon and Coenen (1992), Bench-Capon and Gordon (2009). The authors contend
that ‘legal isomorphism’ has a different function and meaning than the mathematical notion of
isomorphism. They are referring to the reflection of legal content into formal languages.
18“LegalRuleML endeavours not to account for how different interpretations arise, but to provide a
mechanism to record and represent them” (Athan et al. 2014).
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content of statutes, codes, directives, regulations and acts, to formal languages.19
From a linked ecosystem perspective, texts are only a component of the overall
social system: in real settings, at the implementing and use level, meaning and
cognition are distributed across the ecosystem.20 In a similar cognitive vein, after
their work on MetaLex and LKIF Core, Boer (2009) criticised the bijective map-
ping of legal rules to logical propositions, and Hoekstra (2009, 161) pointed out that
“the need for a language construct, such as n-ary relations should be based on a
conscious decision to interpret a use case in a particular way: it is an ontological
commitment.” This is an important epistemic concept that should be made explicit
in all modelling of social life, including legal instruments, documents, and beha-
viour of the legal professions.
Other modelling approaches for legal knowledge management are based on a
different set of closely related concepts. RELaw Workshops have been held to
discuss legal requirements since 2008, including sociological dimensions.21
However, the essential issue of how to link platforms and ecosystems is still at a
preliminary stage.
There are several ways to include stakeholders into the design process,
depending on the objectives of the system. Most of legal management systems are
compliance-oriented, as the design is mindful of the features of legal knowledge as
it is used and interpreted by lawyers, external auditors, and business analysts. They
are not primarily intended to comprehend citizens’ political participation, nor the
features of crowd-civic systems that facilitate interaction, debate, and content cre-
ation (referred in Chap. 3, 3.4.2, Table 3.1).22 However, it has not been ruled out
that they could incorporate these functions in the future, as they endorse flexible
normative interpretations and end-users’ participation, two of the main qualities of
relational law. As we will see later, we understand relational law as the assignment,
embodiment and realization of rights within a shared ecosystem; i.e. creating an
aggregated value to foster trust and security in the connection between Web 2.0 and
Web 3.0 (Casanovas 2013).
19See Wyner and Governatori (2013) about the challenges to be faced.
20See Hutchins (1995, 2006): “The meaning of a complex emerges from the interactions among
the modalities that include the body as well as material objects present in the environment. The
effects of these interactions are generally not simply additive. Such a meaning complex may be
built up incrementally or produced more or less whole, depending on the nature of the components
and the relations among them.”
21RELaw: International Workshop Series on Requirements Engineering and Law, http://gaius.isri.
cmu.edu/relaw/.
22See the compatible functions between Eunomos and Legal-Urn in Boella et al. (2014). Both legal
management systems encompass the discussions between different kind of stakeholders (lawyers,
auditors, and business administrators).
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5.2.2 Responsive, Smart, and Better Regulations
The Communication from the Commission of 23 March 2017 defined the strategy
for governance and interoperability across the state members.23 The EU has
adopted a relational view to foster citizen participation, transparency, public
monitoring and control, considering interoperability as a prerequisite “for enabling
electronic communication and exchange of information between public adminis-
trations” and “for achieving a digital single market.” (EU 2017). In this regard, the
EU provides a set of principles and recommendations24 to promote electronic
communication across administrations, distinguishing four layers of interoperabil-
ity: (i) legal (ensuring that organisations operating under different legal frame-
works, policies and strategies are able to work together, setting interoperability
checks to identify legal barriers); (ii) organisational (relationships between service
providers and service consumers); (iii) semantic (developing vocabularies and
schemata to describe data exchanges in the same format); (iv) technical (applica-
tions and infrastructures linking systems and services). More precisely:
(i) legal issues, e.g. by ensuring that legislation does not impose unjustified barriers to the
reuse of data in different policy areas; organisational aspects, e.g. by requesting formal
agreements on the conditions applicable to cross-organisational interactions; data/semantic
concerns, e.g. by ensuring the use of common descriptions of exchanged data; (iv) technical
challenges, e.g. by setting up the necessary information systems environment to allow an
uninterrupted flow of bits and bytes. [COM (2017) 134]
The European Interoperability Framework (EIF) conceptual model embraces a
holistic perspective on interoperability and compliance, acknowledging the com-
plexity of data governance.25 This is a step towards what many years ago Nonet
and Selznick (1978) called responsive law: “a wider sharing of legal authority”,
“participatory decision as a source of knowledge, a vehicle of communication, and
a foundation for consent”.
We will highlight three different empirical approaches—responsive, smart, and
better regulations—which are not identical, but are devoted to the objective of
getting law closer to civil society. After work done by socio-legal scholars such as
Selznick, Nonet and Kazan, and activists like Ralph Nader,26 the “responsive law”
23Brussels, 23.3.2017 COM (2017) 134 final. Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=
cellar:2c2f2554-0faf-11e7-8a35-01aa75ed71a1.0017.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.
24Underlying principles for public administration are citizen- and user-centred: (i) subsidiarity and
proportionality, (ii) openness, (iii) transparency, (iv) reusability, (v) technological neutrality and
data portability, (vi) user-centricity, (vii) inclusion and accessibility, (viii) security and privacy,
(ix) multilingualism, (x) administrative simplification, (xi) preservation of information,
(xii) assessment of effectiveness and efficiency.
25European Interoperability Framework—Implementation Strategy: https://ec.europa.eu/isa2/
sites/isa/files/eif_brochure_final.pdf.
26http://csrl.org/about/.
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idea came into age and was fleshed out by legal sociologists and criminologists.
How regulations and law should be approached if their main aim was empowering
people? According to Braithwaite:
Responsive regulation involves listening to multiple stakeholders and making a deliberative
and flexible (responsive) choice from regulatory strategies that can be conceptually
arranged in a pyramid. At the bottom of the pyramid are more frequently used strategies of
first choice that are less coercive, less interventionist, and cheaper. 27
Ayres and Braithwaite (1995) showed that compliance, respect, and cooperation
in implementing regulations were possible if citizens and professional people could
embrace and apply them into their everyday life. So, they should be co-involved in
lawmaking, deployment and even enforcement of legislation throughout the legal
drafting, implementation and eventual reform process. Between state regulation and
self-regulation there are many stances that are worth exploring:
Good policy analysis is not about choosing between the free market and government
regulation. Nor is it simply deciding what the law should proscribe. If we accept that sound
policy analysis is about understanding private regulation—by industry associations, by
firms, by peers, and by individual consciences—and how it is interdependent with state
regulation, then interesting possibilities open up to steer the mix of private and public
regulation. It is this mix, this interplay, that works to assist or impede solution of the policy
problem. (Ayres and Braithwaite 1995, 3).
Thus, democracy is enhanced and citizens are empowered by: (i) making choices
to vote in the marketplace; (ii) voting rights in a representative democracy;
(iii) participating “in any local area of collective decision making that has an
important effect on their lives—in their workplace, school, local planning authority,
nursing home, etc.”; and (iv) standing for office, voting, and collectively partici-
pating in special-interest and public-interest associations (Ayres and Braithwaite
1995, 17).
Elaborating on top of Braithwaite’s work, a related view is contended by the
concept of “smart regulation”, coined by Gunningham et al. (1998) for the envi-
ronmental field:
The term refers to a form of regulatory pluralism that embraces flexible, imaginative and
innovative forms of social control. In doing so, it harnesses governments as well as business
and third parties. For example, it encompasses self-regulation and co-regulation, using
commercial interests and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (such as peak bodies) as
regulatory surrogates, together with improving the effectiveness and efficiency of more
conventional forms of direct government regulation. (Gunningham and Sinclair 2017, 133)
The authors try to avoid dichotomies (government/citizens, state/market…) to
focus on the plurality of regulatory forms, influences, and interactions among
international standards organisations, trading partners and the supply chain, com-
mercial institutions and financial markets, peer pressure and self-regulation through
industry associations, internal environment management systems, and culture (i.e.
27http://johnbraithwaite.com/responsive-regulation/. See also Braithwaite (2017).
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“civil society in myriad different forms”) (ibid.). This leads to different design
regulatory principles: (i) preferring complementary instrument mixes over single
instrument approaches, (ii) less interventionist measures, (iii) escalating responses
up an instrument pyramid to build in regulatory responsiveness, (iv) empowering
third parties to act as surrogate regulators, (v) encouraging business to go “beyond
compliance” within existing legal requirements (ibid.). Governments should bind
themselves to entice or induce rather than enforce compliance.28
Both responsive and smart approaches have eventually been considered by the
European Commission when launching a better regulation planning throughout the
whole European policy cycle. Table 5.3 summarises the principles:
These principles are applied through several mandatory instruments before an
initiative is launched and funds are allocated: roadmaps, Impact Assessments, fit-
ness checks, and eventually final audits. According to the Better Regulation agenda,
the EU Commission should ensure that (i) decision-making is open and transparent,
(ii) citizens and stakeholders can contribute throughout the policy and law-making
process, (iii) EU actions are based on evidence and understanding of the impacts,
(iv) and regulatory burdens on businesses, citizens or public administrations are
kept to a minimum.29 Thus, responsive regulation is a way to cope with the “le-
gitimacy market failure” as pointed out by Purnhagen (2015, 51): “top-down
macro-economic regulation without a social bottom-up backup by the peoples of
Europe has mostly failed”.
Yet, it comes with limitations. This is an administrative governance model. It
aims at building a EU public space that guarantees and protects citizens’ rights, but
it is mainly addressed to rulers, state officials and members of public administra-
tions. While the model encompasses individual citizens, organisations, and social
groups, it does not consider putting the whole framework into their hands or lending
them tools to build their own regulatory systems. In this sense, it is perhaps better to
take it as it is, a useful framework, or better, a component of the European gov-
ernance framework linking the macro and micro-levels of public administration.
For instance, it fosters e-participation, in EU law-making processes (Schmitz
et al. 2016, 2017). However, as already shown at the level of legal interoperability,
what is missing is the meso-level. If we define linked democracy as a distributed,
technologically-supported collective decision-making process, what is yet to be
built is the middle-ground connectivity emerging from community-building
citizenry.
It is worth mentioning in this point the impulse of legal mixed public/private
business models in the new Web of Data scenarios. We are thinking of the more
28Thus, “the preferred role for government under smart regulation is to create the necessary
preconditions for second or third parties to assume a greater share of the regulatory burden rather
than engaging in direct intervention (Gunningham and Sinclair 2017, 139).
29https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law/better-regulation-
why-and-how_en.
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than fifty institutes of the World Legal Information Institute,30 who have been
provided with access to all kinds of legal documents since 1992 with the explicit
aim of fostering the rule of law. Actually, they have been turning top-down and
exclusively market-based approaches into more relational and flexible ways of
Table 5.3 Principles of better regulation
Embedded in the planning
and policy cycle
Be well-planned and timely. All the preparatory and analytical
work, including stakeholder consultations, must be done in time
to feed into the policy development process
Of high quality Be of the highest quality. The basis of any stakeholder
consultation should be clear, concise and include all necessary
information to facilitate responses
Evidence-based Be based on the best available evidence including scientific
advice, or a transparent explanation of why some evidence is
not available and why it is still considered appropriate to act
Participatory/Open to
stakeholders’ views
Ensure wide participation throughout the policy cycle. Open
web-based public consultations should be mandatory elements
of any consultation strategy associated with and evaluation or
impact assessment
Respect for subsidiarity and
proportionality
EU action must be relevant and necessary, offer value beyond
what Member State action alone can deliver and not go further
than is necessary to resolve the problem or meet the policy
objective
Comprehensive They must consider relevant economic, social, and
environmental impacts of alternative policy solutions.
Stakeholders’ views must be collected on all key issues
Coherent/Conducted
collectively
Be coherent. New initiatives, impact assessments, consultations
and evaluations must be prepared collectively by all relevant
services in the framework of interservice groups
Proportionate Be proportionate to the type of intervention or initiative, the
importance of the problem or objective, and the magnitude of
the expected or observed impacts
Transparent Be clearly visible. Results of evaluations, impact assessments
and consultations should be widely disseminated. Stakeholder
responses should be acknowledged, and consultation results
widely disseminated through a single access point. The reasons
for disagreeing with dissenting views must be explained
Unbiased Be objective and balanced. They should inform political choices
with evidence—not the other way around
Appropriately resourced and
organised
Be underpinned by sufficient human and financial resources to
enable each evaluation, impact assessment or consultation to
deliver a timely high-quality result
Source European Commission, Better Regulation Toolbox 1, Principles, Procedures & Exceptions.
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/better-regulation-toolbox-1_en_0.pdf, 6–7
30See http://www.worldlii.org/, especially http://www.austlii.edu.au/ and https://www.law.cornell.
edu/.
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handling regulations, services, and rights. These mixed, hybrid models will prob-
ably grow and thrive in the web of data, as they encompass a flexible way to place
themselves between the market, the state, and civil society. The Declaration of Free
Access to Law Movement (FALM) commits them to “provide free and anonymous
public access to that information” and “do not impede others from obtaining public
legal information from its sources and publishing”. They recently added as an
objective the “development of open technical standards”.31 It is an example of an
independent “connectome”. The Institutes foster innovation and experimentation.32
5.3 Governing Linked Democracy: A Socio-Cognitive
Approach
5.3.1 A Regulatory Quadrant for the Rule of Law
The field of Normative Multi-Agent Systems (NorMAS) was incepted to integrate
and cope with the different notions of norms stemming from social, cognitive and
computer sciences. It can be defined “as the intersection of normative systems and
multiagent systems (MAS)” (Boella et al. 2007).33MAS are computer systems
composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, creating contexts for autono-
mous artificial agents.34 Artificial Socio-cognitive systems (ASCS) contemplate this
interface from a tripartite model where the affordances of the system emerge from
the intersection between three dimensions—institutional, the technological and the
“real world” (or social space).35 Thus, reflecting human cogency and agency in
context—its ‘cognitive ecology’. We will start from this same point to define legal
linked data systems or, tout court, socio-legal ecosystems.
Hutchins defined cognitive ecology as “the study of cognitive phenomena in
context” (Hutchins 2010, 705–6). The term points to “the web of mutual depen-
dence among the elements of a cognitive ecosystem”:
Everything is connected to everything else. Fortunately, not all connectivity is equally
dense. […]. To speak of cognitive ecology is to employ an obvious metaphor, that cog-
nitive systems are in some specific way like biological systems. In particular, it points to the
web of mutual dependence among the elements of an ecosystem. (Hutchins 2010, ibid.)
31http://www.falm.info/declaration/.
32Greenleaf (2009), Casellas et al. (2012), Greenleaf et al. (2013), Vallbé and Casellas (2014),
Curtotti et al. (2015).
33See Andrighetto et al. (2013) for a general view; for norMAS and law, Casanovas et al. (2014a).
34On MAS applications see Sierra (2004), Christiaanse and Hulstijn (2012), and especially the
survey carried out by Müller and Fischer (2014).
35See Noriega et al. (2014), Christiaanse et al. (2014), Christiaanse and Hulstijn (2012). In 2016,
their Manifesto for conscious design introduces the notion of Hybrid Online Social Systems
(HOSS) and situates them at the centre of the triangle: the impact of AI affects everyday life
(Noriega et al. 2016). On the notion of ‘coordination’ for norMAS, see Aldewereld et al. (2016).
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Hutchins draws on Bateson’s metaphor of the “blind man” to further illustrate
his point. To explain the locomotion of a blind man with a stick, “you will need the
street, the stick, the man, the street, the stick, and so on, round and round” (ibid.).
The metaphor also echoes Herbert Simon’s ant’s path, and the second order iso-
morphism fallacy.36
Creating a socio-legal ecosystem requires an appraisal of the dynamic coupling
between the social environment, the actors and the tools and technologies they use
to reach their objectives and recreate their social bonds. It involves experimentation,
plasticity and sensitivity. The outcomes of this interplay can also be conceived as
thinking without representation. For example, collective action emerges from a set
of conditions and coordinated actions that constitute the system, allowing multiple
possibilities to deploy in one direction or another. This enaction37 perspective does
not exclude the role of collective emotions in the making of regulatory schemes, as
the cognitive properties of groups are different from the cognitive properties of any
individual in the group.
The idea of complex intermediation is crucial to create sustainable socio-legal
ecosystems on the web. Again, in the first edition of The Sciences of the Artificial
(1969), Simon introduced the property of near-decomposability of systems:
sub-systems can have stronger links within them than between them. The second
edition (1984), which includes a new chapter on the social world, shows how
coordination in a complex system is complex at every level of the system. We could
benefit from these ideas, as the components of a regulatory system also exhibit the
plasticity and diversity of near-decomposable systems.
When it comes to the social implementation of the rule of law—either through
Artificial Socio-cognitive Technical Systems (ASCS), Hybrid Online Social Systems
(HOSS), or Open Linked Data (OLD) systems—it is possible to identify basic
components and the relations between them looking at the sources, domains, and
position with respect to citizens (bindingness of norms or rules). Rather than discrete
categories or lists of requirements, it is a matter of degree and conditions of values and
principles. In a way, this is previous to building any kind of ontology or artificial tool.
We are dealing with the pragmatic dimension of the rule of law, i.e. its governance.
To start with, we could figure out the implementation of the rule of law along
two different relational dimensions at the empirical level: (i) material institutional
power [force, macht, fuerza, forza], (ii) and social dialogue (negotiation,
36First-order isomorphism describes the situation in which a similarity relation exists between an
internal representation and the real-world object being represented (Shepard and Chipman 1970).
Second-order isomorphism refers to a similarity relation that exists between the similarities among
internal representations and the corresponding similarities among multiple real-world objects being
represented (Shepard and Chipman 1970). As famously depicted in The Sciences of the Artificial
(1969), an ant, viewed as a behaving system, is quite simple. The apparent complexity of its
behaviour over time is largely a reflection of the complexity of the environment in which it finds
itself. Complexity is in the environment, not in the ant.
37‘Enaction’ is the notion that organisms create their own experience through their actions in a
dynamic and multi-modal way. We are assuming that this holds as well for social groups or
communities.
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compromise, mediation, agreement). Thinking of law and regulations, power and
how it is handled and eventually shared, matters. Even at the micro-level, the
alignment of Linked Democracy properties with Ostrom’s Common Pool
Resources principles (Fig. 4.3) maintains a proportioned and gradual system of
sanctions. There is a wide range of sanctions, from incentives to criminal punish-
ment. But we are looking for some value to be assigned to them according to the
degree of ‘bindingness’ of norms and the acceptance of stakeholders.
The intuition to first separate binding from non-binding norms according to the
nature of the objectives and procedures is implicitly assumed by many formula-
tions. For instance, Brous et al. (2016) produced a long list of principles for data
governance in their systematic review. They eventually distilled four principles of
data governance for public organizations—organisation, alignment [with the needs
of the business], compliance [monitoring and enforcement], and common under-
standing [of data quality]. But, “data quality is often related to ‘fitness for use’ and
data governance demands binding guidelines and rules for data quality manage-
ment”. Likewise, when searching for requirements for an architecture framework
for pan-European E-Government services, Mondorf and Wimmer (2016) used a
nuanced concept of compliance (and the bindingness of agreements). They applied
the notion of “enterprise architecture”, a concept used to deal with organisational
complexity and interoperability. The EU Better Regulations scheme for interop-
erability has also been structured within this framework. The Open Group
Architecture Framework (TOGAF) is developing the technical architecture to make
it applicable: the EIRA legal view equally splits up legal regulations into binding
and non-binding instruments.38
Figure 5.2 below plots our regulatory quadrant for the rule of law. The validity
of norms (i.e. their ‘legality’) emerges from four different types of regulatory
frames, with some distinctive properties. Properties are understood here as corre-
lating dynamic patterns. But this is only a preliminary scheme, a conceptual
compass to be used for a first clustering of norms, according to their type and
degree of compliance: abidance (for hard law), conformance (for policies), ac-
cordance (for soft law), and congruence (or congruity) for ethics. According to the
degree of abstraction at the implementation level, these four categories can be
blurred into overlapping concepts. Agreements can be understood as mandatories;
in practice, corporate policies can be more binding than some statutes. Actually, the
concept of “negative compliance” or “noncompliance” is used to denote corporate
strategies to avoid legal abidance when compliance is deemed to be too expensive
or contrary to the business interests (Mun 2015).
38“A [Public Policy] is the outcome of a specific [Public Policy Cycle] that aims at addressing the
needs of a group of stakeholders. The policy is formulated and implemented with the help of
[Public Policy Formulation and Implementation Instruments] such as [Legal Requirements or
Constraints] in the form of either [Binding Instruments] or [Non-Binding Instruments], or
[Operational Enablers], such as [Financial Resources] or [Implementing Guidelines].” See “Legal
view” TOGAF (2017, 39).
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5.3.2 Types of Legal Governance
Hard law refers to legally binding obligations, either in the national or international
arena, under regulations that can lead to adjudication court processes. Soft law, on
the contrary, is usually not mandatory. It consists of non-legally binding rules, best
practices, and principles that facilitate the governance of networks, social organi-
zations, companies, and institutions. Soft law makes room for dialogue, negotia-
tions, and shared decisions by relevant actors and interested stakeholders. In the
quadrant, soft and hard law are non-discrete categories situated on a continuum that
allows the coordination of different powers and authorities to produce global law
and regulations across borders involving citizens, organizations, and states
(Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Vihma 2009).
International actors choose softer forms of legalized governance when those forms offer
superior institutional solutions. […]. The realm of soft law begins once legally arrange-
ments are weakened along one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision, and
delegation. This softening can occur in varying degrees along each dimension and in
different combinations across dimensions. We use the shorthand term soft law to distinguish
this broad class of deviations from hard law – and, at the other extreme, from purely
political arrangements in which legalization is largely absent. But bear in mind that soft law
comes in many varieties: the choice between hard law and soft law is not a binary one
(Abbot and Snidal 2000, 421–422).
As recently evaluated by D’Rosario and Zeleznikow (2018), we should not
underestimate the force of soft law, as it evidences the role of market forces and
bilateral and multi-lateral pressures on legal implementation. d’Aspremont et al.
(2017) have also highlighted this point as a social source of International Law.
Fig. 5.2 Regulatory quadrant for the rule of law
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Policy is usually defined as a “a set of ideas, or a plan of what to do in particular
situations, that has been agreed officially by a group of people, a business orga-
nization, a government, or a political party.”39 It refers to policies designed,
enacted, and implemented by corporations, companies, nation-states or interna-
tional agencies and organisations. Policies cannot be understood as soft law when
they are enacted by government agencies that have the capacity of enforcing them
by means of sanctions, fines and lawsuits. There is a phenomenon of osmosis or
hybridization between government administrations and agencies, and corporate
governance. Government agencies tend to be drawn on corporate organisational
and, especially, information and data-driven models. However, public governance
is and should be kept separate from the private one (including companies and
corporations).
Corporate governance is a broad category than can also be considered as a form
of policy-making. It includes methodologies, models and standards developed over
the last twenty-five years (for example, ISO standards related to corporate and
regulatory compliance and security). Some models for IT Governance are drawn
from COSO, COBIT, ISO 27002 (ISO 17799) and ISO 38500.40 There are also best
practices and standards set by international professional organisations. ISO/IEC
2700141 is an information security standard published by the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and by the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC), entitled Information technology—Security techniques—Code
of practice for information security management.42 Standards for the representation
of vocabularies on the Semantic Web have been recently considered by ISOs on
thesaurus. The new ISO 25964 is close to the SKOS approach and includes a data
model. It is divided into two parts: (i) Thesauri for information retrieval,
(ii) Interoperability with other vocabularies.43
W3C recommendations and standards on linked open data also fall within this
category (policy/governance). Developers adopting them benefit from their wide
acceptance. Yet, standards are not expected to gain compliance but conformance.
They refer to the quality of coding and markup tools such as Hypertext Markup
39https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/policy.
40This standard is based on the AS 8015-2005 Australian Standard for Corporate Governance of
Information and Communication Technology (2005).
41http://www.iso27001security.com/html/27002.html.
42See also (i) ISO 17799 (developed today by ISO 27001/02), a guide for implementing a set of
policies, practices and procedures to consolidate the information security administered by an
organization, (ii) ISO/IEC 27002, which requires that management systematically examines the
organization’s information security risks, taking account of the threats, vulnerabilities and impacts;
(iii) Clause 6.1.3 of ISO/27001:2013, describes how an organisation can respond to risks with a
risk treatment plan; an important part of this is choosing appropriate controls; (iv) ISO/IEC 27002
seeking the preservation of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
43ISO 25964: Information and documentation—Thesauri and interoperability with other vocab-
ularies. See the presentation by the project lead (Clarke and Stella 2011).
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Language (HTML) and Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) and allow validators to check
the conformance of web coding to them.44
Both ISO/IECs and W3C standards can be conceived as forms of soft law,
network or multi-stake holder governance. Yet, these latter concepts have a broader
regulatory scope, intended to solve political and social disputes in regional,
national, and international arenas (e.g. conflicts between social groups, corpora-
tions, companies, sub-state and state entities).
We can consider different types of governance that would fall under the policy
label—mainly internet, network,45 stakeholder,46 data, and algorithmic gover-
nance.47 Cap 1 has briefly presented some of them. Data and algorithmic gover-
nance are especially relevant to expand the protections of the rule of law.
We should differentiate Internet governance from the forms of contemporary
governance on the web. The latter has been increasingly introduced through the
combination of algorithms, semantic languages, computational linguistics, data
mining,48 visualization, and, recently, Artificial Intelligence methods (such as deep
machine learning).49 They are ambiguously referred to as “big data”.50 Some
prudence is required here: after their extended review, Sivarajah et al. (2017, 279)
conclude that strengthening empirical research based on in-depth case studies, and
qualitative and quantitative research, is much needed as “most of the articles
analysed followed an analytical approach”.
A functional typology of algorithmic selection applications is offered by Just and
Latzer (2017): (i) search, (ii) aggregation, (iii) surveillance, (iv) forecast, (v) filtering,
(vi) recommendation, (vii) scoring, (viii) content production, (ix) and allocation.
Each one of them constitute separate domains of computer expertise, understood as a
governance “institutional steering”, a “horizontal and vertical extension of traditional
government”, looking beyond public and private actors (e.g. governments and
industry) and, vertically, looking beyond multi-stakeholder instruments. Social
reality is now increasingly shaped and constructed by algorithmic selection (ibid.).
44http://validator.w3.org/, http://jigsaw.w3.org/css-validator/.
45Rhodes (2007), Provan and Kenis (2008), Gottschalk (2009).
46On the notion of ‘stake-holder governance’, Hens and Bhaskar (2005); on its structure and
processes applied to the Internet, Malcolm (2008, 2015); on “stake-holder democracy”,
MacDonald (2008), MacDonald and MacDonald (2017); for a critical view see Bäckstrand (2006),
Fransen and Kolk (2007), Bexell et al. (2010).
47Cfr. The surveys by Chen and Zhang (2014), Siddiqa et al. (2016); cfr. also, on algorithmic
governance, the typology by Just and Latzer (2017).
48I.e. Correlation and regression analysis; and data classification, clustering, prediction, and
diagnosis (Zhao-Hong et al. 2018, 205)
49See the surveys on data-intensive applications (Chen and Zhang 2014), big data life-cycles and
management (Khan et al. 2014) big data management (Siddiqa et al. 2016), big data analytics in
governance (Bhardwaj and Singh 2017), on data processing methods (Zhao-Hong et al. 2018).
50It is commonly described as data satisficing a 5-V model: (i) Volume (data scale datasets),
(ii) Value (low density, high value information), (iii) Variety (including unstructured and
semi-structured data), (iv) Velocity (speed of data collection and analysis), (v) Validity (quality
and veracity of data).
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Thus, the problem is now how to assemble, monitor, use and control these different
methods. Semanticmatching to identify related information, re-engineering, re-using,
model-driven engineering and graph analysis operating on an ontological basis are
some of the techniques that the semantic web community is developing. Smart data is
related to the 5-V model (see note 113): “an organized way to semantically compile,
manipulate, correlate, and analyse different data sources” (Duong et al. 2017) that is
adding value to governance and decision-making. From a regulatory point of view,
there are several challenges related to them: security and data protection, ownership,
privacy, data flows exchange and cross-border data flows. After the enactment of the
European GDPR this is a hot topic, with countless contributions.
We would like to point out just one challenge that is key to the linked democracy
approach. In Table 5.1 we aligned Ostrom’s CPR principles—rules in use matched
to local needs and conditions, participation, self-monitoring, need of proportional
sanctions…—with the substantive principles of the rule of law. This is a new
version of the so-called micro-macro link problem. Ostrom’s principles are
community-driven. How could polycentric governance be compatible with
data-driven societies? Pitt et al. (2013, 40) contend that
Collective awareness can be achieved by analysing big data generated by networked sensors
and devices as well as ICT-enabled users. Search, data mining, and visualization technologies
make it possible to spot trends and predict the trajectories of higher-level variables. This in
turn enables collective action, without which it might be impossible to change community
behaviour to reach a desirable outcome—for example, sustaining a scarce resource.
Social intelligence, collective action modelling entails a shift both in governance
and legal studies. Our contention is that collective awareness can also be carried out
within the framework of the meta-rule of law.
Finally, Ethics primarily refer to morals, social mores, practical knowledge and
principles that should be implemented into legal regulations, policies, and gover-
nance structures. But, most interestingly, ethics can be infused across them.51
Ethics and law were not mentioned in the first accounts on the semantic web (e.g.
Bizer et al. 2011), but this is experiencing a dramatic turn. The defence of ethical
values embedded into computer systems, Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) and Artificial
Intelligence is a hot topic now, bringing together (i) thoroughness (the sound
implementation of what the system is intended to do), (ii) mindfulness (those aspects
that affect the individual users, and stakeholders) and (iii) responsibility (the values
that affect others) (Noriega et al. 2016).
51We can identify schematically at least four stages in privacy and data protection related to ethical
principles. This is a well-known history: (i) the inception of Fair Information Practice Principles
(FIPs) that were published in 1973 by the Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data
Systems in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (USA) under the inspiration of Alan
Westin; (ii) the proposal of a unifying identity metasystem layer by the Microsoft Chief Architect
Kim Cameron in his blog in 2005; (iii) the proposal of Privacy-by-design principles (PbD) issued
by Ann Cavoukian in 2006; (iv) the development of PbD and by default in the General Data
Protection Reform launched by the EU in 2012 that led to the new EU Regulation that came into
force in May 2018.
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The Onlife Manifesto (Floridi 2015) reflects on the fading distinction between
reality, virtuality, human, machine, and nature that seems to be prevalent in our
hyperconnected world. The authors elaborate on the notion of complexity (see
Pagallo 2015; Pagallo et al. 2018) and MAS to question (or nuance) the role of the
nation-state in web of data environments.
Dignum (2018) has shown that ethics and AI are related at several levels:
(i) Ethics-by-Design (EbD, “the technical/algorithmic integration of ethical rea-
soning capabilities as part of the behaviour of artificial autonomous system”),
(ii) Ethics-in-Design (EiD, “the regulatory and engineering methods that support
the analysis and evaluation of the ethical implications of AI systems as these
integrate or replace traditional social structures”), (iii) and Ethics-for-Design (EfD,
“the codes of conduct, standards and certification processes that ensure the integrity
of developers and users as they research, design, construct, employ and manage
artificial intelligent systems”).
We also deem all three levels necessary to implement the principles of the rule of
law beyond the boundaries of the nation state and to develop socio-legal
ecosystems.
5.4 Governing Linked Democracy: Socio-Legal
Ecosystems
5.4.1 Socio-Legal Ecosystems
The term ‘ecosystem’, coined by Arthur Tansley in 1935, originated in biology and
ecology studies. In ecology, the term points to the coexistence of living and
non-living organisms in a niche, or “integration of all biological (biotic) and
nonbiological (abiotic) parts” and “monitoring the movement of energy and mate-
rials (water, chemicals, nutrients, pollutants, etc.) into and out of its boundaries”
(Vogt et al. 1997, 71). The concept was later adopted, among many other disci-
plines, by cybernetics, meaning the interface and exchange of information in
complex systems within their environments (i.e. within social and natural contexts).
Gregory Bateson entitled the collection of his works Towards an Ecology of Mind
(1972). This is the tradition we choose to situate our own use of the term, familiar to
cognitive sciences and cognitive ecology, along with ‘situated meaning’ and ‘sit-
uated cognition’.
The notion of ‘legal ecosystem’ has also been recently used in professional
studies, referring to the involvement of all legal professionals and stakeholders
(Brenton 2017). In computer sciences and law, it has been employed to wrap up the
methodology that involves the participation of end-users in the knowledge acqui-
sition process (Governatori et al. 2009). We will use the notion of ‘legal linked data
ecosystm’ or, tout court, ‘socio-legal ecosystem’ in a different way, meaning all
processes, interactions and exchange of information involved in the social and
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cultural implementation of a regulatory system, including its design, monitoring,
and users’ compliance and behaviour. We will point out the dynamic properties of
its normative elements and its institutional settings.
If we assume the essential socio-cognitive framework described above, it
appears that we cannot generate a legal ecosystem by just laying down, enacting, or
publishing a law or regulation in an official site. In most cases of public law, this
can be considered a necessary non-sufficient condition. Nevertheless, the system
should also be understood, accepted, and settled under the social conditions that
guarantee its implementation. We contend that legal ecosystems are not just gen-
erated from the enactment of laws: they emerge from a set of conditions amongst
human and technical interactions, including the requirements of artificial systems
and the individual and collective behaviour of their users.
Zuiderwijk et al. (2014) have suggested a number of actions and four key
elements when building Open Data (OD) ecosystems: (i) releasing and publishing
open data on the internet, (ii) searching, finding, evaluating and viewing data and
their related licenses, (iii) cleansing, analysing, enriching, combining, linking and
visualizing data, and (iv) interpreting and discussing data and providing feedback to
the data provider and other stakeholders. To integrate the full set of required ele-
ments they add three additional elements: (v) user pathways showing directions for
how open data can be used, (vi) a quality management system and (vii) different
types of metadata to be able to connect the elements. Thus, an OD ecosystem
consists of a multilayered and plural framework: (i) “an open data ecosystem is
characterized by multiple interdependent socio-technical levels, dimensions, actors
(including data providers, infomediaries and users), elements and components”, and
(ii) “need to address challenges related to policy, licenses, technology, financing,
organization, culture, and legal frameworks and are influenced by ICT infrastruc-
tures” (Zuiderwijk et al. 2014, 29–30).
However, to turn these kind of OD ecosystems into legal ones, we should
delineate more precisely how all these elements can be related to the whole regu-
latory system (not only to the type of license at stake) and to agency. Hence, we
would need to articulate a scheme (or meta-model) that could be used (i) to flesh out
the three dimensions plotted in Fig. 10 (legal, social and semantic), (ii) to differ-
entiate the properties of the regulatory system and the meta-rule scheme for the rule
of law, (iii) to embed privacy/data/security and compliance by-design into computer
systems, (iv) to situate and implement them into specific environments, (iv) and to
embed the protections of the rule of law into the meta-rule of law through formal
representations of norms and rights. All components, functions and activities that
the construction of an OD ecosystem entails should be evaluable and evaluated.
Moreover, social ecosystems are complex, and micro-agent interaction and
change can lead to a macro-system evolution (Mitleton-Kelly and Papaefthimiou
2002). Some feed-back processes are associated with them. In the case of the rule of
law, both positive and negative feedback are present: the goal of producing trust
and security through institutional strengthening mechanisms tends to create sta-
bility, which is one of the features to make a socio-legal ecosystem sustainable; but
the whole process is not teleologically-driven, i.e. some changes in the system are
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not intended. Socio-legal systems are cultural, in a broad sense. Thus, “a plethora of
interacting and interconnected micro-feedback-processes whose connectivity and
interaction creates emergent macro-feedback-processes and structures”
(Mitleton-Kelly and Papaefthimiou 2002, 272). Excessive control mechanisms and
inflexible rule-driven organisations can be counterproductive.
Figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 are complementary. The first one is Braithwaite-like,
similar to the pyramids for regulatory theory (responsive and smart regulations)
drawn by Braithwaite, Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair, among others (Drahos
2017). We used an almost identical one to plot the levels of “formality” in medi-
ation: from implicit to explicit dialogue, and from non-binding law to binding law
(Casanovas et al. 2011, Intr.). Processes and outcomes could be accommodated into
it, from natural mediation to legal mediation. Interestingly enough, this could
illuminate the artificial model to support mediation that Noriega et al. (2011)
articulated as an electronic institution, as the problem that emerged out of it was the
legal value of the agreement. When can an artificially-driven procedure ‘count as’
legal? When can procedural moves through different steps be considered as ‘legal’?
Artefacts and e-institutions are tools, and as such can be used informally as well.
Only when the e-institution is nested into a social set of relationships that assert the
degree and value of its “affordances”—the effectiveness and efficiency of its
internal moves and steps in a given environment—the outcome can hold not only as
formally or ‘normatively’ valid, but as ‘legally’ valid as well. The term ‘affordance’
is an interesting concept. It denotes the properties of the environment that are
perceived, endorsed and eventually modified by the agents’ actions. From this
perspective, the ‘validity’ (‘legality’) of a right, norm, or a set of norms can be
understood as a complex outcome of the affordances of the system.
Fig. 5.3 From social informal dialogue to legal formal power
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5.4.2 A Meta-Model for the Implementation
of the Rule of Law
Thus, the problem for validity is not just that the collective processes coming from
the grassroots, bottom-up, should be “legally” compliant with norms to also acquire
a legal value, but that legality itself might show different values and degrees of
accomplishment.
Fig. 5.4 Socio-legal ecosystems pragmatic layer
Fig. 5.5 Meta-model for socio-legal ecosystems (Meta-rule of law)
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‘Validity’ [Geltung, validez, validità, validité] is defined in analytical theory as
the property which captures for any rule or norm the quality of belonging to a legal
system. Usually, a ‘valid’ norm is deemed to be a ‘legal norm’. And, to acquire this
quality of law, a rule or norm is expected to be (or become) valid.52 In legal theory,
the definition has recently turned from a conception in which validity was con-
sidered as a feature of norms or system of norms to a discursive one, in which the
law comes into being by means of the argumentation process stemming from them
(legal argumentation) (Grabowski 2013). This is partially leaning on previous
works on defeasible logic and argumentation by H. Prakken and G. Sartor, among
others, drawing an inferential theoretical approach to legal systems in wich rules are
understood as ‘inferential links’.53
We deem our approach compatible with a normative, discursive or logical
definition of validity (Araszkiewicz and Casanovas 2016). Validity in these latter
senses refers to the regulatory model built by the analyst, i.e. it holds for the
regulatory model that it is built as discourse, reasoning, argumentation or knowl-
edge; but to make it ‘legal’, i.e. admissible, requires the satisfaction of another set
of conditions that are depending on the contextual field of application and on the
regulatory sources at hand. From this standpoint, validity depends upon other
properties—i.e. affordances—running along two different axes (binding power,
social dialogue), and it emerges as a property from the functioning of the whole
system (including human and artificial agents). Regulations unfold along an insti-
tutional continuum. Validity is a characteristic feature of such a continuum, a
property pertaining and emerging from the whole regulatory system which is
essentially dynamic and related to the interactive behaviour of agents. From this
standpoint, it does not ‘supervene’, but ‘emerges’ once first order properties—
enforceability, efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness (criteria for justice)—reach a
pre-determined threshold. Hence, what becomes gradually ‘valid’ is the whole
system, as the actual presence (as a fact) of its components make it happen (in many
ways). This is close to the idea of pragmatic web advanced by Singh (2002a) in the
early days of the Semantic Web: “semantics in a manner that is reusable across
applications, the priority of process over data, the importance of interaction, and the
critical need for accommodating user context” (Singh 2002b).54
52We will follow up here the discussion initiated in Casanovas (2012), and followed in Casanovas
(2015a, b, 2017) and Araszkiewicz and Casanovas (2016). An early example, Casanovas et al.
(2006).
53Sartor (2009a) contends that ‘intermediate legal concepts’ (such as ‘property’) are the concepts
through which legal norms convey both legal consequences and preconditions of further legal
effects. In Sartor (2009b) he contends that there is a tension between their inferential and onto-
logical meaning, and that both sides are required to make sense of legal norms.
54See the Pragmatic Web Manifesto (Schoop et al. 2006), and our position in Casanovas et al.
(2017a).
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Figure 5.4 represents the necessary meta-level that can be added on top of
Fig. 5.1 to ground validity on the three regulatory dimensions of the Web—legal,
social and linguistic. Figure 5.5 depicts the meta-model we propose to cope with
this complexity.
We are facing hybrid environments, partly human, and partly created by artificial
agents or languages (linked data). To operationalise a regulatory system, to inte-
grate its three dimensions into a specific environment and make it ‘legal’, we need
to figure out some more elements: (i) the institutional strengthening of some type of
positive law or rights; (ii) the behaviour of stakeholders (creating, using, and par-
ticipating proactively in its creation, modification and eventual substitution);
(iii) the production of security and trust (as a result: they are never directly produced
but reached); (iv) the presence of intermediate institutions created to “anchor” the
properties of the system—i.e. its affordances—into the social space.
From an empirical point of view, ‘validity’ can be conceptually defined as a
second order property, a four-tuple function of ethics (fairness), policies (effi-
ciency), soft law (effectiveness) and hard law (enforceability), emerging from the
ecosystem. This definition facilitates the application of metrics to measure the
institutional strengthening of the system; i.e. the coordinated organization of nor-
mative components for specific platforms, apps or other devices applying semantic
technologies. We do not yet have a composite indicator for legal validity (i.e. for
assigning legality)—just a preliminary attempt (Ciambra and Casanovas 2014)—
but it would be useful for assessing the legal value of the strength, scope and
performance of the regulatory system.
Figure 5.5 provides more perspectives on the components and the layered
dynamics of the meta-model. Within this approach, several levels of ‘validity’ can
be distinguished: (a) validity as a product of the official norms enacted by an official
body (this is the classical definition); (b) as the composite product of official norms,
multi-layered stakeholder governance, negotiations (dialogue), and ethics (values);
(c) as the product of the internal process of rule-representation in some formal
language (legalXML, legalRuleML)—meta-rule of law—; (d) as the social regu-
latory product within the socio-legal ecosystem. Let´s call them (i) positive validity;
(ii) composite validity; (iii) formal validity; (iv) and ecological validity.
Ecological validity is a popular term in psychology. It refers to the extent the
results of the research can be linked or referred to predict behaviour and situations
in everyday life (i.e. in different contexts and scenarios). Aaron Cicourel cautions
that it can only be approximated in the social and behavioural sciences.55 Our use
of the term refers to the extent a normative system or regulatory model is anchored
and institutionalised within a specific legal ecosystem. In this sense, it relates to the
way that abidance, accordance, conformance and congruence with norms are
55“Validity in the non-experimental social sciences refers to the extent to which complex orga-
nizational activities represented by aggregated data from public and private sources and demo-
graphic and sample surveys can be linked to the collection, integration, and assessment of temporal
samples of observable (and when possible recordable) activities in daily life settings.” (Cicourel
2007, 736)
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effectively materialized, and the affordances that the regulatory system puts into
play and offers to the (human or artificial) agents, depending on how it has been
designed.
Recent research on the semantic relationships established by Hohfeld—the eight
“jural” relationships included into the two classical squares of opposites and cor-
relatives56—has shown that they can be remodelled using Petri nets.57 They can be
conceptualised from an interactional perspective. This leads to the idea of under-
standing the environment and the intentions of action (they can be negative as well)
to set the position and roles of players (as the authors say, a scheme of a seem-to-be
normal sale may hide a money-laundering scheme). Rights and duties are referred
to this semantically enriched patterns to start modelling, i.e. to embed more com-
plex specific situations into a formal representation language.
This is a good place to recall Ostrom’s design principles for sustainable man-
agement (CPR). Pitt and Diaconescu (2015) apply the idea of complex intermediate
autonomous sub-systems to develop the polycentricism of governance in
self-organised institutions.58 For example, when considering the possibility to set
communities that control their own energy infrastructure, Pitt and Diaconescu
(2015) note that excessive demand, which would otherwise lead to a power outage,
could be pre-empted with co-dependent institutions that use social capital to sta-
bilise their inter-operations. However, they also observe that rules alone are not
enough to implement it:
Co-dependence between socio-technical systems with shared resources implies that such
systems cannot run in isolation and follow completely independent rule sets. Indeed,
co-dependence requires coordination via dedicated institutions, the management of which is
critical to the sustainability and endurance of the resulting system of co-dependent systems.
In this case, the ecological validity of the system depends on how well the
institutional coordination of the co-dependence works. But there are many other
situations in which the focal point, i.e. the salient features of the outcome that
produces coordination59, will be related to sanctions, motivation, understanding or
habit of the members of the community (Gunderson and Cosens 2018). Behavioural
compliance and ecological validity are closely related (Casanovas and Oboler 2018).
56I Jural Opposites: Right/No Right; Privilege/Duty; Power/Disability; Immunity/Liability. II
Jural Correlatives: Right/Duty; Privilege/No-right; Power/Liability; Immunity/Disability.
57Sileno (2016, 161 and ff.), Sileno et al. (2014, 2015).
58Pitt and Diaconescu draw from Koestler’s notion of ‘holon’ (something that is simultaneously a
whole and a part): “a holonic system (or holarchy) is composed of “a holonic system (or holarchy)
is composed of interrelated subsystems, each of which are in turn composed of sub-subsystems
and so on, recursively, until reaching a lowest level of ‘elementary’ subsystems” (ibid.).
59We borrow the use of the term ‘salience’ and ‘focal point’ from McAdams and Nadler (2008).
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5.4.3 Semantic Web Regulatory Models (SWRM)
The meta-model depicted in Fig. 5.5 allows the assessment of ‘legality’ or ‘validity’
to embed the protections and values of the rule of law into modelling—SW lan-
guages, NorMAS, ASCS. To regulate processing and the outcomes of an infor-
mation system on a platform, e.g., several sources are usually used at different
dimensions and levels of organization. Take privacy, for instance. It begins to take
shape in the semantic field (Kirrane et al. 2018). There is a pool of norms coming
from different organisms and settings, including statutes, case law, policies, stan-
dards, best practices… Norms are not just there: they are first selected, interpreted,
constructed, combined and eventually implemented by means of a set of interme-
diary processes into regulatory models. Moreover, to ingrain legal rights into
computer models, a process of correlating and mapping design strategies, e.g.
against privacy and data protection patterns, must be put in place.
Working on the modelling strategy, Colesky and Ghanavati (2016) have pro-
posed to add a further level of abstraction that they define as tactic. Strategy
“specifies a distinct architectural goal in privacy by design to achieve a certain level
of privacy protection”, while tactics is “an approach to privacy by design which
contributes to the goal of an overarching privacy design strategy”. Therefore, in the
line of goal-oriented requirements engineering, they flesh out the “quality attribute”
for privacy strategies regarding data, i.e. (i) enforce, (ii) demonstrate, (iii) control,
(iv) inform, (v) minimise, (vi) abstract, (vii) separate, (viii) and hide. This is related
to semantic compliance.
There are at least three ways to embed Privacy by Design (PbD) into modelling
(design planning): (i) direct strategy (compliance by design, as it was classically
understood by Cavoukian), (ii) tactics (near compliance, as defined by Colesky and
Ghavanati (2016) and (iii) indirect strategy (compliance through design). The
notion of ‘near compliance’ reflects the difficulties of modelling legal rights:
“software designed with compliance in mind from the beginning, resulting in less
legal consultant work”. The notion of ‘compliance through design’ tries to
encompass not only legal requirements but the systemic interoperability that is
needed to model affordances and socio-legal conditions.
An indirect strategy is subjected to some more requirements, as it embraces a
pragmatic approach. It comprises the information flow, the organisation, the
functions and affordances of the technological device, the roles of designers, con-
trollers and end-users, including lawyers or consultants that participate all along the
process, in which ontology building is one of the components to enhancing and
implementing rights (Casanovas et al. 2014b). Thus, semantic interoperability is
one of the objectives to be reached, but legal compliance is deemed to have a
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deeper and larger scope than regulatory compliance. Compliance-by design
(CbD) and Compliance-through design (CtD) can be distinguished according to the
structure, components, and the nature of their effects.60
This is especially relevant for the implementation of the meta-rule of law, because
the way that rights (and especially political rights) are defined sets a normative and
institutional framework in which all citizens exercise and perform their freedom and
specific liberties. These liberties have a transnational and global scope and have been
conceptualised in a number of political philosophies. We have recently summarised
their ethical scope in four dimensions, elaborating on Walzer’s, Nussbaum’s, and
Floridi’s formulations: (i) complex equality (justice could be adjudicated across
distinct distributive spheres, in order to respect the differences and harmonise social
goods, wealth, political office, commodities, education, security, health…), (ii) con-
textual integrity (adequate selection and enactment of rights to norms of specific
contexts) (iii) ontology (not to be confused with computer ontologies, it refers to
fundamental ethical concepts), (iv) and algorithmic governance. By doing this, we
intended to address the bases for setting the relationships between linked democracy
and the meta-rule of law (Casanovas et al. 2017b).
We will stress now that to foster socio-legal ecosystems related to linked
democracy we should rely both on infrastructures, programs and artificial tools, and
on the legal instruments and models to develop better and smart stakeholder gov-
ernance. Responsive law is still an ideal. Linked democracy, as it has been pre-
sented in previous chapters, is a way to organise knowledge, institutions, and
people to foster interoperability, remove silos, and create a secure framework for
data sharing. We have already shown (ibid. 2017, Poblet et al. 2017) that it might
operate to frame the connection between expert, collective, and personal knowledge
in public health, allowing and empowering people to manage their own medical
Electronic Health Records (EHRs) (also referred to as Medical Health Records
[MHR]) in a safe and efficient way. However, as Robert Mathews has reminded in
his introductory article for a Health & Technology special issue on privacy and
medicine, “privacy desperately needs a common language, and a universal frame of
reference, but it lacks for one” (Mathews 2017, 268). Well: the same is needed for
the rule of law. We desperately need a lingua franca, a reliable meta-rule of law
with a global scope, but we lack for one.
The distinction between normative Semantic Web Regulatory Models (nSWRM)
and institutional Semantic Web Regulatory Models (iSWRM) (Casanovas 2015a, b)
is relevant here. The former ones are based on semantic languages, encompassing
almost exclusively inferential tools and RDF, RuleML SPARQL, OWL (among
many other languages). In this sense, implementation is not a modelling priority.
Digital Rights Management (DRM), Rights Expression Languages (REL), machine
processable languages for the expression of licenses, such Open Digital Rights
languages (ODRL) constitute privileged examples: the ODRL Core Model was
60See the recent surveys on business process regulatory compliance (Hashmi et al. 2018a), and on
legal compliance (Casanovas et al. 2017c), Hashmi et al. (2018b) .
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designed “to be independent from implementation” (2009).61 But this is not the
same for iSWRM. Conversely, they need to be much more attentive to the com-
munity of users and their organisations. iSWRM allow people to communicate,
interact, share and set self-regulated collectives for specific purposes. They help to
rebuild, maintain and change social bonds. Regulations applicable to platforms
addressing e-learning, e-health, disaster management, crisis-mapping, or political
participation are some examples. Terminologies (multi-lingual term banks),
cotrolled vocabularies and content-related thesauri help implementing this insti-
tutional dimension of regulatory models (Rodríguez-Doncel et al. 2016).
However, this is not an absolute distinction, for institutions and norms are built
alike and they often constitute distinctive sides of the same socio-legal ecosystem.
Would it be possible to speak of personal ecosystems? For example, when I make a
personal use of a Creative Commons license, should I be considered a member,
element or component of the CC ecosystem? According to the organisation, there is
an affirmative answer for this question:
Initially we define the ecosystem as the network in which CC operates. Creative Commons
often must respond to events over which we have little control or influence. These events
arise from the fields of technology, society and non-users of CC licenses, and economic,
regulatory and environmental influences. CC exerts some control and influence over
licensing of digital content; users of CC licenses, our Affiliates and the digital commons,
and the technical infrastructure we use. CC has a high degree of control over our internal
processes, how we communicate and promote our work and our suppliers.62
This means equating ecosystems with the performance and scope of social
networks. Our use of the term in a broad sense can also encompass this version, as
this is referred to as the implementation of codes, rules and principles empowering
the user and having an impact on her behaviour. It empowers the user to choose and
select the framework she wants for labelling and managing her personal content on
the web. But the regulation itself is not institutionally-driven. It does not create and
manage the public identity for the user. The user does.
An institutionally-driven model instead focuses on the identity of the social
group that creates or uses the tool as a sufficient condition to constitute the insti-
tution. It intends to mainly set up a structured environment for the community or
social group that comes up as a result of its inception.
5.5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, (i) we have presented innovative forms of governance, (ii) advanced
a set of minimal conditions for the rule of law on the web; (iii) introduced some of
the requirements for legal interoperability, (iv) and proposed a conceptual scheme
to frame socio-legal ecosystems.
61https://www.w3.org/2012/09/odrl/archive/odrl.net/2.0/DS-ODRL-Model-20090923.html.
62https://wiki.creativecommons.org/wiki/Research.
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The thread that runs through the entire chapter is that the rule of law can work as
the general and global framework that gets together some regulatory instruments
that have commonly been kept disjointed—national, international and responsive
law; policy, and better, smart and data governance; semantic web languages, and
algorithmic governance.
The rule of law constitutes an ideal yet to be developed for the web of linked
data. Let’s be reminded of the W3C five-star principles for the web: (i) make your
stuff available on the web under an open license; (ii) make it available as structured
data; (iii) make it available in a non-proprietary open format; (iv) use URIs to
denote things; (v) link your data to other data to provide context.63
The notion of linked democracy embraces them, but it should provide the
adequate protections and incentives to foster them safely and appropriately.
Berners-Lee blogged in 2009: “It’s not the Social Network sites that are interesting
—it is the Social Network itself. The Social Graph. The way I am connected, not
the way my Web pages are connected.” He called it the Giant Global Graph.
This is implicitly echoing the same problems encountered by political philoso-
phers in the 16th and 17th centuries. It reminds another, less gentle, artificial giant.
If we don’t want to go back to the contractual notions of covenant, pact and
delegation of power, we should be able to come up with some notions to empower
and protect people and enhance their rights. The notions of meta-rule of law and
sustainable socio-legal ecosystems point at the way we all should be connected. The
link between the individuals and the collective.
The quadrant we have drawn (hard law, policy, ethics and soft law) can be used
as a sort of regulatory quadrant for the sources of the rule of law. But this is an
idealization: regulations at the implementation level are hybrid; they encompass
norms, principles and values from all sections. Likewise, institutions connecting
linked data with people, platforms and ecosystems can be built in many different
ways. They set up a hybrid public space, between the market, the state and civil
society—a relational notion of law, in which rights and duties can be assigned with
different degree of compliance and enforcement.
The four notions of validity introduced in this chapter are related to legal gov-
ernance. They can be used for different purposes. Positive validity is often assumed
by semantic web developers as an ontological commitment. Formal validity refers
to the internal consistency of models. Once established as a reasonable threshold
(this would be a golden rule), composite validity can be used for evaluating the
legal compliance of platforms focusing on their informational flows. This can be
done independently of their aims and objectives—political crowdsourcing, crisis
and disaster management, or security and open source intelligence. Ecological
validity refers to the creation of legal linked data ecosystems by institutional means,
i.e. through shared systemic (not just semantic) interoperability building.
Compliance through Design (CtD) is one of the conceptual ways we can follow to
set a reliable institutional framework.
63https://5stardata.info/en/.
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CtD can be operationalised at different social, legal, and jurisdictional levels. For
example, to enhance bottom-up participation (Karamagioli et al. 2017; Poblet
2018), or to link the rule of law to constitutional rights on specific national grounds.
At that level, the ideas of open access and open constitutional courts (Keyzer 2010)
are close to open rights and linked open data ecosystems. They can be readjusted to
the dimensions of the next stages of the web illustrated in Figs. 5.2 and 5.3.
From a theoretical point of view, our conceptualization has two important
political consequences. The first one is that within the web of data, ‘legality’ cannot
be taken as the result of the activity of official representatives, the judiciary, gov-
ernment members and state agencies in a national state, alone. In a linked
democracy model, legality comes from the grassroots as well, and it can be the
result of the interaction of agents (all kind of agents: human and artificial, individual
and collective) that respect the rule of law. It is a collaborative endeavour.
Themeta-model has a second consequence. If these distinctions make any sense, it
is not necessary to keep the sharp Weberian divide between legitimacy and legality;
i.e. the strict separation between the ground of the political system (e.g. based on a
majority rule) and its development through a legal autonomous system. Democracy
and legality are intertwined. In this way, democracy is not deemed to be just a political
form that shapes constitutions and laws, but a process to organise innovative and
shared knowledge that empowers individuals, i.e. people, at a global level on theweb.
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Conclusion
Communication technologies have permeated almost every aspect of modern life,
shaping a densely connected society where information flows follow complex
patterns on a worldwide scale. The World Wide Web created a global space of
information, with its network of documents linked through hyperlinks. And a new
network is woven, the Web of Data, with linked machine-readable data resources
that enable new forms of computation and more solidly grounded knowledge.
Parliamentary debates, legislation, information on political parties or political
programs are starting to be offered as linked data in rhizomatic structures, creating
new opportunities for electronic government, electronic democracy or political
deliberation. Nobody could foresee that individuals, corporations and government
institutions alike would participate in a joint space of information establishing
mutually beneficial relationships.
Chapter 1 has presented in detail the technologies enabling the Web of Data and
has sketched practices of much interest for experts in political studies. The concept
of democracy, which has remained relatively unaffected by this wave of changes,
needs a revision and the idea of a Linked Democracy is an exploratory contribution.
Chapter 2 has reviewed deliberative and epistemic models of democracy and
traced how some of their features are present in the current ecosystem of civic
technologies. Building on both these models and empirical examples of participa-
tory ecosystems we propose the concept of Linked Democracy as a basis to rep-
resent distributed, technology-supported, collective decision-making processes
where data, information, and knowledge are connected and shared by citizens.
Chapters 3 and 4 expand this concept by sketching a multilayered model and
preliminary suggesting some core properties that we connect with Ostrom’s design
principles for the effective management of common-pool resources.
Chapter 5, finally, outlines the regulatory frameworks for linked democracy
ecosystems that we denominate ‘socio-legal ecosystems’ and, on top of them, the
concept of ‘meta-rule of law’. The chapter distinguishes between hard law, gov-
ernance, soft law and ethics. They are connected and constitute what we have called
the “legal quadrant” for the rule of law.
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The Web of Data is any data available on the web in any form, such as raw data
files, data exposed via API, or IoT streams. Linked data is a subset of the former set,
i.e. it is an approach to publishing and sharing data on the web, following the five
rules proposed by Tim Berners-Lee. We have contended that the protections and
principles of the substantive rule of law can be represented into the languages of the
Web of Data and embedded into compliance systems to generate trust and to define
the global space as a public space.
The notion of linked democracy operates within this space in which corpora-
tions, companies, rulers, providers, consumers and citizens are using all kinds of
linked-data repositories that cannot be treated as separate silos, as they are (or will
be) linked through graph-driven mechanisms. The notion of relational law points at
the allocation of behavioural expectations (assignment of rights and obligations) in
terms of a shared technological framework in which computer systems and
human-machine interfaces create an aggregated value fostering the connection
between Web 2.0 and Web 3.0. Our goal has been to provide a conceptual roadmap
that helps us to ground the theoretical foundations for a meso-level, institutional
theory of democracy.
The Web of Data has transformed the way we access, produce, share, and reuse
information, data, and knowledge. Most likely, further developments will come in
successive waves of innovations in distributed technologies, machine learning,
image and voice recognition, etc. These technologies will shape in new ways how
we behave, interact, and make decisions as individuals, groups, and crowds. But as
citizens of free societies we should retain our say in these processes. In the digital
era, this can be done by augmenting, enriching, and diversifying the ways to
participate and align our decisions. This book has started to explore this path.
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